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This thesis looks at the Carbon Reduction Commitment (the CRC) Energy Efficiency Scheme. This, for 
the purposes of this PhD, is a green tax on energy consumption that targets large businesses not 
already covered by the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme or Climate Change Agreements. 
The CRC is has had a rocky life. It has been reformed on numerous occasions and will now come to 
an end in 2019. Importantly, the CRC has received relatively little academic attention, especially in 
legal scholarship. As such, this thesis aims to plus a gap in academic scholarship by providing a case 
study of the scheme in an original, empirical analysis of the scheme. Drawing upon 31 semi-
structured interviews with regulatees, solicitors and the Environment Agency; and a quantitative 
analysis of emissions under the scheme, this PhD will begin to tell the story of how the CRC has been 
perceived by those who pay it.  
 
Whilst the CRC is coming to an end in 2019, this thesis remains important for two reasons: first, it is 
important to gain a deeper understanding of the failings of the CRC from the eyes of regulatees, and; 
second, this study will provide broader lessons to take away from the CRC and which can be carried 
forward to its replacement (the Climate Change Levy). 
 
This is an account of how different regulatory aspects send deeper messages to regulatees. In 
particular, this thesis considers: stability; competence of the regulator; nudging; positive incentives; 
and the efficiency of the CRC. As such, this thesis draws on a wide range of literature in order to 
analyse the above themes in light of the original data from the empirical study. This thesis concludes 
that how regulation is packaged and presented to regulatees is critical and can affect how they 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
"[C]limate change is no longer some far-off problem. It is happening here. It is happening now."1 
 
Climate change is a significant environmental threat. Human influence on the Earth’s changing climate 
has been scientifically confirmed and is growing.2 It is today considered to be “extremely likely” that 
climate change has been caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gases.3 These anthropogenic sources 
of greenhouse gas emissions are at their highest in history,4 and have risen from around 280 parts per 
million (ppm) at the start of the industrial revolution to around 400ppm.5 In 2017, the 12th annual 
Global Carbon Budget predicted a 2% rise in global carbon emissions, which signifies the first increase 
in carbon emissions in three years.6 These emissions are having “widespread impacts” on natural 
systems,7 and the best-known consequence of climate change is temperature increase, with global 
surface temperature projected to rise 1.5°C in the next century.8 It is of little surprise, therefore, that 
the law has attempted to mitigate the anthropogenic causes of climate change.  
 
The policy challenges associated with tackling climate change have been described as “super wicked”,9 
due to the extraordinary difficulties associated with crafting climate change legislation.10 It has also 
been described as the “defining issue of our age”.11 The challenges surrounding climate change are 
linked to its global impact (i.e. we are concerned with overall, global levels of GHGs) and its long term, 
“potentially irreversible” consequences.12 As such, its international nature requires largely 
international action. Difficulties arise because the benefits of climate change mitigation are not 
accrued by the individual countries taking action, but rather by all countries;13 meaning that most 
                                                          
1 Barack Obama, August 31st 2015, Anchorage US. Available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/09/01/remarks-president-glacier-conference-anchorage-ak accessed 24/08/2017. 
2 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report’ (2015), Foreword. 
3 Ibid, Summary for Policymakers. 
4 Ibid, 2. 
5 Ibid,4; a recent reading of 406ppm was recorded in January 2017 by Scripps Institute of Oceanography, ‘The 
Keeling Curve’ available at https://scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/keelingcurve accessed 04/10/2017 
6 Global Carbon Project, ‘Carbon budget and trends 2017’ (13 November 2017). Available at 
www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudgetpublished last accessed 14/11/2017. 
7 IPCC (n 2), 4. 
8 Ibid, Summary for policymakers. 
9 Richard Lazarus, ‘Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future’ 
(2010) 40 Environmental Law Reporter 10749. 
10 Ibid, 10750. 
11 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Opening Remarks at 2014 Climate Summit (23rd September 2014) 
12 Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (OUP 2017), p2. 
13 Ibid, 3. 
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countries will only engage in climate change mitigation, if other countries do the same.14 On the 
international level, it has been difficult to reach a global agreement on climate change. Bodansky et al 
suggest this is for the following reasons: 1) climate change impacts most areas of domestic policy (for 
example energy, agriculture, transport etc.) and so has high economic stakes; 2) states are being 
required to act now to tackle future, long term impacts of climate change; and, 3) each state has a 
different list of priorities, capacities and perspectives on climate change.15 All of these factors result 
in climate change being an expensive, long-term problem that cannot be resolved by one country 
alone.  
 
The aims of this thesis are twofold. First, to shed light on a relatively unexplored regulatory regime 
that forms part of the climate change regulatory toolbox in the UK (the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment (CRC)). Second, to consider how and why regulatees have responded to the CRC. 
Following a public consultation on the scheme in November 2015, the government abolished the CRC 
and it will end in 2019. The fact that the CRC now has a limited lifespan does not detract from the 
original contributions that this PhD thesis has to offer. These contributions lie in three domains.  
First, the study of the CRC is itself original.16 The CRC is a relatively untouched subject in legal 
scholarship. This thesis will therefore provide an exposé of a major environmental tax regime in the 
UK. Second, this thesis draws upon the data collected from an original, empirical study (31 interviews 
with regulatees, the regulator and CRC advisors). Third, and finally, this thesis draws upon a number 
of theoretical frameworks to triangulate an analysis of the CRC. This combination of approaches is a 
novel blend of theories that allows for an original insight into the CRC. In particular, this thesis draws 
upon both regulatory and tax literature to provide a number of policy recommendations for future 
regulation. 
 
By engaging with regulatory and tax literature as well as the original, empirical data, this thesis will 
also put forward several policy points. In particular, this thesis will tell the story of how the various 
regulatory aspects of the CRC communicate different messages to regulatees.  First, in line with 
economic literature this thesis argues that tax instability has negative impacts on engagement with 
                                                          
14 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change’ (2015), p5. 
15 Bodansky et al (n 12), 3-4 
16 A study on the effectiveness of the CRC was commissioned by the government prior to its abolition in 2016: 
DECC, CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Evaluation: Final Synthesis Report (July 2015). This report focuses on 
Phase One of the scheme. The current study builds on this work in three ways: first, this thesis considers the 
second phase of the CRC; second, my study considers the views of participants, solicitors and the regulator 
(while the government study only looks at regulatees; and finally, the government study does not engage with 
any legal scholarship (or scholarship in any field). Also of note is the fact that this report is relatively difficult to 
find unless you know it exists.  
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regulation by regulatees. Beyond this, this thesis goes further to argue that an unstable piece of 
regulation can lead to perceptions of unstable policy. Second, where there is a lack of trust in the 
competence of the regulator, this also has impacts on engagement and compliance – echoing 
existing trust literature that demands a level of trust between the regulator and regulated. Third, 
nudging literature primarily focuses on the role of nudging with individuals. This thesis argues that 
there is a role for nudging to play in businesses, and in particular, how the use of social norms and 
reputation can provide a driver for behavioural change in the corporate setting. Fourth, this thesis 
argues that rewards can be better than sanctions (in line with current regulatory literature). 
Taxpayers would like to be able to make some link between what they are paying in taxes and 
environmental projects. While this thesis does not argue for tax hypothecation, some rebranding of 
tax revenues and/ or environmental projects would help CRC participants make the link between 
green taxation and an environmental benefit. Finally, the narratives from the above all draw from 
the point that the CRC is perceived as ‘just a tax’. My work suggests that a complex scheme is a 
difficult scheme to understand and engage with, confirming regulatory and tax literature on this 
point. Furthermore, as the CRC is perceived as ‘just a tax’, it is arguably too complex for purpose. 
This thesis argues that a higher level of complexity could be tolerated for something that is more 
than ‘just a tax’.  
 
The take away point for this study on the CRC is that regulatees are perceptive. How a regulatory 
scheme is packaged to them has the ability to alter how they engage with a scheme. Despite the CRC 
ending in 2019, lessons can be carried forward to future regulatory schemes and, in particular, 
future environmental taxes. The key contribution of this thesis is therefore to provide some lessons 
to take forward to the Climate Change Levy (CCL),17 which will replace the CRC. How this future tax is 
packaged to taxpayers/ regulatees could have an impact on how the tax is engaged with and 
whether a high level of emissions reduction could be achieved. 
 
This chapter will provide the contextual backdrop to this thesis. First, the existing regulatory responses 
to climate change will be briefly outlined, at both an international and domestic level. Here, this 
chapter will consider the overarching agreements which drive climate change mitigation; as well as 
explore the underlying politics behind the UK’s response. Second, a short introduction to the CRC will 
be provided. This chapter will then move on to the study which underpins this thesis, and will outline 
                                                          
17 By way of introduction, the CCL is a UK tax that targets business consumption of energy. The tax is paid by 
energy suppliers and is then added onto the energy consumer’s energy bill. See Section 1.1.4 of this Chapter 
for more information.  
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the research methods, questions and theoretical frameworks which form the basis of this doctorate. 
Finally, by way of guidance, the structure for the remainder of this thesis will be summarised. 
1.1  Regulatory Responses to Climate Change 
 
1.1.1 What is regulation?  
While the pool of regulatory literature is vast, regulation has been defined as a sustained and focused 
control over certain activities by a public agency.18 Baldwin et al identify a number ways in which the 
word regulation has been used, including: as a specific set of commands; as deliberate state influence; 
and, as all forms of social or economic influence.19 These ideas move from the more restrictive (i.e. a 
specific set of commands held within a piece of legislation) to broader concepts of influence that go 
beyond legislation and include the use of economic measures (such as taxes and subsidies). At its 
widest, all forms of social and economic influence could be considered as regulation, meaning that 
regulation need not be created by the State.20 Gunningham distinguishes environmental regulation 
from environmental ‘law’ by saying that: 
 
“Regulation is a rather broader category and includes much more flexible, 
imaginative and innovative forms of social control which seek to harness not just 
governments but also markets (as with economic instruments), business and 
third parties”21 
 
With this broader concept of regulation in mind, there are therefore a number of regulatory tools at 
the disposal of the government. These tools are available to provide either a ‘red light’ to certain 
activities (i.e the regulation seeks to restrict behaviour) or to provide a ‘green light’ whereby activities 
are facilitated.22 
                                                          
18 P Selznick, ‘Focusing Organisational Research on Regulation’ in R Noll (ed), Regulatory Policy and the Social 
Sciences (Berkeley 1985), p363. 
19 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding regulation: Theory, strategy and practice 
(2nd Edition) (OUP 2012), p2. 
20 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation (Clarendon Press 1998). 
21 Neil Gunningham, Environment Law, ‘Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (2009) 21(2) JEL 
179, 181. 
22 A Ogus, Regulation, Legal Form and Economic Theory (OUP 1994) 
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There are also a number of different, possible regulatory approaches.23 Traditionally, and a common 
starting point when looking at regulation,24 command-and-control regulation was the most common 
form of regulation and is “where legal authority and the command of law is used to pursue policy 
objectives”.25 For emissions control, the most common example of command and control regulation 
is the setting of standards to achieve environmental aims.26 This approach has the advantage of 
bringing political legitimacy to the regulated activities;27 as well as sending strong moral signals to both 
the regulatees and the wider population – namely, that to engage in polluting activity is a concession 
and not a right.28 However, from the 1980s command-and-control regulation was widely criticised for 
“being inflexible and excessively costly to business”.29 This can lead to problems of overregulation, 
intrusion into business,30 and the impediment of competition.31 While command and control 
regulation will arguably remain relevant to any modern regulatory framework,32 arguments were 
made for the “introduction of ‘less-restrictive’ and ‘incentive-based’ controls.33  
 
Despite criticisms of command-and-control regulation, businesses have still resisted the introduction 
of taxes in the place of direct regulation.34 There has, however, been a shift towards a greater use of 
economic instruments since the late 1990s.35 Economic measures work by altering the negative and 
positive incentives associated with a particular environmental behaviour in order to encourage 
business to change their behaviour.36 
                                                          
23 For a succinct review of the literature, see: Christopher Taylor et al., ‘Selecting Policy Instruments for Better 
Environmental Regulation: a Critique and Future Research Agenda’ (2012) 22 Environmental Policy and 
Governance 268. 
24 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials (CUP 2007), 
p80. 
25 Baldwin et al (n 19), 106. 
26 There are different standards approaches that can be taken; namely performance-based standards, 
technical standards and ambient-based controls. For definitions of further approaches in command and 
control regulation see: G Lubbe-Wolff, ‘Efficient Environmental Legislation – On Different Philosophies of 
Pollution Control in Europe’ (2001) 1 JEL 79. 
27 E Elliott, ‘Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution Control Program that Works!’ (1994) 92 Michigan Law 
Review 1840, 1845. 
28 Gunningham and Grabosky argue that other instruments may send out moral signals that would indicate 
that polluting is a right: Gunningham and Grabosky (n.19), 42. 
29 Gunningham (n 21), 183. 
30 See for example, C Veljanovski, ‘Economic Approaches to Regulation’ in R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, The 
Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010) 28. 
31 Baldwin (n 19), 108; C Veljanovski (n 29), 33. 
32 J Harman, ‘Environmental Regulation in the 21st Century’ (2004) 6 ELR 141, 143. 
33 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Introduction: Regulation – The Field and the Developing 
Agenda in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010), p9. 
34 Gunningham (n 21), 184. 
35 Ibid, 185; Baldwin (n 19), 7. 
36 Roger Perman et al., Natural Resource and Environmental Economics (Addison Wesley 2011). 
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These economic measures are considered to be more efficient and cost-effective compared to 
traditional command-and-control regulation,37 and include charges, taxes, subsidies, and trading. The 
principal function of these charges and taxes is to create behavioural change for a certain activity.38 
However, as environmental taxes also raise revenue, it is difficult to identify genuine economic 
instruments for behavioural change amongst more generic, revenue raising taxes.39 The CRC, as will 
be discussed below, is a de facto tax, but one which has clearly been marketed as part of the climate 
change toolbox for the government. The CRC is therefore not an example of classic command-and-
control regulation, but rather an economic instrument, which (according to the government) aims to 
reduce carbon emissions. Government attitudes towards regulation are reflected in the shift away 
from command-and-control regulation. In the UK, this is reflected in the “better regulation executive” 
which seeks to ensure that regulation is “smarter, better targeted and less costly”.40 
 
Beyond economic instruments, alternative approaches to regulation include self-regulation and 
voluntarism. The government describes self-regulation as “an approach initiated and undertaken by 
those whose behaviour is to be regulated”.41 In the environmental sphere, these measures encourage 
business to introduce their own mechanisms for environmental protection and so provide a 
“significant degree of flexibility to businesses”.42 It can also “engender a degree of ownership of 
regulation within the industry”.43 However, business interest in these mechanisms could be explained 
by a desire to escape “the imposition of binding standards altogether”.44 Other criticisms include a 
scepticism that self-regulation can achieve environmental goals without being underpinned by 
command-and-control regulation.45 More generally, Gunningham notes that the attitudes of business 
towards environmental protection has traditionally been a reactive, rather than proactive, one.46 
However, these attitudes are now changing with the knowledge that going beyond compliance with 
environmental regulation is good for business as well as the environment.47 Compliance in regulatory 
                                                          
37 Gunningham (n 21), 185. 
38 Morgan and Yeung (n 24), 86. 
39 Ibid. 
40 https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/better-regulation-executive last accessed 02/11/2017. 
41 UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘Promoting Alternatives to Regulation’ (2012); also the 
wording of the definition adopted in: Christopher Hodges, Law and Corporate Behaviour: Integrating Theories 
of Regulation, Enforcement, Compliance and Ethics (Bloomsbury 2015), p466. 
42 Taylor (n 23), 281. 
43 National Audit Office, ‘Using Alternatives to Regulation to Achieve Policy Objectives’ (June 2014) page 16 
44 Gunningham (n 21), 187. 
45 Christopher Taylor et al., ‘Better by Design: Business Preferences for Environmental Regulatory Reform’ 
(2015) Science of the Total Environment 287. 
46 Gunningham (n 21), 193. 
47 Ibid, 194. 
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literature can be seen in a number of landmark concepts: responsive regulation;48 smart regulation;49 
and really responsive regulation.50 These concepts will be explored further in Chapter Five, but 
primarily consider how the regulator approaches issues of non-compliance. 
 
This thesis does not seek to provide an answer to this regulatory debate of ‘what works best’. Rather, 
this thesis will apply regulatory and tax theory to the CRC in order to identify shortcomings and 
strengths, with a view to problematising key regulatory features that will improve engagement with 
the scheme (and most importantly future schemes that will replace the CRC from 2019) and reduce 
carbon emissions. The following sections will consider the international and UK regulatory responses 
to climate change. 
 
1.1.2 International level approaches  
 
Climate change 'law' goes beyond the individual regulatory response to tackle the environmental 
problem, and has an "integral international dimension".51 The first foundation block in international 
climate change law is the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was 
adopted in 1992 and ratified in 1994.52 The Convention, now ratified by 176 states, seeks to stabilise 
greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere to a level that would “prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”.53 The Convention places the onus of this stabilisation on 
developed countries by asking them to “take the lead” in the fight against climate change.54 However, 
the convention does not require action. Instead, it highlights climate change as a problem and 
encourages change. This is demonstrated in its only provision that refers to limiting GHGs, Article 4.2, 
which is phrased as a non-binding aim, rather than a legally binding target.55 The Framework also 
establishes a Conference of the Parties (COP), which meets annually and is the highest decision-
making body of the UNFCCC.56 Of particular note are COP meetings COP3, which adopted the Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997, and COP21, which adopted the Paris Agreement in 2015. The Kyoto Protocol and 
Paris Agreement will be considered in turn. 
                                                          
48 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (OUP 1992). 
49 Gunningham and Grabosky (n 21). 
50 Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ (2008) 71(1) MLR 59. 
51 Jacqueline Peel, ‘Climate Change Law: The Emergence of a New Legal Discipline’ (2008) 32 MULR 922, 978. 
52 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, ratified 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 
107. 
53 Ibid, Article 2. 
54 Ibid, Article 3. 
55 Ibid, Article 4.2. 
56 Ibid, Article 7. 
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The requirement to act is found within the Kyoto Protocol, which creates an obligation for states to 
ensure that their GHGs do not exceed “assigned amounts” with the objective of reducing emissions 
by 5% between 2008 and 2012.57 The assigned amount varies in line with each country’s ability to 
reduce emissions. In order to enable this reduction, the Protocol allows for three flexibility 
mechanisms; whilst their efficacy has been called into question, it is worth outlining each in turn.58 
First, the Protocol allows International Emissions Trading which permits countries that are below their 
assigned amount to trade with other countries. The Protocol, therefore, only aims to reduce emissions 
by 5% by 2012, and no further (though it was envisaged that there would have been further phases).59 
Second, the Protocol provides for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows developed 
countries to offset some of their emissions by implementing emissions reducing programs in 
developing countries.60 Finally, Article 6 allows for a Joint Implementation mechanism, which allows 
Annex I countries to transfer emission reductions units to other Annex I countries for emissions 
reducing projects which are aimed at reducing anthropogenic GHGs.  
 
In addition to the three flexibility mechanisms under the Protocol, Article 4 allows for the cooperation 
of parties to fulfil their commitments jointly under the Protocol. For example, the EU has adopted a 
cooperative approach under the protocol with its Burden Sharing Agreement, which was an 
agreement by fifteen EU Member States at the time of the Protocol to aggregate emissions and 
distribute the burden according to each member’s ability to reduce GHGs.61 Specific measures 
adopted by the EU will be discussed below.  
 
The Paris Agreement is the most recent addition to the international law portfolio, and once again 
builds upon the work of the UNFCCC. The Agreement, which has been ratified by 175 parties to the 
Convention,62 aims to keep global temperature increase below 2 degrees Celsius.63 In order to achieve 
this, the Agreement requires parties to put their best efforts to achieving “nationally determined 
contributions” (NDCs) as well as putting in place the infrastructure and financial means for developing 
countries. According to Article 4 of the Agreement, parties are responsible for determining and 
                                                          
57 United Nations, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(1997;2005), Article 3. 
58 Gerd Winter, ‘The Climate is no Commodity: Taking Stock of the Emissions Trading System’ (2010) 22(1) JEL 
1. 
59 Elizabeth Fisher, Environmental Law (OUP 2013) p643. 
60 Kyoto Protocol (n 57), Article 12. 
61 Council Decision 2006/944/EC of 14 December 2006 determining the respective emissions levels allocated to 
the Community and each of its Member States under the Kyoto Protocol [2006] OJ L358/87. 
62 Correct as of 5th March 2018 with the most recent state to ratify being Trinidad and Tobago on the 22nd 
February 2018. http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php accessed 05/03/2018. 
63 United Nations, Paris Agreement (2015), Article 2. 
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communicating their NDCs; which countries will then work towards by implementing national climate 
change mitigating measures. 
 
1.1.3 European Union level approaches  
 
Taking a geographical step down from the international scene, the European Union (EU) has been a 
key player in the international climate change scene. In general, “there is broad agreement within the 
European Union that law and regulation have an important part to play in mounting a response to this 
era-defining challenge [climate change]”.64 Although, Čavoški argues that this positive and strong 
stance on climate change is not necessarily as visible in a post-austerity Europe.65 Overall, the EU has 
ratified the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement.66 As discussed above, the 15 states 
who were members of the EU at the time of the Kyoto Protocol aggregated their emissions and worked 
together towards their Kyoto targets. In addition, the EU also introduced its EU ‘Climate and Energy 
Package’ in 2008. This package contains measures such as the Renewable Energy Directive,67 and the 
Carbon Capture and Storage Directive.68 However, the best-known measure of the EU in its climate 
change toolbox is undoubtedly the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). 
 
Economic approaches to environmental problems are not novel.69 Many groups have come to realise 
that the power of economics and the market can be harnessed in order to tackle environmental 
problems.70 That is to say that the optimal financial path can be made to coincide with the best (or 
                                                          
64 Suzanne Kingston, Veerle Heyvaert and Aleksandra Čavoški, European Environmental Law (CUP 2017), p258. 
65 Aleksandra Čavoški, ‘A Post-Austerity European Commission: No Role for Environmental Policy’ (2015) 24(3) 
Environmental Politics 501, 501. 
66 Council Decision 94/69/EC of 15 December 1993 concerning the conclusion of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change [1993] OJ L 33/11; Council Decision 2002/358/EC of 25 April 2002 
concerning the approval, on behalf of the European Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change [2002] OJ L 130/1; Council Decision 2016/1841 of 5 October 2016 
on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Paris Agreement  adopted under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [2016] OJ L 282/1. 
67 European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/28/EC of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources [2009] OJ L 140/16. 
68 This Directive provides the framework for the safe storage of carbon dioxide. European Parliament and 
Council Directive 2009/31/EC of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide [2009] OJ L 140/114 
69 See for example, T Tietenberg, ‘Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation’ (1990) 6(1) Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy 17, 17. For a recent working paper on the intersection of environmental policy and 
taxation at an EU level, see: Ulrike Spangenberg, Ann Mumford, and Stephen Daly, ‘Navigating Taxation 
towards Sustainability: Contradictions between social, gender, environmental, and economic ambitions, 
obligations and governance capacities in European tax law’ (February 2018) available at http://umu.diva-




better) environmental path.71 As set out above, this is an alternative to more traditional command 
and control regulation. One example of an economic approach is the emissions trading scheme and 
includes regimes such as California’s AB-32 Cap-and-Trade System,72 Quebec’s Cap and Trade System 
for Greenhouse Gas Emissions,73 and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).74 One 
way of defining an emissions trading scheme is that “it is a scheme under which the government 
imposes a total limit on the total quantity of emissions, issues allowances adding up to that total and 
then allows emitters to buy and sell surplus allowances among each other”.75 One of the general 
principles underlying emissions trading, put forward by Coase,76 is that pollution is part of production, 
and that pollution can therefore be turned into clear, transferable legal rights. By defining pollution 
as such, it is possible then to allow the open market, rather than the Government and command-and-
control regulation, to aid in its regulation.77 Following on from Coase’s work, the concept of emissions 
trading has been widely discussed in environmental literature.78 
 
Peeters and Weishaar argue that “significant academic literature” supports the use of emissions 
trading schemes as a regulatory instrument;79 while Freeman and Kolstad state that the use of such 
schemes will continue, “unless one can show that [they] are somehow deficient”.80 In a review of 
emissions trading schemes from the past thirty years, Schmalensee and Stavins highlight a number of 
advantages that emissions trading schemes have over more traditional command and control 
regulation.81 These include being “environmentally effective and economically cost effective”;82 
providing incentives for emissions reductions at lower costs;83 as well as providing a source of revenue 
                                                          
71 Ibid.  
72 More information available from: https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm accessed 
26/03/2018. 
73 For more information, see http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/Systeme-plafonnement-
droits-GES-en.htm last accessed 16/03/2018. 
74 European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 Establishing a Scheme for 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community [2003] OJ L275/32 (as amended  by 
Directive 2009/29/EC). 
75 Sanja Bogojevic, Emissions Trading Schemes: Markets, States and Law (Bloomsbury 2013), p4. 
76 Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1. 
77 Ibid.  
78 See Bogojevic (n 75), Chapter 1 for an extensive list of references. 
79 Marjan Peeters and Stefan Weishaar, ‘Exploring Uncertainties in the EU ETS: ‘Learning by Doing’ Continues 
Beyond 2012’ (2009) 1 Carbon and Climate Law Review 88, 89. 
80 Jody Freeman and Charles Kolstad, ‘Prescriptive Environmental Regulations versus Market-Based Incentives’ 
in Jody Freeman and Charles Kolstad (eds), Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation: Lessons After 
Twenty Years of Experience (OUP 2006), pp4-5. 
81 Richard Schmalensee and Robert Stavins, ‘Lessons Learned from Three Decades of Experience with Cap-and-
Trade’ (2015) Harvard HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series. 
82 Ibid, page 4 
83 Ibid, page 5 
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for governments.84 The EU implemented its own Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) which 
commenced in 2005,85 and the scheme has been labelled as a “cornerstone” of Europe’s 
environmental protection policy.86 It is the largest multi-country emissions trading scheme in the 
world.87 Its aim is to facilitate the achievement of international climate change targets (discussed 
above), and does this through a ‘cap and trade’ system, which entails setting a cap on the aggregate 
emissions of the participating states, and allows the individual states to trade their emissions to stay 
within the cap. The scheme applies to all Member States of the EU, plus Iceland, Lichtenstein and 
Norway. In its first phase, the EU ETS was criticised for granting so many free allowances and the lack 
of a price floor.88 Directive 2009/29/EC substantially reformed the EU ETS, and the current scheme has 
been described as being “meatier” and more “detailed” than its predecessor.89 
 
Baldwin has criticised the use of emissions trading by arguing that a trading process does not 
necessarily achieve a reduction in GHGs, but that this depends very much on mode of distributing 
allowances.90  As of Phase III (2013), much of the EU ETS has become more centralised, with a single 
EU-wide cap;91 and a central emissions trading EU registry.92 The scheme has also expanded, with 
more gases and industries covered in the scheme, for example aviation.93 Originally due to cover all 
flights taking off or landing in the EU, a ‘stop the clock’ has now limited this to intra-EU flights.94 In 
terms of how the EU ETS now works, the EU allocates Member States their allowances, and then the 
states then auction most of these allowances off at a national level.95 The EU ETS covers 45% of 
Europe’s GHGs,96 and as such, is a significant tool aimed at mitigating climate change. 
 
                                                          
84 Ibid, page 11 
85 European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 Establishing a Scheme for 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community [2003] OJ L275/32 (as amended  by 
Directive 2009/29/EC). 
86 Case C-127/07 Arcelor Atlantique and Lorraine and Others v Commission [2008] OJ C44/8, Opinion of AG 
Maduro, para 2. 
87 European Communities, ‘EU Emissions Trading: An Open Scheme Promoting Global Innovation to Combat 
Climate Change’ (European Commission, Brussels 2005). 
88 Schmalensee and Stavins (n 81), 15. 
89 Sanja Bogojevic, ‘The EU ETS Directive Revised: Yet Another Stepping Stone’ (2009) 11 Env LR 279, 280. 
90 Robert Baldwin, ‘Regulation Lite: the Rise of Emissions Trading’ (2008) 2 Regulation and Governance 193, 
196. 
91 ETS Directive (n 74), Article 9. 
92 Ibid, Article 19. 
93 Ibid, Articles 12(2a) and 14(3). 
94 Originally announced: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-854_en.htm accessed 24/03/2018. 
The stop the clock has since been renewed annually.  
95 There are some exceptions, held in articles 10a and 10b, which allow free allocations for some types of 
industry, new market entrant, and for manufacturers of products at risk of carbon leakage. 
96 https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en accessed 05/10/2017. 
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1.1.4 Regulatory Responses to Climate Change: The UK Response  
 
Closer to home, UK policy is committed to “working at home and abroad to adapt to the effects of 
climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by investing in low-carbon energy sources, 
improving fuel standards in cars and increasing energy efficiency wherever possible.”97 Former Prime 
Minister David Cameron referred to climate change as “one of the most serious threats facing our 
world”.98 This is offset by other UK policy manifestations under a more recent Conservative 
government, such as the abolition of the Department of Energy and Climate Change in 2016, a decision 
that has since been labelled as “plain stupid”.99 Former Secretary of State for the Environment, Andrea 
Leadsom, reportedly asked ministers “is climate change real?”100 In addition, the current environment 
secretary, Michael Gove, attempted to drop climate change as a subject from the geography 
curriculum at school.101 Yet, Gove has also criticized US President Donald Trump over his decision to 
pull out of the Paris Agreement.102 More recently in the 2017 Autumn Budget, however, Chancellor of 
the Exchequer Phillip Hammond MP talked of a need to protect the future environment and 
specifically stated that “the tax system can play and important role in protecting our environment”.103 
The UK policy front on climate change therefore sends mixed messages. When considering the UK 
regulatory response to climate change, this can also be seen in the numerous reforms over the past 
10 years. The UK climate change toolbox primarily consists of the following: the Climate Change Act 
2008; the Climate Change Levy; Climate Change Agreements; and, the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment.104  
 
The Climate Change Act 2008 embodies what has been described as a “tighter and more robust series 
of measures” and an “aspiration to do the right thing”;105 and which purports “to impose legally 
                                                          
97 https://www.gov.uk/government/topics/climate-change accessed 24/08/2014. 
98 David Cameron, UN Climate Summit 2014, 23rd September 2014. 
99 http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change-department-killed-off-by-theresa-may-in-






heat-on-paris-agreement-fossil-fuels-a7852626.html accessed 24/08/2017. 
103 The Rt Hon Phillip Hammond MP, Autumn Budget 2017: Speech (22 November 2017) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/autumn-budget-2017-philip-hammonds-speech accessed 
23/11/2017. 
104 The government strategy for climate change can be accessed via https://www.gov.uk/guidance/climate-
change-explained#uk-government-action accessed 24/03/2018. 
105 Harriet Townsend, ‘The Climate Change Act 2008 – Will it do the Trick?’ (2009) 11 ELR 116, 116-117. 
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binding domestic targets, supported by transparent budgeting and reporting processes”.106 Key 
arguments on differences the Act has made are: “a better political debate on climate change”; “the 
climate consensus has held”; and an example of “international leadership, inspiring others to act”.107 
Other reviews of the Climate Change Act 2008 call for a greater focus on decarbonisation,108 and argue 
that the Act has so far failed to secure political commitment and investor confidence.109 The Act 
requires a climate change risk assessment to be carried out in the UK every five years.110 The first of 
these assessments was published by the government in 2012,111 and the most recent in 2017.112 The 
2017 report labels the Climate Change Act as “an important piece of UK legislation”.113 Furthermore, 
the 2017 report highlights six key areas of concern for the UK: 1) flooding; 2) risks to health from higher 
temperatures; 3) risks of shortages in water supply; 4) risks to natural capital; 5) risks to food 
production; and, 6) new and emerging pests and diseases.114 The government then attributes a risk 
level to each of the areas, which in turn forms the basis of the UK plan of action against climate change. 
In addition, the Act also introduces the Committee on Climate Change,115 which aims to advise the UK 
on climate change and the setting of carbon targets.116 
 
This thesis is not concerned with the more specific consequences of climate change, but rather is 
seeking to consider how the UK’s broader climate change regulatory response is helping to reduce 
GHGs. Part of the UK’s GHG reduction package is the Climate Change Levy, which was introduced in 
the Finance Act 2000,117 and which applies a tax on supplies of energy. Supplies which are taxable are 
considered taxable commodities, and include electricity, gas, oil and coal.118 The Levy only targets 
                                                          
106 Mark Stallworthy, ‘Environmental Justice Imperatives for an era of Climate Change’ (2009) 36(1) Journal of 
Law and Society 55, 64. 
107 Sam Fankhauser et al, ‘10 Years of the UK Climate Change Act’ (LSE Grantham Research Institute on Climate 
Change and the Environment, March 2018) available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/10-Years-of-the-UK-Climate-Change-Act_Fankhauser-et-al.pdf accessed 
18/04/2018, Infographic.  
108 Roger Pielke, ‘The British Climate Change Act: a Critical Evaluation and Proposed Alternative Approach’ 
(2009) Environmental Research Letters 024010. 
109 Matthew Lockwood, ‘The Political Sustainability of Climate Policy: The Case of the UK Climate Change Act’ 
(2013) 23 Global Environmental Change 1339. 
110 Climate Change Act 2008, s.56. 
111 DEFRA, ‘UK Climate Change Risk Assessment: Government Report’ (January 2012). 
112 HM Treasury, ‘UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017’ (January 2017). 
113 Ibid, Executive Summary. 
114 Ibid, 11-17. 
115 Climate Change Act (n 110), s.32. 
116 Ibid, s.33. 
117 Finance Act 2000, s.30. 
118 Ibid, Schedule 6. 
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business consumption;119 and the levy is paid by the energy supplier.120 In practice this then equates 
to an additional ‘bill’ being added onto businesses’ energy bills by their supplier – so for instance, 
British Gas would work out the amount of levy to be paid and add this onto the bill.  
 
For those with a Climate Change Agreement (CCA), a reduced rate of Climate Change Levy is 
charged.121 These agreements require businesses to report and set two-year interval targets to reduce 
energy consumption.122 These are voluntary agreements made between industry and the Environment 
Agency that sit under broader umbrella agreements made between the government and industry 
sectors. Once a certificate is issued by the Environment Agency, this entitles the holder of a CCA to a 
90% reduction in the CCL rate for electricity.123 A list of organisations that have been issued a reduced 
rate certificate due to a CCA is published and available to view online.124 
 
As set out above, the Carbon Reduction Commitment forms the foundation of this study. Introduced 
in 2009, it also targets business consumers of energy in an attempt to reduce energy consumption. 
The details of the CRC will be considered later in the thesis, but a brief introduction is provided below.  
1.2 The Carbon Reduction Commitment 
 
The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme has operated in phases and is currently in its second phase (from 
2014).125 As explored above, following the conclusion of the second phase, the CRC scheme will end 
in 2019. The CRC targets high consumers of energy (that are not already covered by other climate 
change linked regulatory schemes, such as Climate Change Agreements, 126  or the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme),127 in order to reduce their carbon emissions. Once a participant meets the 
qualification criteria for the scheme (consumption over 6000MWh of energy, and a special type of 
                                                          
119 Ibid, Schedule 6, Part III. 
120 Ibid, Schedule 6, Part IV. 
121 Ibid, Schedule 6, Part IV. 
122 More information on how the CCL operates is available from: Environment Agency, Climate Change 
Agreements Operations Manual (Verson 7, April 2017). 
123 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/climate-change-agreements--2 accessed 24/08/2017. 
124 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/climate-change-agreements-reduced-rate-certificates 
accessed 24/08/2017. 
125 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order 2013, SI 2013/1119, Article 2.  
126 "Climate change agreements are voluntary agreements made by UK industry and the Environment Agency 
to reduce energy use and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. In return, operators receive a discount on the 
Climate Change Levy (CCL), a tax added to electricity and fuel bills." Definition source: 
https://www.gov.uk/climate-change-agreements--2 accessed 13/07/2015. 
127 CRC 2013 Order (n 125), Schedule 1, paragraphs 28 and 29. 
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meter fitted to read energy consumption),128 the scheme is mandatory, and the participant must 
register for the CRC and comply.  
 
The CRC then operates by effectively taxing participants on their carbon emissions.129 This is through 
the purchase and surrender of allowances where the participant is required to purchase and surrender 
one allowance for every tonne of carbon dioxide emitted.130  The revenues from the allowances go to 
the Treasury.131 A difficulty with the CRC lies in the fact that it bases its initial measurements on energy 
consumption (i.e. qualification is based on energy consumption), yet the tax is based on carbon 
emissions. This requires participants to convert their energy consumption into emissions data using 
government issued emissions factors.132 In England, the CRC is enforced and regulated by the 
Environment Agency.133 
 
There is a debate to be had about whether the CRC should be labelled as a tax. Whether or not the 
CRC is a tax is important in the sense that a wider pool of tax literature opens up and becomes more 
relevant. For the purposes of this PhD, I label the CRC as a de facto tax and in so doing then draw upon 
this additional tax scholarship. I set out the rationale for this decision below.  
 
Whilst there are a number of definitions of a tax,134 Re Eurig Estate sets out key criteria. 135 This 
approach has been adopted by leading tax law textbooks and provides a useful starting point for this 
discussion. 136  The criteria are as follows: 
 
1. The tax is compulsory – once the qualification criteria have been met under the CRC, it is 
mandatory to comply.137 
                                                          
128 Ibid, Article 3. 
129 I say effectively because a) there are debates as to whether the CRC is a tax; and b) the ‘tax’ is raised 
through the purchase of allowances, rather than through a tax bill. See later on in this chapter for further 
explanation. 
130 CRC 2013 Order (n 125), Article 36(1). 
131 HM Treasury, ‘Spending Review 2010’ (2010), p62. 
132 CRC 2013 Order (n 125), Article 33(1) and Schedule 1, paragraph 33. 
133 Ibid, Article 9; for Wales, this is the Natural Resources Body; for Scotland, this is the Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency; and for Northern Ireland, this is the chief inspector.  
134 For a review of the various definitions of tax see: John Snape and Jeremy de Souza, Environmental Taxation 
Law (Ashgate, 2006). 
135 Re Eurig Estate (1999) 165 DLR (4th) 1, paragraph 15-16. 
136 See Glen Loutzenhiser, Revenue Law, 8th Edition (Hart, 2016); Snape and de Souza (n 134). 
137 CRC 2013 Order (n 125), Article 3. 
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2. The tax is levied by a public body – in the case of the CRC, the Environment Agency is the 
administrator and ensures compliance. This involves the payment for allowances through the 
CRC Registry.138 
3. The tax is intended for public purpose – in the 2010 Spending Review, it was specifically stated 
that the revenues of the CRC were destined for “public spending”.139 
4. The tax has been introduced by legislation – this is a potential sticking point of the CRC. The 
CRC scheme itself is actually held within a piece of secondary legislation: The CRC Energy 
Efficiency Scheme Order 2013.140 The parent Act for this secondary legislation is actually the 
Climate Change Act 2008.141  
 
The CRC has not been introduced specifically by a piece of primary legislation and this is a clear 
argument against the CRC being a tax. The full name of the CRC is also CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme 
which would also indicate something other than a tax. This is not, however, the first time that the 
mechanics of a taxation scheme have been introduced by secondary legislation. The Income Tax 
(Employments) Regulations 1944 introduced the PAYE (Pay-as-you-earn) system;142 and whilst this 
secondary legislation did not impose the tax itself,143 it is an example of a significant tax element being 
held in secondary legislation – just as is the case with the CRC. 
 
Furthermore, there appears to be some level of confusion about how to label the CRC both within 
government and outside. In addition, mixed messages have been sent by government when the CRC 
has been lumped under the same bracket as other environmental taxes.144 Other mixed messages 
include sending the revenues of the CRC to the Treasury,145 as well as the government including the 
CRC as part of the business energy tax landscape.146 During interview, all interviewees were asked: 
                                                          
138 Ibid, Articles 6 and 9. 
139 Spending Review 2010 (n 131), 62. 
140 CRC 2013 Order (n 125).  
141 Climate Change Act (n 110). 
142  S,R & O 1944/251. See John HN Pearce, ‘The Road to 1944: Antecedents of the PAYE Scheme’ in John Tiley 
(ed.), Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 5 (Bloomsbury 2012).  
143 PAYE being a mechanism for the collection of Income Tax, which is found annually in the Finance Act – a 
primary piece of legislation. 
144 On the gov.uk website the CRC falls under “Environmental Taxes, Reliefs and Schemes for Businesses” 
where related content is “pay environmental taxes”. See: https://www.gov.uk/green-taxes-and-reliefs/crc-
energy-efficiency-scheme accessed 16/03/2018. 
145 Spending Review 2010 (n 131), 62. 
146 HM Treasury, ‘Business Tax Road Map’ (March 2016); also see CRC’s website which also refers to the 




“do you consider the CRC to be a tax”. All interviewees in my study referred to the CRC as a tax. The 
following quotes from interview data summarise the interviewees’ views on the subject well: 
 
“Well, it is – I believe it is technically a tax because I believe there is a definition 
of a tax and I remember a meeting where the Treasury stated quite clearly that 
this is a tax – so it is a tax. But I have always considered it to be a bit more than 
a tax. One of the successes of the CCAs is that it mixed the carrot and the stick 
and so it mixed a bit of the push and a little bit of pull. The original intent of the 
CRC is that it would do the same through the revenue recycling scheme, so you 
provided a bit of a stick and a bit of a carrot and incentivised what you were 
trying to incentivise. So, I thought it was always a bit more than a tax, even 
though it technically is just a tax since the Treasury took the revenues from it.” 
(CRC M9)147 
 
“Amy: Do you think that the CRC is a tax? 
 
Interviewee: I didn’t think so when it was first devised, and it was certainly was 
the case with everything that came out on the CRC – nothing mentioned it 
being a tax, but when you spoke to people who were sceptical about how it 
was going to work, people said: ‘oh it is just another tax’. Now I have noticed 
that as each year has gone by, it has been seen more and more as a carbon tax. 
When you explain what the CRC is to people, if you only have 30 seconds to 
explain it to somebody, then it doesn’t feel misrepresentative to just say: ‘oh, 
it’s a carbon tax’.” (CRC M11) 
 
The fact that the CRC is not a tax under current definitions of taxation does not stop the CRC from 
being perceived as a tax in the eyes of the interviewees. CRC M9 clearly believes that the CRC is a tax 
in the legal sense as they refer specifically to tax definitions. Both excerpts from CRC M9 and M11 
demonstrate that the CRC has been labelled as a tax by the wider CRC community (and potentially 
also the Treasury). Considering these mixed messages about whether the CRC is labelled as a tax, and 
the fact that all participants in this doctoral study considered the CRC to be a tax, this PhD will adopt 
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the stance that the CRC is a de facto tax. One of the key purposes of this thesis is to explore how 
participants have engaged with the CRC. Therefore, if they engage with the CRC as a tax, then tax 
literature is very much relevant.  
 
This plurality of the CRC (the fact that it is both a tax and regulatory scheme) can cause some linguistic 
issues. There are a number of terms that could be used to refer to those who have to comply with the 
CRC: participant; taxpayer; and regulatee. Throughout this thesis, it would be disingenuous to the 
specific fields of study to only adopt one term. As such, each of these terms will be used dependant 
on the literature I am looking at, and all refer to a participant of the CRC scheme.  




Doing a PhD was, for me, the next logical step in an academic career following on from my LLM at 
the University of Birmingham. Both an interest in research and my desire to pursue an academic 
career after the PhD were the principal drivers behind my decision to apply for funding to complete 
a PhD at Birmingham. My interest in environmental taxes and the CRC was almost a happy accident. 
The research area for this thesis derives from a longstanding interest in the environment, and more 
specifically environmental law, which dates back to my undergraduate studies at the University of 
Sheffield. There, Dr Carolyn Shelbourn made the subject come alive for me. I specialised as much as I 
could in environmental law for my LLB. 
 
I brought this keen interest in environmental law to my LLM at Birmingham. During this time, I thought 
about areas that were lacking research – which is how I stumbled across the CRC. The CRC at this point 
in 2014 was considered a technical and dense scheme, which was scheduled to run for the next 30 
years.148 The scheme was largely untouched in the academic sphere, providing an opportunity to make 
a real contribution to the CRC literature. I began my research journey by focussing on the 2012 reforms 
to the scheme as part of my LLM dissertation, which led on to the start of my PhD in 2014. It was 
during this work that I first engaged with the CRC and it was impossible to ignore that the CRC had 
undergone a significant amount of reform for its age. These reforms then raised the questions of why 
they were needed and what went wrong with the first iterations of the scheme. It was here that I 
                                                          
148 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order 2010, SI 2010/768. 
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began to think about what makes an effective environmental tax. Taking a purist viewpoint, the CRC 
aims to reduce emissions and forms part of the UK climate change toolbox. As such, an effective 
environmental tax is one which facilitates and encourages behavioural change: in this case, resulting 
in a drop in carbon dioxide emissions.  
 
The CRC is due to end in 2019. However, this does not alter the importance of a PhD that focusses 
on the CRC. The importance of this study remains on two levels: First, it is always important to 
consider why a piece of regulation does not work; and second, the CRC will be replaced by an 
incarnation of the CCL that will cover the scope of the CRC.149 As such, this PhD remains relevant in 
considering the final form of what will succeed the CRC, and will still help to paint the picture on 
what drives behavioural change under an environmental tax regime.  
This thesis will explore the following research questions: 
 
1. What is the CRC, and how does it work? 
2. How have regulatees perceived the CRC, and has this perception altered how the regulatees 
have engaged with the scheme? 
3. What drives regulatees to change their behaviour under an environmental taxation scheme? 
4. What does existing literatures say about these drivers, and is there a role for these drivers in 
a UK environmental tax regime? 
5. Has the CRC been effective in reducing carbon emissions? 
 
1.3.2 Research Methods 
 
This is an empirical thesis in which I will draw upon both qualitative and quantitative research to shed 
light on the CRC. Whilst regulatee perceptions of the CRC (uncovered by interview) are important, the 
objectivity of the CRC emissions data will help to form a more comprehensive picture of the scheme.150 
By triangulating and drawing together both the qualitative and quantitative data,151 I hope to discover 
whether and how regulatees have engaged with the CRC, and what, if needed, could improve this 
engagement. Chapter 2 sets out my methodology and methods in a much greater depth. 
                                                          
149 HM Treasury, ‘Reforming the business energy efficiency tax landscape’ (September 2015), paragraph 4.11. 
150 Burke Johnson, Anthony Onwuegbuzie and Lisa Turner, ‘Towards a Definition of Mixed Methods Research’ 
(2007) 1(2) JMMR 112, 123. 
151 See Jennifer Greene, Valerie Caracelli, and Wendy Graham, ‘Toward a Conceptual Framework for Mixed 
Method Evaluation Designs’ (1989) 11(3) Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 255. 
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The qualitative aspect of this thesis comprises of 31 50-minute semi-structured interviews. In order to 
gauge a wider perception of the CRC, these interviews targeted: the regulator; participants of the CRC; 
environmental consultants; and, solicitors. Two phases of interviews were undertaken for this study: 
a pilot study and a main study. The initial pilot study of 8 interviews was undertaken between October 
and December 2015. The interviewees for the pilot study were all university participants of the CRC, 
and were selected at random to be contacted. This was done by collating each university participant, 
identified through the CRC 2013-2014 ARP,152 onto a spreadsheet and using a random number 
generator to generate the corresponding university to be contacted. Out of 50 universities contacted 
by email, 8 positive responses were received and the interviews took place both over the phone and 
face-to-face. The interviews were semi-structured, using an interview schedule as a basis. 
 
Following this pilot, a further 23 interviews were scheduled and undertaken between January and 
April 2016. Initially, recruitment for these interviews was done at random by letter (again using the 
ARP and a random number generator). Despite 90 letters being sent to participants of the CRC, no 
positive responses (and only one negative response) was received. I then contacted the regulator for 
the scheme and asked for an advert to be placed in the taxpayer newsletter.153 This proved more 
productive. The interviewees for the main part of the study were therefore self-selecting, and were a 
mix of taxpayers, advisers (i.e. consultants), and solicitors. The regulator (an Environment Agency 
official) was also interviewed, with questions focussing on taxpayer perception of the CRC. The 
demographic of the taxpayers was varied. Interviewees came from a range of sectors including: higher 
education; construction; utilities; retail; transport and logistics; hospitality; the NHS; and local 
authorities. The study therefore consists of data from both the public and private sector.  
 
The quantitative aspect of the thesis involves an analysis of the raw emissions data which is published 
annually by the Environment Agency in the ARP.154 This quantitative approach required me to collate 
the emissions data for each of the six years for which the scheme has been active and a published 
report, including only those participants that had reported their emissions for all years under the 
                                                          
152 Available via https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/crc-annual-report-publication-2013-to-2014 
accessed 15/12/2016. 
153 Following an interview with the regulator, a short advert of the study was placed into a participant email 
update in March 2016. This advert contained contact details which allowed participants to come forward if 
they wanted to be interviewed.  
154 The Annual Report Publications are all available from https://www.gov.uk/guidance/crc-energy-efficiency-
scheme-annual-report-publication last accessed 22/08/2017. These documents list the participants under the 
scheme and their raw emissions figure reported for that year.  
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CRC.155 Using this redacted emissions data, I outline in Chapter 3 some descriptive statistics including 
the median and mean (average) emissions under the scheme for each participant. In addition, I 
perform a paired t-test on each pair of consecutive years to determine whether there is a statistically 
significant difference between the years of the CRC. The purpose of this is to determine whether there 
has been a change in emissions under the scheme. As the CRC aims to reduce carbon emissions, an 
effective CRC would see a drop in emissions on a yearly basis. To complement the t-tests, a repeated 
measures test has also been conducted, and this compares each year to every other year under the 
scheme to test whether there is a statistical difference between years.  
 
1.4 Thesis Structure and Theoretical Frameworks 
 
The theoretical frameworks adopted by this thesis form part of its original contribution, in the sense 
that the analysis of the CRC is being conducted through a number of theoretical angles. This thesis will 
adopt multiple theoretical frameworks to mirror the themes that arise from the study data. As such, 
work on regulatory stability, trust, nudging, incentives, and efficiency will be covered in the 
substantive chapters of this thesis. During the analysis of my interview data, it quickly became 
apparent that one overarching theoretical framework would not tackle all of the issues raised by my 
interviewees. Given this, I decided that it would be disingenuous to my data to artificially shoe-horn 
my data into one theory; and adopted a multiple theory, inductive approach. 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis will consider the method and methodology underlying my study of the CRC (as 
raised above) in more depth. The thesis will then move on to consider the scheme which forms the 
basis of the study: the CRC. Chapter 3 will outline the key features of the CRC, the existing literature 
on the CRC and, finally, will present the statistical findings from the CRC emissions data. This chapter 
will then inform chapters 4 through to 8, which cover the substantive themes that arose from the 
interview data. 
 
The numerous reforms of the CRC during its lifespan drew out concepts of regulatory stability and the 
practical impacts of instability on an environmental regime. As such, Chapter 4 will consider the role 
of tax and regulatory stability and the CRC. The concept of stability will draw upon the work of wider 
                                                          
155 This was a painstaking and long-winded task, which in hindsight required a lot of resources and effort for 
the insight gained into the CRC. 
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economic theorists and Elen Stokes,156 who argue respectively that tax stability and regulatory stability 
have a role to play. Economic literature argues that stability is important to maintain stability in the 
rule of law, property rights and institutional stability.157 Stokes argues that how regulation is packaged 
is important and that stability and change can be used to illustrate the adequacy of regulatory 
regimes.158 The chapter will argue that an unstable regulatory regime is a less efficient one; and that 
instability is perceived and interpreted by regulates. This can bring into play a bigger role for how 
policymakers package regulation, as unstable regulation can also speak to unstable policy in the eyes 
of the interviewees.  
 
The interview data also raised questions surrounding the competence of the regulator, and Chapter 5 
considers the role that trust has played between regulatees and the Environment Agency. When 
looking at trust, this thesis will rely upon the work of Roger Kaperson et al,159 who explore the role of 
social trust alongside a more traditional cognitive trust. This social trust comprises of four key 
elements: competence, caring, predictability and commitment. By running through these elements of 
trust, Chapter 5 will outline the practical impacts of what is perceived to be an incompetent regulator.  
Chapter 6 considers the role of nudging and draws upon the seminal work of Cass Sunstein and Richard 
Thaler, who look at how influencing choices can drive behavioural change.160 Interviewees expressed 
an interest in a reputational element for the CRC (for example rankings and performance publications). 
Thaler and Sunstein argue that we follow the crowd and are conscious of our public image.161 Through 
the use of reputational drivers, policymakers can harness social norms to encourage competition and 
collaboration between businesses to further behavioural change goals. Chapter 6 therefore examines 
the potential for nudging under the CRC and how a reputational element under the scheme could help 
to drive behavioural change. 
 
Incentives, which are similar to, but distinct from, nudges are covered widely in literature. Chapter 7 
will draw upon this wide range of literature to consider the role of incentives in environmental 
                                                          
156 Elen Stokes, ‘Regulatory Domain and Regulatory Dexterity: Critiquing the UK Governance of ‘Fracking’’ 
(2016) 79(6) MLR 961. 
157 Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (CUP 1990); Friedrich von 
Hayek (edited by Ronald Hamowy), The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press 2011); Walter 
Lippmann, The Good Society (Transaction 1938). 
158 Stokes (n 156).  
159 Roger Kasperson, Dominic Golding and Seth Tuler, ‘Social Distrust as a Factor in Siting Hazardous Facilities 
and Communicating Risks’ (1992) 48(4) Journal of Social Issues 161. 
160 See for a comprehensive introduction to nudging: Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving 
decisions about health, wealth and happiness (UK: Penguin 2009). 
161 Ibid, p65. 
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taxation. Specifically, this chapter will consider the differences between the negative incentives (the 
cost of the tax) and potential positive incentives (included tax hypothecation and green investment) 
and how they are viewed by participants of the CRC. Chapter 7 will argue that the carrot can be better 
than the stick,162 and as in the case with the CRC, how revenues have been labelled is important to 
participants of the scheme, particularly as the CRC scheme was originally revenue neutral. In addition, 
positive incentives in general can work well alongside the negative incentive of the tax to improve 
participant engagement. Chapter 7 therefore explores a wider role for incentives, both negative and 
positive, to consider whether incentives have the potential to reduce emissions further. 
 
Finally, the above themes will be drawn together by considering how they all affect efficiency. What 
makes ‘good’ regulation will be considered by drawing upon the work of Robert Baldwin et al.163 
Chapter 8 will specifically consider the complexity of the CRC and the impacts that this has had on 
regulatee understanding and engagement with the scheme, in order to argue that the CRC has been 
perceived by participants as unnecessarily complex.  
 
All of the themes in chapters 4-8 feed into Chapter 9 which discusses the regulatory package. This 
chapter will draw together all five themes to argue that how regulation is packaged is crucial to 
efficiency and to increasing regulatee/ taxpayer engagement. The role of regulatory symbolism is 
considered, and by drawing on the work of John Dwyer and Bart van Klink,164 this chapter argues that 
the attributes of the CRC covered in this thesis form part of the perceivable regulatory package and 
all feed into how the CRC has been perceived since its introduction. By considering this overall image 
which is being portrayed to regulatees, policymakers can tailor the regulatory package to imbed 
environmental values. My work suggests that these environmental values will be perceived by 
regulatees and engaged with. Chapter 9 also looks to the future and beyond the abolition of the CRC, 





                                                          
162 As per motivational theory seen in Jeremy Bentham, ‘From An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation’, in John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarianism and Other Essays (1987 Penguin). 
163 Baldwin et al (n 19).  
164 John Dwyer, ‘The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation’ (1990) 17 Ecology LQ 233; Bart van Klink, ‘Symbolic 
Legislation: An Essentially Political Concept’ in Bart van Klink, Britta van Beers and Lonneke Port (Eds), Symbolic 
Legislation Theory and Developments in Biolaw (Springer 2016). 
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Chapter Two: Research Methods and 
Methodology 
 
In 2015, a government study into the CRC was commissioned by DECC, which undertook a quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of the first phase of the CRC scheme.1 Where similar themes arise from the 
two studies, reference will be made to the government study. However, in general, nuanced, different 
themes (which this thesis has drawn from legal scholarship) run through the two studies. 
 
There is a general lack of empirical work in environmental law.2 There is a general lack of empirical 
research in law full stop.3 This Chapter will outline both the methods and methodology that have been 
used for my empirical study of the CRC scheme. I will explain the structure and rationale behind my 
study on the CRC. My study is based on 31 semi-structured interviews of CRC participants, advisors 
and the regulator of the CRC scheme. The interviews took place between October 2015 and April 2016. 
The study also draws upon the raw data published within the Annual Report Publication. This is an 
Excel spreadsheet which details the emissions data for each CRC participant published annually by the 
Environment Agency.  
 
I have structured this chapter into three parts: Part 1 of this chapter will consider the research 
questions that I set out to answer during the study; Part 2 will explore the mixed methods 
methodology and underlying paradigm which underpinned the analysis; and Part 3 will outline the 
methodology for my study as well as the methods of analysis. 
This chapter has been revised iteratively following the conclusion of the interviews, and so the past 




                                                          
1 DECC, ‘CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Evaluation: Final Synthesis Report’ (July 2015). 
2 See for example: Steven Vaughan, ‘“The Law is my Data”: The Socio-Legal in Environmental Law’ (4th 
September 2017) available at https://blog.oup.com/2017/09/socio-legal-in-environmental-law/ accessed 
25/04/2018. 




2.1 Research questions and analysis overview  
 
2.1.1 Research questions  
 
Originally, my research questions focussed on the 2012 simplification of the CRC, and whether this 
influenced the scheme’s efficiency. However, it quickly became apparent that this was not an 
important point for the interviewees. In addition, I had a research question on the Polluter Pays 
Principle, which again was removed because I no longer thought it to be key to answering the question 
of whether the CRC was efficient. Finally, my original research questions were wider, bringing in a 
comparison of other schemes and analysing their efficiency. However, the CRC tends to run in isolation 
from other schemes, and while participants were aware of other taxes and regulatory schemes, they 
were unable to draw in depth comparisons. Comparisons will, however, still be drawn between the 
schemes in the chapters that follow to consider whether an alternative to the CRC can be suggested.  
 
My research questions have since changed into one main research question, and several sub-
questions which flow from the main question. The research questions addressed in the subsequent 
parts of this thesis are: 
 
1. Is the CRC an effective tool to reduce carbon emissions? 
a. How is the CRC perceived by those that pay it? 
b. Has the CRC reduced carbon emissions? 
c. In what ways, and to what extent, have the participants of the CRC engaged with scheme? 
d. What is the role of politics and the government in terms of participant engagement with 
the CRC? 
e. Is there a role for incentives in environmental taxation? 
f. Would an alternative regulatory mechanism provide a more effective solution to 
environmental taxation alone? Could environmental taxation be combined with other 
tools to make it more effective? 
 
To answer the above research questions, this project blended both qualitative and quantitative 
research. This is justified on the premise that the study aims to look into the efficiency and the 
perceptions of the CRC. The efficiency of the CRC will be studied in two ways: through a consideration 
of tax theory, and also a quantitative analysis of the CRC emissions data published by the Environment 
Agency within the Annual Report Publication (ARP). In terms of the quantitative analysis, various 
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statistical approaches were taken to determine whether the CRC has had an impact on carbon 
emissions. Additionally, to gain an insight into the perceptions of the scheme, over 30 interviews were 
carried out.  
Due to the dual nature of this study's research aims (i.e. whether the CRC has been efficient and how 
the CRC is perceived), I made the decision that it would have been impossible to achieve both without 
the blend of both qualitative and quantitative methods. This duality is reflected in the methodology 
that was adopted for this study. 
 
2.1.2 Limitations of the study 
 
First, I acknowledge that my sample size was relatively small at 31. Within this figure, there was a 
mixture of participants, consultants, solicitors and the regulator; which means that each individual 
pool of interviewee type was much smaller than 31. In Chapter Two, I highlighted the difficulties I saw 
in recruiting participants of this study. It was only following an advertisement in the CRC newsletter 
that the majority of participants for this study were secured. There are therefore issues in the fact that 
my interviewees were, for the large part, self-selecting, and would indicate that they already had 
strong opinions on the CRC. In addition, with a bigger pool of participants, I acknowledge I would have 
a richer data set which would allow me to present more concrete conclusions throughout this thesis.  
 
Second, whilst this thesis acknowledges that the CRC is coming to an end, it does not cover the 
replacement in any great depth. It would have been useful to gain a deeper picture of the views held 
by CRC professionals on the CCL. These views were hinted at during interviews, and it would have 
been useful to develop these in further questions. Additional research is necessary to understand the 
role that the CCL will play in organisations from 2019. Nonetheless, I would argue that the lessons 
learnt from the CRC have a wider regulatory application and are still useful in terms of understanding 











2.2.1 Mixed methods research: the paradigm war  
 
As the name might suggest, mixed methods is usually the combination of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods.4  Traditionally, mixing methods has been discouraged because quantitative and 
qualitative methods are considered to be separate paradigms. Following Kuhn’s definition of a 
‘paradigm’,5 Morgan states that it is a “consensual set of beliefs and practices that guide a field”.6 
Quantitative methods tend to follow a positivist approach, which looks at facts and truths as 
independent from human experience and perception.7 Durkheim argues that research should only 
consider facts, and that a reliance on subjective experience is not necessary.8 On the other hand, 
qualitative methods tend to take a constructivist approach, which instead argues that there is more 
than one truth and that truth depends on human experience.9 Constructivists argue that it is not 
possible to analyse human behaviour in the same way as we might analyse natural/ scientific 
phenomena.10 
 
Critics of mixed methods research, and particularly purists (from both camps),11 state that it is 
impossible to reconcile the two methods, which are in themselves linked to paradigms that have 
'impermeable' boundaries.12 This is based upon the idea that qualitative and quantitative data are on 
opposite ends of the epistemological spectrum and so should not be brought together.13 This inability 
                                                          
4 Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber, Mixed Methods Research: Merging Theory with Practice (The Guildford Press 
2010), p3. 
5 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (first edition) (University of Chicago Press 1962). 
6 David Morgan, ‘Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained: Methodological Implications of Combining 
Qualitative and Quantitative Methods’ (2007) 1(1) Journal of Mixed Methods Research 48, 49. 
7 Amaryll Perlesz and Jo Lindsay, ‘Methodological Triangulation in Researching Families: Making Sense of 
Dissonant Data’ (2003) 6(1) International Journal of Social Research Methodology 25. 
8 E Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (Free Press 1966). 
9 Joanne Sale, Lynne Lohfeld, and Kevin Brazil, ‘Revisiting the Quantitative-Qualitative Debate: Implications for 
Mixed Methods Research’ (2002) 36(1) Quality & Quantity 43. 
10 Reza Banakar and Max Travers, ‘Law, Sociology and Method’ in R. Banakar and M. Travers (eds), Theory and 
Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) pp1-26. 
11 Kenneth Howe, ‘Against the Quantitative-qualitative Incompatibility Thesis (or Dogmas Die Hard)’ (1988) 
17(8) Educational Researcher 10. 
12 John Creswell, ‘Controversies in Mixed Methods Research’ in Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (Eds), The 
Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (2011 Sage), p275. 
13 Charles Teddlie and Abbas Tashakkori, ‘Mixed Methods Research: Contemporary Issues in and Emerging 




to combine the two different methods has also been labelled as the 'incompatibility thesis'.14 Purists 
in the quantitative camp argue that qualitative methods are too subjective and lack precision;15 whilst 
purists in the qualitative camp criticise quantitative methods for their lack of flexibility which leads to 
surface data (i.e. data that is not deep or rich).16 There are then two sides of the debate, with number 
crunchers on the one side of the fence and “navel-gazers” on the other.17  
The incompatibility thesis has since been largely dismissed with the possibility of merging methods.18 
In this sense, each method will be accorded their own paradigm, but that they are "compatible and 
can be used fruitfully in conjunction with one another".19 Mixed methods research has, in fact, been 
hailed as a response to the paradigm wars.20  Bazeley has argued that: 
 
"Although the epistemological arguments of the "paradigm wars" sharpened 
our thinking about issues relating to mixed methodology, their lingering legacy 
has been to slow the progress of integration of methods".21 
"If quantitative and qualitative are poles on a multidimensional continuum, as is 
now widely recognized, then emphasis on the separate definition of these 
components (and inclusion of both) in a mixed methods study can create 
unhelpful boundary issues and potentially impede analytic integration."22 
 
In light of these above arguments, I adopt an intermediate position. I disagree with the idea that there 
is an absolute truth as favoured by the positivist approach; yet, qualitative data from interviews is 
limited by its subjectivity, and is context dependent.  
 
Mixed methods researchers have attempted to create an alternative philosophical framework in 
which to place mixed methods research.23 Whilst no perfect solution has yet been found, an attempt 
can be made to "fit together the insights provided by qualitative and quantitative research into a 
                                                          
14 Kenneth Howe, 'A critique of experimentalism ' (2004) 10(1) Qualitative Inquiry 42. 
15 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (fourth edition) (OUP 2012). 
16 Alan Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research (Unwin Hyman 1988), p104. 
17 As labelled by each camp’s opposition: Sam Sieber (1973) ‘The Integration of Fieldwork and Survey 
Methods’, (1973) 78(6) American Journal of Sociology 1335; and Nigel Fielding and Jane Fielding, Linking Data 
(Sage 1986). 
18 Creswell (n 12), 275. 
19 Teddlie and Tashakkori (n 13), 285. 
20 Martina Feilzer, ‘Doing Mixed Methods Research Pragmatically: Implications for the Rediscovery of 
Pragmatism as a Research Paradigm’ (2010) 4(1) JMMR 6, 6.  
21 Patricia Bazeley, 'Integrating Data Analyses in Mixed Methods Research'(2009) 3(3) JMMR 203, 203. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Feilzer (n 20), 7. 
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workable solution".24 Against this debate, I argue that the two methodological approaches can be 
combined in this middle ground through a pragmatic approach. This framework has been adopted as 
a paradigm for mixed method research by many authors,25 and it argues that methods should be used 
as a tool for research. 26 As such, I believe that this framework resonates with and bypasses the 
arguments put forward in the paradigm war debate – it frames the diverging methodological 
approaches as a tool to help answer research questions. This is echoed in the literature, which, under 
a pragmatic approach, argues that there is a false dichotomy between the two methodological 
approaches.27  
 
Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that there is quite often an overlap in the two approaches in 
research. For example, it has been noted that most forms of research make use of numbers in some 
capacity, thus bringing the quantitative into the qualitative.28 In terms of quantitative research, it has 
been argued that eventually the data will be analysed with some qualitative elements, as even 
quantitative researchers need to make sense and select the relevant data.29 This builds upon the idea 
that quantitative researchers make decisions during the design and implementation of the study 
which are not objective, introducing a level of subjectivity into their findings.30 Pragmatists separate 
the practical from the theoretical and believe that one single methodological approach is not exclusive 
to a particular paradigm.31 Rather, they adopt an approach which identifies the problem to be 
explored, and choose the appropriate methods to tackle the problem.32  
 
However, pragmatism itself has a muddled history.33 As a philosophical concept, pragmatism accepts 
that there are both singular and multiple realities which are all open to research.34 John Dewey argued 
                                                          
24 Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, Mixed Methods Research: A research paradigm whose time has come (2004) 33 
Educational researcher 14, 16 
25 See John Creswell and Vicki Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research (Sage 2007) 
p26. 
26 Janice Beyer, ‘Researchers Are Not Cats – They Can Survive and Succeed by Being Curious’ in Peter Frost and 
Ralph Stablein (eds), Doing Exemplary Research (Sage 1992).  
27 Isadore Newman and Carolyn Benz Qualitative-Quantitative Research Methodology: Exploring the 
Interactive Continuum (Southern Illinois University Press 1998). 
28 Stephen Gorard and Chris Taylor, Combining Methods in Educational and Social Research (Open University 
Press 2004). 
29 Alan Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research (Unwin Hyman Ltd. 1988). 
30 Anthony Onwuegbuzie and Nancy Leech, ‘On Becoming a Pragmatic Researcher: The Importance of 
Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methodologies’ (2007) 8(5) International Journal of Research 
Methodology. 
31 Nigel Gilbert, Researching Social Life (third edition) (Sage 2008). 
32 Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (n 24). 
33 Feilzer (n 23), 7. It is not within the scope of the thesis to go into a detailed historical analysis of pragmatism. 
34 Creswell and Plano Clark (n 24), 24; and Feilzer (n 23), 8. 
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that pragmatism was simply the search for the truth, be that an objective truth (as in the positivist 
stance), or the truth of many realities (akin to the constructivist stance).35 The pragmatist standpoint 
on research “relies on an argument for the utility of research means for research ends";36 orienting 
itself to solve “real world” problems.37 Critics of pragmatism argue that relying on this practical 
pragmatism as a philosophical pragmatism is not so simple.38 This is because Dewey’s pragmatism "did 
not so much offer new answers to old epistemological questions as he replaced the very assumptions 
on which modern epistemology had been based."39 It is also a philosophical approach that does not 
sit among the traditional philosophical strands; it is "rather a set of philosophical tools that can be 
used to address problems."40 
 
What is key about Dewey's pragmatism is that it does not accept that knowledge is the only version 
of reality, but that experience is equally important.41 In fact, pragmatism accepts that knowledge is 
both constructed and based on the reality of the world we experience.42  In a project where the focus 
is experience and perception, as well as hard facts, this approach resonates well. Whilst a philosophical 
paradigm is important to any project involving social research, "it matters less how this philosophy is 
packaged."43  
 
2.2.2 Mixed Methods Research: Justification of approach  
 
It is important that the research questions of a project are framed with the methodology in mind.44 It 
is also important to choose a methodology that can best answer the research questions posed. 45  Tax 
research is not traditionally reflexive, and methodology of research is not often discussed at any 
length.46 Whilst my project does focus on a UK tax, I wish to openly justify my approach to methods 
                                                          
35 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (1925 Kessinger), p47. 
36 Gert Biesta, ‘Pragmatism and the philosophical foundations of mixed methods research’ in Abbas Tashakkori 
and Charles Teddlie (eds), The Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research (2nd 
Edition) (2010 Sage), p96. 
37 Feilzer (n 23), 8. 
38 Biesta (n 36), 96. 
39 Ibid, 105. 
40 Ibid, 97. 
41 Ibid, 107. 
42 Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (n 24), 18. 
43 Jennifer Greene and Jori Hall, ‘Dialetics and Pragmatism: Being of consequence’ Abbas Tashakkori and 
Charles Teddlie (eds), The Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research (2nd Edition) 
(2010 Sage), p121. 
44 Hesse-Biber (n 4), 10. 
45 Howe 1988 (n 11). 
46 Lynne Oates (Ed), Taxation: A Fieldwork Research Handbook (Talyor and Francis 2012), p1. 
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and methodology. In this study, I considered both whether the CRC is efficient (objectively) as well as 
how the CRC is perceived (subjectively) – these questions demonstrate the need of both quantitative 
(objective) and qualitative (subjective) methods. Thus, the duality of methods used in this project is 
the reason behind my initial decision to adopt a mixed methods approach. 47 The main aim of the 
research was to explore whether the CRC is considered to have been an effective instrument. 
Therefore, the quantitative data will provide a general backdrop, whilst the qualitative data is 
intended to provide a deeper understanding of how the CRC operates. Whilst it is unusual for the 
qualitative methods to be the primary focus in a mixed methods study, it is not unheard of.48  
 
Whilst not a novel methodology (work using this methodology can be seen to date back as far as 
1855),49 mixed methods research is growing in popularity and influence.50 That is not to say that the 
approach is without criticism in the literature. Denzin states, for example, that there is a need to 
acknowledge the messiness of mixed methods.51 In addition, there has been discussion that would 
suggest that mixed methods research subordinates qualitative research below quantitative research.52 
This problem is overcome by the acknowledgement that qualitative research has much to contribute 
to this project (indeed, it is the primary focus of this project); and by the thorough integration of both 
quantitative and qualitative into the project.53 In the present study, qualitative research will provide 
a crucial fleshing out of our understanding of how environmental taxation is perceived by those 
affected by it, and is an insight that would never be obtained by quantitative data alone.  
 
Furthermore, there are logistical difficulties with mixed methods research - the costs in both time and 
money of conducting the research. This is a salient point, due to the time constraints attached to 
conducting doctoral research as well as financial considerations. There is also a question of training; 
as the researcher would need to be competent with both the qualitative and quantitative methods.54 
Teddlie and Tashakkori argue that to combat these criticisms, mixed methods research should only be 
used when it is necessary to answer a research question.55 In the present study, I wanted to explore 
                                                          
47 Abbas Tashakkori and John Creswell, ‘Developing Publishable Mixed Methods Manuscripts’ (2007) 1(2) 
JMMR 107; and Abbas Tashakkori and John Creswell, ‘Exploring the Nature of Research Questions in Mixed 
Methods Research’ (2007) 1(3) JMMR 207, 207. 
48 Hesse-Biber (n 4), 14. 
49 Ibid, 2. 
50 Ibid, 1. 
51 Cresswell (n 12), p278. 
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and uncover how the CRC has been perceived by those affected by it and this would have been 
impossible without the use of interviews and participant involvement. In addition, the known benefits 
of mixed methods research make this approach useful in the current study. 
 
Johnson et al argue that such a blend of qualitative and quantitative methods allows the researcher 
to gain a broader and deeper understanding of the problem.56 The blend also allows “words, pictures 
and narrative” to be added to the quantitative data in order to develop a meaning to the numbers.57  
The approach allows the researcher to have multiple ways of seeing the problem at hand.58 There are 
further benefits to employing a mixed methods framework to this research. Greene et al and Hesse-
Biber both raise three key advantages to using a mixed methods approach which influenced my 
decision to adopt a multi-method approach: triangulation; complementarity; and expansion.59 The 
first benefit of triangulation will be considered in more detail below, in section 2.2.3, which considers 
how the two sets of data will be brought together to examine the same research questions.60  
 
A second benefit of complementarity allows the researcher to “gain a fuller understanding of the 
research question” as one data type enhances the other.61 It allows the strengths of each method to 
enhance the other.62 In this particular study, the quantitative data complements the qualitative by 
providing a statistical backdrop to the CRC on which to build the more detailed picture. The approach 
also allows me to give voice to two different perspectives: the raw emissions data published by the 
government; as well as those of the participants.63 Ultimately, the complementarity of both sets 
means that bringing them together allows me to create a much “bigger picture” of the CRC.64  
 
Finally, Greene et al and Hesse-Biber speak of expansion, which is the extension of the breadth and 
range of the enquiry by potentially producing more detailed findings than would be otherwise 
produced without a mixed methods approach.65 By collecting data from a wider range of sources and 
                                                          
56 Burke Johnson, Anthony Onwuegbuzie and Lisa Turner, ‘Towards a Definition of Mixed Methods Research’ 
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http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/89/1/MethodsReviewPaperNCRM-005.pdf accessed 01 November 2017, p12. 
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stakeholders, a greater and more comprehensive understanding of the research topic can be 
achieved.66 This is not necessarily the case in my current study as the Environment Agency data does 
not truly broaden the range of enquiry. Rather, the use of quantitative data in this study is another 
perspective, which will enable me to tell the story of the CRC. I consider the analysis arising from the 
quantitative data to be the broader, foundational blocks of the story of the CRC, with the deeper 
qualitative data identifying the more specific issues that arise from the scheme. I argue that without 
both methods, the story of the CRC would not be as rich. Indeed, the quantitative data would not 
stand alone very well,67 and so it necessary to combine this with the qualitative interviews. The next 
section will now consider the bringing together of these two methods.  
 
2.2.3 Method design 
 
Triangulation is one of the benefits of a mixed methods strategy.68 Traditionally, triangulation brings 
together the two data types so that the one may validate the other.69 However, in my study, I was 
conscious of the fact that the quantitative data may not reflect the issues raised in the qualitative 
phase of the project. In light of this, I still saw value in bringing the data sets together for two main 
reasons: 1) regardless of whether the data sets agree, they still form part of the CRC story; and, 2) it 
is interesting to consider how and why the two data sets diverge from one another. In this sense, I will 
be using triangulation as a way of bringing two different, yet complimentary, data sets together.70 
There are four major designs that are commonly used for mixed methods research: the triangulation 
design, the embedded design, the explanatory design and the exploratory design.71 The reasons for 
choosing a certain design will be made clear throughout the rest of this section, but I will first explain 
my reasons for dismissing the other designs. The embedded design is where the qualitative data is 
secondary to the quantitative data.72 As such, I have dismissed the design asfor both of my data sets 
are of equal weight but have been used differently. The explanatory design uses qualitative data to 
subsequently explain the quantitative data,73 and whilst the role of my qualitative data has been to 
help explain any quantitative findings, the qualitative data also has the purpose of painting a picture 
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of the CRC in combination with the quantitative data. Finally, the exploratory design builds on the 
explanatory design where there is a need for further exploration for the quantitative data by the 
qualitative data (for example, where a variable needs to be explored further).74 Again, this is not the 
primary purpose of the study, and whilst the qualitative data may help to shed some light on the 
quantitative data, the focus is on the two data sets working together. Some aspects of each of the four 
designs reflect within the current study, however, the design chosen encompasses the primary 
purpose of the study. 
 
This study has adopted the triangulation design as a structure for this thesis. It is a "well-known 
approach"75 which brings together research from different sources to "obtain different but 
complementary data on the same topic".76 A succinct definition of the aims of triangulation can be 
seen within the work of Brewer and Hunter: 
 
"Triangulated measurement tries to pinpoint the values of a phenomenon more 
accurately by sighting in on it from different methodological viewpoints".77  
 
The design essentially keeps the two different data sources separate (quantitative data and analysis 
can be found in Chapter 3, while the substantive qualitative chapters can be found in Chapters 4 
onwards), until the two sources are interpreted together to more effectively answer a problem (see 
Chapter 8). Cresswell and Plano Clark explain the use of the triangulation design as: 
 
"the design is used when a researcher wants to directly compare and contrast 
quantitative statistical results with qualitative findings or to validate or expand 
quantitative results with qualitative data."78 
 
In this study, the quantitative data and analysis is presented first as a foundation for the thesis. This is 
subsequently followed by the qualitative data which seeks to paint a deeper picture of the CRC 
through the eyes of those involved with it. To determine whether the CRC is an effective instrument, 
both emissions statistics (quantitative data) and participant perceptions (qualitative data) will be 
                                                          
74 Ibid, p75. 
75 Ibid, p62. 
76 Janice Morse, Approaches to qualitative-quantitative methodological triangulation (1991) 40 Nursing 
Research 120, 122. 
77 John Brewer and Albert Hunter, Multimethod research: A synthesis of styles (1989 Sage), p17. 
78 Cresswell and Plano Clark (n 25), p62. 
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brought together. This depth of analysis would not be achieved by quantitative data analysis or 
qualitative data analysis alone.   
 
The data is kept distinctly separate until it is time to interpret the results of both datasets in Chapter 
8. As such, this study will not adopt the simple triangulation design but will adopt the convergence 
model of the triangulation design.79 This model goes one step further than the standard triangulation 
design by explicitly separating out the two data sets throughout the process until a final interpretation 
is conducted using both sets of data. This suits the present study well, as the quantitative data will be 







Diagram illustrating the convergence model of the triangulation design.80 
 
Whilst there have been appraisals of the triangulation design, there have also been criticisms. These 
need to be dealt with to justify the adoption of this design for the present study. Cresswell and Plano 
Clark outline a number of potential criticisms of the triangulation design, of which four are relevant to 
the CRC study.81 The first criticism is that researchers need to bear in mind the fact that having at least 
two different samples and sample sizes will have consequences when considering both data sets 
together; and that it is crucial to specify the interplay between both the quantitative and qualitative 
data.82 Whilst this is an important consideration, my study into the CRC has already borne this in mind 
during its development - for the quantitative data will provide a more general insight into the CRC 
with a smaller, deeper insight provided by the qualitative data.  
                                                          
79 Ibid, pp62-63. 
80 Ibid, p63. 
81 Ibid, pp66-67. 



























Secondly, Cresswell and Plano Clark build upon this by saying that it could be difficult to converge the 
two types of data. Again, this has been considered by accepting the fact that the quantitative data 
analysis will provide the background context to the qualitative data which will then fill in the fine detail 
of the study. I do not believe that the data sets need to be identical to converge them in this manner. 
Thirdly, there is the risk that the two data sets may not agree with one another. This is the case with 
the current study, for whilst the quantitative data demonstrates that the CRC has been effective on 
some level, the qualitative data is very much mixed in terms of how participants view the CRC. Bringing 
the two types of data together naturally introduces a conflict. I therefore acknowledge that this 
conflict exists, but the two types of data remain of interest as they still paint the picture of the CRC. It 
is also perfectly possible that the CRC is effective (based on the emissions data), but that the 
regulatees despise its existence (and so it is painted as inefficient in the qualitative data). Even if the 
emissions data indicate an effective instrument, the fact that participants do not view the scheme as 
effective is striking and is worthy of exploration. Unexpected results are a possibility in any study, and 
the diverging data sets provide a rich source of interpretation for this thesis.  
 
Finally, it requires a lot of time and expertise to collect and analyse two data types at the same time; 
however, this study perfectly suits simultaneous data collection, since the quantitative data is already 
readily available via the Environment Agency. Without the need to collect data for the quantitative 
aspect of the project, allows the two data sets to run parallel to one another harmoniously. In addition, 
the triangulation approach also has benefits to a study. It has been described as an "intuitive design" 
when dealing with two types of data,83 and it is certainly simpler than trying to convert both data sets 
to weave them together at an earlier point in the study design. It is also an efficient design in terms of 
time,84 as both data sets may be collected at the same time rather than one after another. This is a 
significant benefit of the triangulation design for the present study which has ambitious data goals. 
Finally, each type of data can be collected and subsequently analysed. This allows for the most to be 
taken from each of the data sets and minimises any loss from the convergence of the two sets of data. 
I will now consider the design of each methodological approach in the following section. 
 
 
                                                          
83 Cresswell and Plano Clark (n 25), p66. 
84 Ibid.  
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2.3 Qualitative Methods  
 
I opted to conduct interviews for this project because I wished to obtain wider perspectives on the 
CRC from the people who are involved with it. I believed that it was important to gain this perspective 
to understand how the CRC operates in practice and whether it was perceived to be effective in 
practice. In the main, these interviews were conducted over the telephone for the convenience of the 
interviewee. However, on five occasions, I was able to conduct the interview face-to-face, and this 
enabled me to explore participants’ experiences in more detail.85 The interviews themselves were 
semi-structured and I had identified a number of issues (that I had gleaned from the literature) 
beforehand.86 However, I was looking to glean “an account of the values and experiences of the 
respondent in terms meaningful to them”.87 Therefore, whilst I had a list of questions covering certain 
topics as a starting point, the interviewee was free to answer in the manner they saw best, and free 
to introduce new ideas and topics.88 Brinkmann and Kvale describe the semi-structured interview as 
an “openness to changes of sequence and forms of questions in order to follow up on the specific 
answers given and the stories told by subjects”.89 
 
The issues therefore naturally changed and developed through the course of the itnerviews. As such, 
I had to be flexible and change the interview schedule during and after the pilot study; and, indeed, 
during the interviews themselves.90 This allowed interviewees to develop their ideas and drive the 
direction of the interviews.91 This was critical for this study as I was looking at how the CRC has been 
perceived by the interviewees, and not what I thought they had perceived. During the interviews, I 
used open-ended questions which allowed interviewees to express themselves in their own words.92 
I avoided the use of ‘leading questions’, as I did not want to influence the answers provided by 
interviewees.93 Drawing upon literature, I also kept questions as simple as possible and considered my 
use of language to ensure that the questions did not incite closed or short answers.94 The interview 
schedules can be found in Appendices 1 and 2. 
                                                          
85 Tim May, Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process (3rd Edition) (Open University Press 2001). 
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87 Neil Stephens, ‘Collecting Data from Elites and Ultra-Elites: Telephone and Face-to-Face Interviews with 
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88 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (OUP 2008), p438. 
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edition) (Sage 2015), p150. 
90 Raymond Lee, Doing Research on Sensitive Topics (Sage 1993). 
91 Gilbert (n 31). 
92 May (n 85). 
93 Brinkmann and Kvale (n 89), pp199-200. 




The following section of this Chapter will take a closer look at the interviews that have been conducted 
as part of this project. Interview theory will be considered as well as the practical methods and 
methodology of the interviews themselves. Broader aspects of the project, such as ethics, will also be 
outlined. First, I turn to the pilot study. 
 
2.3.1 The Pilot interviews 
 
My anticipated problems in the early part of the study were primarily concerned with data collection. 
The primary problem was likely to be interview recruitment; that is identifying suitable candidates for 
the study and arranging an interview with them. As such, I was conscious to keep re-evaluating the 
success of my recruitment strategy, which is one of the reasons why a pilot study was introduced. In 
addition, other anticipated problems revolved concerned the interview questionnaire. I was 
apprehensive that the questions would not be suitable for two reasons: 1) They simply might not have 
gone down well with interviewees, in the sense that interviewees did not respond well to them; and 
2) I might have missed out further relevant questions on issues that I had not identified in the first 
draft of the interview questionnaire. Once again, I thought that the pilot study would help to rectify 
this. 
 
Initially, between 30 and 40 interviews were planned, and in light of the literature which dictates that 
interviews should be carefully thought out alongside the research questions,95 several drafts were 
made of the interview questionnaire. Interviewing, however, is an art and not a science.96 Therefore, 
the interviewing process included a pilot interview stage where the initial interview questionnaire was 
tried and tested and then amended in light of issues that were raised during these initial interviews. 
This allowed me to obtain the most relevant data in the most efficient way. I decided to undertake 
between 4-5 interviews for the pilot study, with the intention of using these initial interviews to amend 
and improve my interview questionnaire and interview technique. In addition, I made the decision to 
limit the pilot study to the university participants of the scheme. This was for two reasons: universities 
would give a useful insight into the public-sector approach to the scheme; and they would also be 
understanding, hopefully, of the need to develop and work on interview questions for the purposes 
of research.  
 
                                                          
95 Steinar Kvale, Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (Sage 1996), p12.  
96 Ibid, p13.  
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Following this decision, it was necessary to determine the sampling method for the pilot interview. I 
decided to choose a random sampling method, which is a form of probability sampling that allows me 
to generalise my results.97 The random sampling was conducted by populating a spreadsheet with the 
names of the universities that participated in the scheme, in the order that they are featured within 
the 2013-2014 ARP (alphabetically). Then, using a random number generator,98 I generated five 
random numbers (using the number of universities as the range). For example, if the generator gave 
me the number 2, then I would contact the second university on the list, the number 7 would 
represent the seventh on the list and so forth. These five numbers represented the first five 
universities that I would contact for the pilot interview. 
 
On reflection, this method of choosing participants made it difficult for me to recruit a sufficient 
sample for the pilot study because I had to contact a high number of participants to get enough 
positive responses. The process for recruiting the pilot participants was adapted during the 
recruitment process itself. Initially, I planned to contact the five universities with the invitation by 
email. However, this was quickly changed to 10 universities, and finally to 50 universities, to 
compensate for the fact that the response rate would not be 100%. In the future, I would increase the 
number of potential interviewees contacted from the start of the study, as waiting for responses and 
incrementally increasing the pool of potential recruits was a slow and arduous process. A small 
number of the candidates responded quickly, but the general response was slow and not positive. It 
was therefore necessary for me to chase potential participants on several occasions before receiving 
a positive response.  I decided to follow up the initial email within two weeks with a second, follow up 
email. In addition, I contacted a number of institutions by phone, but again had only limited success. 
From the 50 universities that were contacted, I received eight positive responses, three negative 
responses, and 39 without response. My pilot study therefore consists of eight interviews which were 
conducted between October 2015 and January 2016.  
 
Fortunately, the pilot study did give me the opportunity to trial my initial interview schedule. The pilot 
study also allowed me to draw some initial conclusions on the data;99 and I was flexible to new ideas 
that were raised by interviewees that were not in my original interview schedule.100  The result of this 
was that the interview schedule changed significantly to include the themes raised by the interviewees 
including the revenues of the CRC. Overall, I found the pilot study to be incredibly formative to the 
                                                          
97 Sharan Merriam, Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation (Wiley 2009), p77. 
98 The random number generator can be found at https://www.random.org/ accessed 10/08/2015.  
99 Lisa Given (Ed), The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods (Sage 2008), p624. 
100 May (n 85). 
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final interview schedule used in the main study phase. Appendix 2 contains both the pilot and revised 
interview questionnaire.  
 
2.3.2 Main study phase 
 
Following the pilot study of the project, I progressed onto the main phase of interviewing. Once again, 
I had problems recruiting interviewees for the study. For this stage of the project, I decided to target 
interviewees who fell under the following three headings: participants of the CRC; solicitors/ advisers 
of the CRC; and the regulator. By targeting three different aspects of the CRC, I hoped to triangulate 
the various views of the CRC and draw conclusions that take into account views from all sides of the 
CRC. The approaches for each type of interviewee were different and will be discussed in turn.  
 
2.3.2.a The regulator 
 
The regulator was identified and contacted directly for the project. This communication consisted of 
an email which was sent directly to the regulator and resulted in an interview being scheduled. A 
limitation of this interview is that I selected the interviewee, and that there is no element of 
randomness to this sample. However, since the administrator for the CRC is fixed in the CRC Order, 
there was no way to bypass this. This interview was conducted face-to-face, and was the longest 
interview conducted under the study (at 91 minutes in length). It provided me with a unique 
opportunity to allow the regulator to express itself at length.101 
 
As will be discussed below, following this interview, my research was advertised to all the participants 
of the CRC via a newsletter in April 2016: 
 
“Request for Volunteers – Research Project on Environmental Taxation  
Amy Louise Lawton of Birmingham University is looking for participants of the 
CRC Energy Efficiency scheme to participate in a project exploring the purpose 
and design of environmental taxation; and the role that environmental taxation 
could and should play within the climate change arena, using the CRC as a case 
study. She is interested in anyone who has been a participant for either phase 
of the CRC. It is a great opportunity for you to share your views in an 
independent study of the scheme.  
                                                          
101 Ibid.  
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Participants of the study will take part in a short (30-40 minute) interview with 
Amy, and all interviews will be on an anonymous and confidential basis. If you 
would be interested in taking part in this project, please send an email to 
a.l.lawton@bham.ac.uk.” 
 
This advertisement was key to this study’s viability as it provided me with a fresh access point to those 
involved in the CRC. Following the circulation of this newsletter, the project received interest from 
both participants and consultants and provided me with the opportunity to schedule a further 16 
interviews in April and May 2016. Without this newsletter, it is likely that I would have struggled to 
recruit a sufficient number of people to the study. I now turn to the recruitment of participants of the 
CRC. 
 
2.3.2.b Participants of the CRC 
 
Following the approach taken for the pilot interviews, I initially contacted the participants in the same 
way. I used the 2013-2014 ARP as a point of reference,102 and used a number generator to identify the 
participants that I would contact. Using this method, I generated 25 participant names. Due to the 
constraints of my ethical approval, if the number for a local authority or NHS trust was generated, I 
simply generated a new number and moved on.103  
 
Participants of the CRC tend to be large, private organisations and it was difficult to identify the CRC 
contact within the organisation. As such, I took the decision to contact these organisations by letter, 
as I was able to send the letter to the registered headquarters of the company.104 I sent out 25 letters 
to the 25 names on the list. Out of those 25, I received two negative responses and the remaining 
number did not respond. A month later, following the low response rate, I sent out a further 60 letters 
to participants identified in the same manner. Of these 60 letters, I received a further two negative 
responses with the remaining number not responding. It was quickly apparent that this approach was 
not yielding results. Following the advertisement of my project in the CRC newsletter, I received 
interest from a further 16 people who were willing to be interviewed – these were a blend of 
                                                          
102 Note that as of January 2016, the 2014-2015 ARP still had not been published and as such, the author was 
still relying on the 2013-2014 ARP. 
103 This is because my ethical approval did not allow me to include NHS trusts or local authorities in the 
research. In order to be able to contact these organisations, an additional ethical approval was required. At the 
time of the study, following advice from my supervisors, I decided not to apply for this additional approval.  
104 A copy of the letter can be found in Appendix 4. 
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participants and consultants for the CRC. Therefore, the interviewees for my main interviews were 
self-selecting.  
 
The demographic of the participants I interviewed varied. I interviewed participants from the following 
sectors: Higher education; construction; utilities; retail; transport and logistics; hospitality; the NHS; 
and local authorities.105 I therefore had a mix of public and private participants from a range of sectors. 
A limitation of this is that whilst I had a varied range of interviewees from the participant pool, I did 
not have the opportunity to probe deeply into specific sectors. I acknowledge, therefore, that my data 
is more of an overview of the participants of the CRC and cannot be used to explain trends in specific 
sectors. In terms of organisation size, my interviewees also varied. Due to the nature of the CRC, all 
the organisations would be considered ‘large’ organisations as the scheme was designed to capture 
larger consumers of energy.106 However, within this, there is still a wide range of organisations. This 
study included an interview with an organisation that only just fell into the CRC with a liability in the 
tens of thousands of pounds; but also included an interview with one of the emitters in the top 1% of 
the scheme, with a liability figuring in the millions. Most organisations naturally fell in the middle and 
there was generally a six figure (i.e. above £100,000) liability under the CRC. The individuals 
interviewed were generally male (two interviews were with women in this category) with a career 
history in environmental management. The interviews also consisted of organisations throughout the 
UK (except for Northern Ireland), although there was a concentration of organisations in the South 
East of England. A good mix of different organisations were represented in the interview data set.  
 
2.3.2.c Solicitors/ advisers of the CRC 
 
It was not easy to identify which solicitors had a practise on the CRC, either from an existing list of 
solicitors, or from the websites of key firms. In order to identify these solicitors, I generated a possible 
list of solicitors from the Law Society website.107 The list consisted of 86 solicitors who potentially 
worked on the CRC, and I systematically took the name of every other solicitor on the list (so the first, 
third, fifth and so on). If the solicitor did not practise in the UK, I moved to the next solicitor on the 
list. This gave me a shorter list of 43 solicitors to contact, which was achieved by a short email 
addressed to the solicitor, a copy of which can be found in Appendix 5.  
                                                          
105 Note, that whilst I could not actively contact NHS/ Local Authorities under my ethical approval, I was 
permitted to interview them if the approached me following the newsletter (permission granted April 2016). 
106 For more information on the workings of the CRC scheme, see Chapter Three.  
107 This list was generated by filtering solicitors who practised in environmental law and more specifically, 




One of the main difficulties in interviewing solicitors is that they are ‘elites’.108 Whilst they are used to 
being interviewed or asked their opinion,109 they are also time poor, and so recruitment to the study 
was a particular concern. Following contact with the first 43 solicitors, I received one positive 
response. Two weeks later, I sent a reminder email to the 42 remaining solicitors and received seven 
positive replies as a result. Of those seven, five scheduled interviews, and four interviews were 
eventually undertaken.110 From the five interviews undertaken, one further solicitor was identified, 
and an interview scheduled. I undertook a total of six interviews with solicitors. My response rate was 
therefore relatively low, but this in line with the idea that lawyers are busy and hard to access.111 A 
further demonstration of this is that one solicitor submitted a short monograph style email in the place 
of an interview because he was too busy to do an interview.  
 
In addition, elite interviewing can skew the interview dynamic. Here, there is a tendency for the 
researcher to “be in awe” or to be “intimidated” by the people they are interviewing.112 These feelings 
can come from a range of sources such as the solicitor’s status, influence or expertise.113 It can result 
in the interviewer being “talked down to” in light of the interviewee’s elite status.114 I found that when 
interviewing these solicitors, such a talking down was not really present. I did not feel patronised by 
the solicitors, nor was I made to feel intimidated during the interview. What was interesting was that 
I had some experience of what is termed “gate-keeping questions”,115 where the solicitors would test 
my knowledge of the CRC by asking specific questions. For example questions such as “I don’t know 
whether you have heard of X”, and “I’m not sure how much you know about Y” preceded some 
explanations of more complex points. My background as a researcher (without experience in the legal 
profession) probably did not help the dynamic of the interview,116 and the interviewees were explicitly 
told that I was a doctoral student. Overall, however, I do not believe that the elite nature of these 
                                                          
108 Steven Vaughan, ‘Elite and Elite-Lite Interviewing: Managing Our Industrial Legacy’ in Alex Franklin and Paul 
Blyton (Eds), Researching Sustainability: A Guide to Social Science Methods, Practice and Engagement 
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interviews negatively impacted on the views that were expressed by the solicitors, and I noticed a shift 
away from gate keeping questions as the interview progressed.117 
 
Following the advertisement of my research in the CRC newsletter, I also received interest from 
consultants who were willing to be interviewed. In total, 31 interviews were conducted. Whilst there 
is no magic number for the number of interviews to make a study viable, there needs to be enough 
interviews to answer the intended study question. 118 In the case of the current study, I believe 31 
interviews were sufficient to answer the research questions in this thesis, as recurrent themes were 
present throughout all interviews. Below is a summary of all interviews. 
 
Interview stage Number of interviews  Demographic of interviewees 
Pilot Interviews 8 Universities across the UK. 
Solicitor Interviews 6  Solicitors largely based in 
London and the South of 
England. 
Main Interviews 16 A mix of participants (12) and 
consultants (4). 
Participants from across the UK 
geographically and a wide 
range of sectors (hospitality, 
retail, utilities, logistics and 
education). 
Regulator 1  
 TOTAL 31 Note: an additional monograph 
was submitted which has also 
been coded. Therefore, 32 






                                                          
117 Perhaps because of my dogged explanations of more complex aspects of the CRC, whereby I gained some 
respect from the elites. See, Vaughan (n 108), Chapter 7. 
118 Merriam (n 97), p80; Kvale (n 95), p101. 
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2.3.4 Access, ethics and informed consent  
 
For all research undertaken at the University of Birmingham, ethical approval must be obtained.119 
Ethics approval for this project was obtained in August 2015 through the University of Birmingham via 
a process of self-assessment and an ethics approval form which was then approved by the 
University.120 The process required me to consider the potential ethical questions raised by my project, 
as well as how to handle the data and obtain informed consent. Both anonymity and confidentiality 
posed significant problems for my research - for without both, there is the risk that the participants of 
the study could be exposed to negative publicity depending on their response to the interview 
questions. The data used within the study therefore had to be both confidential and anonymous. 
 
To ensure that the data was both confidential and anonymous, a number of precautionary measures 
were taken. Most of the raw interview data (sound files) were sent to a private company for 
transcription. Before transcription, the transcription company was required to sign a confidentiality 
agreement prior to them receiving the sound files. Once the data had been transcribed, I went through 
all the data and redacted any confidential information that could identify the participant. This left a 
transcript that could not be linked back to the original participant and was followed by a permanent 
deletion of the original transcript and recording. From then on, only the redacted files were retained 
for the rest of the project. For analysis, the participant will not be linked to any ID number or name. 
Only their regional location and ‘type of organisation’ information (e.g. retail, education etc.) will be 
retained. These steps should mitigate the above risks and prevent any negative portrayal of an 
individual organisation, as well as limit the ability of third parties to identify who participated in the 
study.  
 
In addition, I secured informed consent from my participants. Simply obtaining consent may not be 
sufficient when undertaking a qualitative study, and this is particularly relevant when the interviews 
are to be recorded.121 It is therefore necessary to obtain further consent.122 In addition, the University 
requires the consent to be an informed consent,123 and a failure to implement a strategy for obtaining 
                                                          
119 University of Birmingham, Code of Practice for Research 2014, paragraph 7.1 
120 See https://intranet.birmingham.ac.uk/finance/accounting/Research-Support-Group/Research-
Ethics/University-Ethical-Review.aspx accessed 22/05/2015 
121 David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction (Sage 
2001), p271. 
122 Ibid.  
123 University of Birmingham, Code of research, paragraph 10.1.6(iv). 
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informed consent could be deemed as negligence.124 Silverman argues that informed consent includes 
the provision of information that is understood by the participants who are volunteering.125 As the 
project targeted adult businessmen, lawyers and civil servants, I was relatively unconcerned about 
their ability to provide informed consent. Nonetheless, a procedure was designed and developed to 
obtain informed consent for the current study.  
 
The participants of the study were asked to give their consent on two occasions: firstly, by email, when 
the details of the interview are confirmed; and secondly, at the start of their interview. As all the 
interviews were recorded, there remains a permanent record of their oral consent given at the start 
of each interview in the interview transcript. For the consent to be informed, the participants received 
a participant information sheet,126 which detailed all the information relevant for the study 
(withdrawal, contact details, the data collection and analysis etc.). The sheet was written in clear and 
simple language so that it was accessible to all participants; there was also the opportunity for 
participants to email any further questions that they may have had to ensure that they had understood 
both the contents of the information sheet and the study itself: none of the interviewees emailed me 
any questions.  
 
2.3.5 Analysis of the data 
 
The purpose of qualitative data analysis is to make sense of the data.127 There is no one correct way 
to analyse qualitative data.Rather, the method of analysis should consider the purpose of the study 
and integrate this purpose into the methods used from the start.128 There are risks attached to the 
fact that this analysis was conducted by a human (i.e. me), and it is important that any analysis is 
systematic, disciplined and transparent to ensure that the analysis is conducted in a rigorous 
manner.129 The purpose of this study is to identify and perceive CRC participants’ perceptions of the 
scheme; as well as identify how their level of engagement links to existing tax and regulatory theory. 
The method of analysis will therefore be largely thematic and will draw upon the existing literature in 
these areas. 
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At the outset, a decision was taken to transcribe all of the interview data to ensure that the data was 
clear and readily accessible for data analysis once the interviews had been completed.130It was 
thought that doing this would enable me to re-familiarise myself with the data.131 Initially, the decision 
to transcribe for clarity was balanced against the factor of time (roughly three to four hours per hour 
of recording),132 as well as the ethical issues that are raised by transcribing interview data. The 
interview data was transcribed from the audio recording of the interview. As it is important to start 
data analysis from the outset,133I transcribed my first few interviews immediately after the interview. 
This allowed me to review the initial data in light of my research questions,134 and where appropriate, 
alter my approach to the interview. Due to the risks of basing my transcriptions solely on an audio 
recording of the interview, I also made the decision to take notes during the interview, both as a 
transcription aid135 and in case of technology failure. 
 
I therefore transcribed my first four interviews verbatim myself, following the start of the pilot study 
and removed any identifiers within the data. Following the receipt of external funding from the 
Chartered Institute of Taxation, the decision was made to get the rest of the interview recordings 
professionally transcribed. Therefore, 27 of the recordings were transcribed ‘intelligent verbatim’ 
(which removes stutters and repeated words) by an external company. Once the transcripts were 
returned, I then began the process of cleaning and redacting the data to make it confidential and 
anonymous. To clean the data, I listened once again to the recordings with the transcripts open. 
Overall, there were few issues with the transcripts; it was largely a matter of correcting a few lesser-
known acronyms which had been typed incorrectly. The cleaned, redacted copies of the transcripts 
were then uploaded into NVivo 11 for coding.  
 
2.3.6.a Initial exploration of the data 
 
I presented on the initial findings of my data at a conference before I had coded my data.136 I therefore 
familiarised myself with the data before the coding process began. A difficulty with this was that there 
was a lot of data to read and reflect upon. However, it gave me the opportunity to get an initial idea 
                                                          
130 Willow Powers, Transcription Techniques for the Spoken Word (AltaMira Press 2005), 25. 
131 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3(2) Qualitative Research 
in Psychology 77, 87. 
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133 David Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook (Sage 2000), p121. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Powers (n 130), p29. 
136 Society of Legal Scholars conference, 2016, Oxford: UK. 
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of the themes that were emerging from the data. Reading through all the data before coding allows 
researchers to focus on the data as a whole, rather than the intricacies that are identified with 
coding.137 I therefore read through each interview transcript twice, in order to “capture the essential 
nature of what was being spoken of”.138 In hindsight, I would have preferred to have read through the 
transcripts one more time – as I believe this would have made the process of coding much swifter. 
Another limitation is that reading through transcripts categorises the data by document, rather than 
allowing ideas to cut through all the data.139 
 
2.3.6.b Coding the data 
 
For most researchers, coding forms a key part of any analysis of qualitative data;140 as it forms the 
foundations of any subsequent analysis.141 Coding can be used to identify themes and develop theory 
from qualitative interview data.142 Auerbach and Silverstein define a theory as “a description of a 
pattern that you find in the data”.143 It helps by allowing the researcher to look across the data as a 
whole, rather than by individual piece of data.144 It is a process of both data reduction and data 
retention,145 by keeping relevant parts of the data. 
 
I used NVivo 11 to code my data.146 I found the use of this software to be helpful, as it allowed me to 
readily visualise the themes in the data and organise my ideas. Using software to aid the coding 
process is not a novel idea.147 Some issues have been raised about the use of software for analysing 
data,148 including technological aversion and the potential to make errors due to the complexity of 
coding programmes. However, NVivo is a useful programme which focusses on providing the 
researcher places in which to store and visualise their data to facilitate analysis.149 In addition, I 
attended a training course on NVivo in March 2016, which equipped me with the skills required for 
                                                          
137 Patricia Bazeley, Qualitative Data Analysis: Practical Strategies (SAGE 2013), p101. 
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using the software. I went through the codes several times in the software in order to streamline the 
nodes, a process which has been labelled first and second cycle coding in the literature.150 
 
2.3.6.d First cycle coding 
 
A number of methods can be used to initially code data, and these can be mixed and matched in order 
to complete what is referred to as ‘First Cycle’ coding.151 These methods are largely low-inference 
codes, i.e. fairly descriptive, used to build a foundation for later coding cycles.152 I identified a number 
of First Cycle coding methods which were relevant to this study: sub-coding; simultaneous coding; 
emotion coding; and theming the data. I used these methods alongside one another to initially identify 
codes within the interview data.  
 
Sub-coding is the process of attributing further codes to an initial code in order to develop detail and 
to enrich meaning.153 It is especially useful when there is a volume of data and a greater depth of 
categorisation is desired.154 In this study, whilst the volume of data is not particularly great (31 
interview transcripts and 1 short monograph of two pages), sub-coding was useful to organise codes 
– i.e. to allow for broader codes to contain more detailed codes, which was a useful tool to organise 
my data. In addition, emotion coding allows data to be labelled in terms of emotions that are 
experienced by participants.155 By coding the emotions in my data, I was able to gain a deeper insight 
into participant perspectives,156 and therefore, their perceptions of the CRC. Since I am particularly 
interested in whether the participants are willing to engage with the CRC, I limited these codes to 
“engaged” and “disengaged”. This limited the amount of emotion I was able to explore, but I decided 
that a full emotive coding would have produced little reward for the time cost involved. 
 
The main approach to coding my data was theming the data. This is the most pertinent approach to 
coding my data, since I will be drawing upon the relevant literature bases to create meaning in the 
data. Theming the data involves attributing a meaning to a unit of data, whether that is a word or a 
phrase.157 It is a way of organising repeating ideas within the data into implicit topics, as a way getting 
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to the core meaning of the data.158 This is because a theme is not limited to a specific extract of text, 
but is something that runs throughout the data.159 It is argued that this is an active process, with the 
researcher playing a role in identifying the themes and selecting those which are of interest.160 Whilst 
there is not one correct way to go about this, a logical approach to thematic coding is to draw on 
literature at the start of the coding process.161 Building upon this, my choice of themes is only one way 
of interpreting the data from this study.162 It is also important to attribute names to these repeating 
ideas, in order to create the themes, and the goal of this naming is to strike to the core of the repeating 
idea.163 To achieve this, I drew upon the surrounding literature to attribute meaningful names to the 
codes. As such, my codes referred to ideas and themes within regulatory, tax, nudge and governance 
literature. Whilst there is no set number of themes to identify, it is important to only code what is 
necessary to avoid too great a volume of codes and/ or themes.164 Auerbach and Silverstein suggest 
around 60 themes are sufficient for a study.165 In the end, this study had 70 nodes.166  
 
Following this process, I mapped the codes. This is the process of reorganising the full list of codes and 
condensing them further to create a smaller number of central themes.167 This was particularly useful 
in the present study. I discovered several themes were repeated that were essentially identical and 
could be condensed (for example, I initially had both simplicity and complexity, but decided to 
condense this down to the idea of complexity alone); as well as identifying codes that were core to 
my study (for example regulatory overlap). Overall, I deleted eight codes that were either repetitive 
or proved to be insignificant (as they only featured in single interviews). 
 
2.3.6.e Second cycle coding 
 
Similar to code mapping, second cycle coding is the recoding of data to ensure that the most accurate 
words or phrases are used; as well as the reorganising and reanalysing data which is coded during the 
first cycle.168 In addition, second cycle coding gives the researcher an opportunity to review the data 
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and start to introduce theoretical codes (also referred to as analytical or pattern codes169), which are 
umbrella codes that cover the codes already identified during the first cycle.170 These codes are larger, 
and more abstract than those identified in first cycle coding, and are also referred to as theoretical 
constructs.171 It allows the researcher to identify their core conceptual categories that are emerging 
from the data.172 During this stage, I thought about the main, overarching themes that ran through 
my data. This allowed me to bring together several nodes into broader ideas. 
 
2.4 Quantitative Methods 
 
Statistics “play a vital role in collecting, summarising and interpreting data”.173 The statistical aspect 
of this project aims to shed light on the efficiency and effectiveness of the CRC. As the data is published 
annually by the regulator, the data did not need to be collected other than from the regulator itself. 
As such, the next section of this chapter will outline the sampling techniques and analysis 
methodology that was used to determine whether or not the CRC has had an impact on emissions. 
Basic statistical analysis will also be used to paint a broader picture of the scheme itself. 
 
2.4.1 Access to data 
 
The access to the data for statistical analysis was relatively simple. This is because the raw emissions 
data for the scheme is now published annually within the Annual Report Publication (following the 
2012 CRC reforms). As such, I based my analysis on all the annual data up to the most recent report 
available (the 2015-2016 ARP), which encompasses six years of raw emissions data. Another aspect of 
the data is that it is published within a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The benefits of using this data are 
clear: it is data that is readily accessible, and in an easy to use format. 
Whilst the data is simple to access, and the software easy to use; the data does have one drawback. 
The Environment Agency (EA) only publishes the raw data for emissions, and each year is on separate 
sheets of the document. In addition, the EA is clearly limited to publishing the data that they have 
received, and as such, there are 'holes' within the data. For example, although there are over 2500 
registered participants for phase one, there are only 2040 data entries for the compliance year 2013-
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2014. Furthermore, many participants do not have data for each of the four years (for example there 
is only data for the first two years, or the last two years). As such, the data needed considerable sorting 
and cross referencing before it could be used to represent all four years. A limitation of this aspect of 
the study is also that it will be limited in scope and will not cover every participant for the CRC. 
 
2.4.2 Approaches to statistical  analysis 
 
A range of statistical approaches was used to answer the question of whether the CRC has been 
effective. However, this analysis does not consider other variables which could impact on emissions 
(such as gains or losses in assets and increases or decreases in production) and so only provides an 
initial snapshot into the emissions under the CRC. I acknowledge that this is a major limitation in the 
utility of this data. Nevertheless, the time and resources required to gather the data on these other 
variables would have been beyond the confines of doctoral study. I believe that the very general 
trends shown by the statistics can still paint a background to the CRC. 
 
Initially, descriptive statistics were used to get an idea of trends in the emissions data. The descriptive 
statistics used with the CRC include: the total emissions; the median emissions; the mean (average) 
emissions; and the raw difference between yearly averages. Baguley argues that descriptive statistics 
“are an excellent starting point for most statistical analyses and are a good way to summarize and 
communicate information”.174 I found these descriptive statistics to be a useful starting point for my 
statistical analysis and allowed me to gain a provisional idea of what to expect from the more complex 
statistical analysis.  
 
Two forms of statistical analysis were then used to provide a basic picture of the CRC and the emissions 
of the participants. In order to determine whether there is a relationship between the first-year 
emissions (2010-2011) and the final year emissions (2013-2014) of Phase 1, a two-sample t-test was 
carried out. In addition, a further analysis of all the data was attempted to determine whether there 
is an annual change/ relationship in the data, by using a repeated measures analysis. The two 
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2.4.2.a Paired t-test 
 
There are four steps to carrying out a hypothesis test:175 
 
1. Set up the hypotheses; 
2. Specify the significance level; 
3. Compute the test statistic and generate the p value; 
4. Decide whether to accept or reject the hypothesis. 
 
The first step was to decide upon a hypothesis that I wanted to test using the t-test. It was my 
hypothesis that the CRC scheme has resulted in a reduction in emissions over the four years between 
2010 and 2014. As such, the null hypothesis will be that there has been no reduction, or no change in 
emissions (this will be represented by the term H0), and the alternative hypothesis will be that there 
has been a reduction in emissions (this will be represented by H1). Therefore, my hypothesis can be 
represented as follows: 
H0:  1 =   2 
H1:  1 >   2 
Within the above hypothesis,  is the population mean of the data set,176 and so   1 will be the mean 
for the 2010-2011 emissions data and so forth. Furthermore, as the test is looking to see whether the 
emissions have decreased, this will be a one tailed test - which means that is it only interested in 
whether the emissions have reduced, and not whether they have increased. SPSS generates a 2-tailed 
significance (which looks at whether there has been an increase or decrease in emissions), which 
means that the figure needs to be halved to obtain the one-tail figure.177  
 
The next step requires a significance level to be chosen. The significance level represents the 
percentage of error that will be taken - for instance, a 1% significance level means that the author can 
state that there is a relationship with 99% accuracy should the t-test be satisfied. For the purposes of 
this study, a 5% significance level has been chosen as this is the orthodox approach.178 
 
                                                          
175 See Robert Carver and Jane Nash, Doing Data Analysis with SPSS: Version 18.0 (Brooks/Cole Cengage 2012), 
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Once both the hypothesis and the significance level have been determined, it was then time to 
compute the t-test and generate a p value - which will be used to either accept or dismiss the null 
hypothesis (H0). The calculation for the t-test was conducted through SPSS, a statistical software 
package. To produce a p value, the emissions data for both the 2010-2011 year and the 2013-2014 
year were inputted into SPSS. This was achieved by simply copying the data column from Excel into 
SPSS. Once both variables were copied over, the test was conducted by first selecting the 'Analyse' 
tab, followed by 'Compare Means', and 'Paired Samples T-Test'. SPSS then generates a table with the 
p value, which can then be judged against the significance level.  
 
As I have chosen a 5% significance level, the p value needs to be less than 0.05 to be statistically 
significant; and as this is a one tailed test (I am only looking at whether there has been a drop and not 
whether there has been an increase), I needed to halve this value. As such, the p value searched for 
was one which was less than 0.025 (or 2.5%). If a p value of less that 0.025 was generated, I could 
dismiss the nullhypothesis and accept the alternative. On the other hand, if the value was greater than 
0.025, then no statistically significant relationship will exist between the two years. The effect of this 
was that such a figure left me unable to state that there had been a reduction in emissions.  
 
2.4.2.b Repeated measures analysis  
 
It was whilst I was on a statistics course at the University of Hertfordshire (June 2015) that I was first 
introduced to this potential method of statistical analysis. It is more complex and less commonly used 
than the t-test but will complement my analysis. Repeated measures explore the difference between 
all four years at the same time to determine whether there is a statistically significant relationship.179 
However, because the repeated measures analysis does not simply calculate the mean of the two data 
sets but looks at the individual changes between the same data over the four years; a different 
approach was required. It was necessary to dismiss data entries that did not have entries for each of 
the four years. As such, the data had to be correlated manually within Excel,180 and a final emissions 
data sheet created, which could then be copied from Excel to SPSS.181 
Once in SPSS, the method of conducting the statistical analysis was simple, yet longwinded. The 
method for analysing the data by repeated measures is listed below: 
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1. 'Analyze' tab; 
2. 'General Linear Model'; 
3. 'Repeated Measures'; 
4. Once within the repeated measures tool, it is necessary to specify the number of levels to be 
measured - in this case, I had four years’ worth of data and so there were four levels to be 
measured; 
5. Each level then needed to be defined within SPSS, which simply put, was the transfer of each 
year into the test. For example, level 1 was the 2009-2010 emissions data, level 2 the 2010-
2011 emissions data and so forth; 
6. Once all the levels had been defined, the test was run by clicking 'OK' in SPSS - this then 
generated the results. 
 
It is important to note that repeated measures tests for sphericity meaning it requires a data set with 
a normal distribution. Sphericity has been defined as: “the assumption that the variances of 
differences between repeated measures are equal”.182 In other words, the repeated measures test 
explored whether there was an overall relationship between the changes in CRC emissions on a year-
to-year basis. When doing an initial trial with a sample of 100, I found that this method of analysis did 
not work, because I had only tested the participants beginning with ‘A’ within the 2013- 2014 ARP.  As 
such, my data did not follow the normal distribution curve. In addition, a significance level of 5% was 
once again chosen and SPSS will provide a value in a table to this effect. 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Traditionally, mixed methods research has received criticisms from an epistemological viewpoint. 
Combining both quantitative and qualitative methods is to combine to methods which are at the 
opposite ends of a spectrum. One way to get around this is to adopt a pragmatic standpoint, where 
methods are a tool to help answer research questions. This is the approach taken by this thesis. In 
order to answer questions of the efficacy of the CRC, both statistics and interviews are used to tell a 
story of the CRC.  
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In terms of interviews, this study comprises of 31 semi-structured interviews and includes interviews 
with the regulator, participants of the CRC and solicitors/ advisors on the CRC. The structure of these 
interviews has given interviewees the opportunity to express their own views on the CRC which has 
directly informed the structure for the rest of this thesis. During the analysis of these interviews, 
transcripts were coded, and themes were identified. In the second stage of coding, these themes were 
brought together to form more complex ideas which form the foundation of each of the substantive 
chapters to follow. 
 
In addition, quantitative, statistical analysis will be introduced to provide a more general backdrop of 
the CRC. These statistics will look at the raw emissions data published on the CRC to consider whether 
there has been a reduction in emissions during the scheme. Approaches include descriptive statistics 
(averages, medians etc.), as well as more complex statistics (t-tests and repeated measures). It is 
important to reiterate that the quantitative analysis seeks to complement the qualitative data and is 
only being used to paint some rough, initial pictures of the CRC. The following chapter will now 







Chapter Three: The Carbon Reduction 
Commitment 
 
This Chapter summarises the substance of the CRC scheme as it is found within the CRC Energy 
Efficiency Scheme Order 2013 (as amended by the CRC amendment Order 2014),1 hereafter referred 
to as the Order.2 The substance of this chapter will be very dense and dry. However, this is an 
important point in itself, as the density of the CRC feeds into how the regulatees engage with the 
scheme. It is also important to outline how the CRC works as the different aspects of the CRC form the 
basis for the analysis chapters that follow. These subsequent chapters will take various points from 
the CRC and draw upon literature and interview data, in order to consider how the CRC is perceived 
and engaged with.  
 
This chapter will draw upon the CRC Order and the government issued guidance for the scheme. 
Guidance forms part of the ‘soft law’ that surrounds the CRC and works alongside the hard law (in this 
case the 2013 Order). It is, as put forward by Vaughan, “governance arrangements that operate in 
place of, alongside or blended with […] ‘hard law’”.3 It is important to bear in mind that the guidance 
on the CRC is plentiful, but also extremely dense and technical. The 2013 Order spans 152 pages, 
although this is shorter than the 2010 Order, which spanned 235 pages. Whilst this is not as copious 
as other pieces of regulation,4 the guidance for the CRC remains vast. It comprises of guidance 
communicated in a variety of mediums by both the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
and the Environment Agency. To date, the guidance is made up of 650 pages of PDF guidance; 39 slides 
of PowerPoint; and, 18 pages of website guidance.5 
 
The structure adopted for this chapter consists of a chronological summary of the scheme found in 
the 2013 Order, which will be considered alongside all the relevant guidance. It is split into five main 
parts comprising of: a brief literature review; a brief overview of the CRC scheme; an exploration of 
the 2013 Order; the abolition of the CRC; and the presentation of a statistical analysis of CRC reporting 
and emissions data. Due to the length of the Order, the section which runs through the substance of 
                                                          
1 CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme (Amendment) Order 2014, SI 2014/502. 
2 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order 2013, SI 2013/1119. 
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the scheme will be further split into six subsections and will consider: the trading scheme; emissions 
and supplies; participants; the administrator; group liabilities; and, enforcement and penalties. 
 
By way of introduction, and as set out in Chapter One, the Carbon Reduction Commitment is a scheme 
within the UK that aims to reduce carbon emissions, in accordance with the UK's international 
emissions targets, using economic and market incentives. The CRC targets high-energy consuming 
organisations that are not already covered by other regulatory schemes such as Climate Change 
Agreements (CCA) and the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). It operates by effectively 
taxing participants for each tonne of carbon dioxide that they emit. This is achieved by assigning a 
price per tonne of CO2 (which is an 'allowance'), and by making participants purchase and surrender 
a number of allowances that is equivalent to their emissions. It is enforced and regulated by the 
administrator, which varies dependent in which country of the UK the organisation is based. For 
England, the administrator is the Environment Agency, and it is charged with the operation of the 
scheme within England and its enforcement.  
 
3.1 Literature Review of the CRC 
 
The lack of existing academic literature on the CRC forms one of the claims as to the originality of this 
thesis. When searching for the "Carbon Reduction Commitment" in the database for the Journal of 
Environmental Law, there is only one result - a piece about Northern Ireland's consent to the Climate 
Change Act 2008.6 This is not a paper which focuses on the CRC, it simply contains the phrase within 
the main body of its text. 
 
When considering literature outside the Journal of Environmental Law, there is a similar lack of 
literature on the CRC. The literature that does exist can be divided into two main groups: writing that 
predates the introduction of the scheme and/or descriptive pieces that lack any level of analysis. For 
instance, Grubb praised the introduction of the CRC, stating that it plugged a gap in emissions control 
in the UK. However, as his article predated the introduction of the CRC, his article was based upon the 
theoretical CRC, rather than final legislation that was introduced.7 Further examples can be seen 
                                                          
6 Sharon Turner, ‘Northern Ireland's Consent to the Climate Change Act 2008: Symbol or illusion?’ (2013) 25(1) 
JEL 63. 
7 Michael Grubb, ‘Plugging the gap in energy efficiency policies: the emergence of the UK ‘Carbon Reduction 
Commitment’’ (2009) 8 EREM 1. 
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within a 385 page book that contains only 13 lines about the scheme,8 short legislative pieces,9 or 
within four short paragraphs in an article on emissions reduction.10 Other literature includes pieces 
that lack analysis -  which are mostly concentrated on the reforms of 2012 - and simply bullet point 
information to the reader.11 By and large, the CRC is simply mentioned in passing as one of the 
regulatory tools in the climate change toolbox.12 Other contributions include the publishing of the 
Environment Agency's CRC league table (which ranked the participants each year, but which has since 
been abolished) in academic journals.13 In all of the literature, however, there has yet to be an in-
depth analysis of the scheme, as seen within this thesis.  
 
It could be argued that the lack of literature in the area could be justified by the fact that the CRC is a 
relatively new instrument, only coming into force in 2010. However, as time goes by this argument 
loses its potency, particularly as the scheme is now in its eighth year and second phase. The lack of 
literature may also be justified by the technical and complex nature of the scheme. The CRC has its 
roots in numbers: and in particular, the calculation of emissions across potentially complex 
organisations from energy supplies to potentially numerous sites. This is compounded by the fact that 
at the start of the scheme 29 fuels were included (this has now been reduced to two), requiring 
participants to calculate emissions from obscure energy supplies. It is also perhaps the fact that phase 
one required participants to structure their organisations into complex qualifying units (SGUs), that 
discouraged scholars from tackling the subject. Regardless of the reasons behind the lack of literature 
on the CRC, it gives this thesis, and this Chapter, the opportunity to shed some light and explain a 
modern, and important tool of environmental protection as part of a broad suite of approached to 
combatting climate change.  
 
Due to the lack of useable literature on the CRC, this chapter will be largely descriptive in nature, 
drawing its content from the CRC Orders and associated guidance. Wider literature will be brought in 
later on in the thesis in order to explore specific aspects of the CRC.  
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3.2 A brief overview of the CRC scheme 
 
3.2.1 The CRC Scheme 
 
As introduced within Chapter I, the CRC was introduced in 2009 and the first phase was implemented 
in April 2010. As each phase lasts four years, the CRC is currently in its second phase, which 
commenced on the 1st April 2014. The scheme was introduced as a mechanism to help the United 
Kingdom meets its Kyoto Protocol targets (to reduce CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050).14 The scheme is 
therefore centred on CO2 emissions, and acts as a green tax for those that qualify for the scheme. It 
is a mandatory contribution to state revenue based on the quantity of CO2 that the participant emits, 
for the emissions equal to a number of allocations which must be paid for by the participant. The CRC 
therefore also has a secondary purpose of raising state revenue and it was initially predicted that the 
tax would create £1.1 billion per year by 2015.15 However, this prediction has since been lowered to a 
prediction of £0.9 billion for 2015, and an actual revenue of £0.7 billion in 2011-2012.16 The CRC still 
represents a large proportion of green tax revenue for the United Kingdom, however, as it is the third 
highest revenue tax behind the Climate Change Levy and the Landfill Tax.17 
 
An organisation will qualify for the CRC scheme if it meets the scheme's qualification criteria: at least 
one settled half hourly meter (half hourly meters are used by large consumers of energy and allow the 
energy data to be read remotely by the energy supplier every 30 minutes); and consume at least 6,000 
MWh of energy.18 The energy sources that are covered by the scheme were dramatically reformed 
with a major simplification of the scheme in 2012. The reforms were preceded by a public Consultation 
by the government in December 2012, during which the majority of the proposed reforms were 
approved by those consulted (which included both participants to the scheme and third parties).19 The 
approved reforms mainly (with the exception of a small number which came into effect immediately) 
came into effect with the start of the second phase in April 2014 and so there is little empirical data 
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17 Ibid.  
18 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Article 3: “qualifying amount”.  
19 DECC, ‘Consultation on simplifying the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme’ (March 2012). 
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on the efficiency of the simplified scheme. The reforms will be briefly outlined so that the current 
scheme may be contextualised next to how the scheme used to be. 
A government review of the scheme was commissioned in 2015 and looked at Phase One of the CRC.20 
This review found that whilst the CRC had been effective at making some participants reduce their 
energy consumption, the effectiveness of the CRC was hindered by its complexity.21 Following this 
review, a second public consultation on the CRC was held in late 2015, which asked stakeholders 
whether the CRC should be abolished.22 In the 2016 Spring budget, the abolition of the CRC was 
announced.23 The CRC will therefore come to an end following the 2018-2019 compliance year and 
will be replaced by the CCL. 
 
3.2.2 The 2012 reforms 
 
The CRC scheme first underwent a vast reform in 2012-2013. There is not the space here to consider 
all 46 of the proposed 2012 reforms, however, the main purpose of the reforms was to simplify the 
scheme, primarily due to its high administrative costs. George Osborne, the then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, gave the reasons behind the reform as the following: 
 
"The carbon reduction commitment was established by the previous Government. 
It is cumbersome and bureaucratic and imposes unnecessary costs on business, so 
we will seek major savings in the administrative cost of the commitment for 
business."24 
 
The Chancellor also indicated that a change in political stance within Government was also a reason 
behind the reforms, but it remains clear that the financial burden of the unreformed CRC was the 
primary concern behind its reform. The Consultation and Government therefore proposed that the 
2012 simplifications would cut the costs of the CRC by 55% million by the year 2030.25 As such, the 
reforms focussed on cutting unnecessary aspects of the scheme and included: cutting the number of 
                                                          
20 DECC, CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Evaluation: Final Synthesis Report (July 2015). 
21 Ibid, pp 9-13.  
22 HM Treasury, ‘Reforming the Business Energy Efficiency Tax Landscape’ (September 2015). 
23 HM Treasury, ‘Policy Paper: Spring Budget’ (2016), paragraph 4.14. 
24 George Osborne, House of comments Financial Statement 2012, 21st March 2012, Column 798 
25https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/reducing-demand-for-energy-from-industry-businesses-and-the-
public-sector--2/supporting-pages/crc-energy-efficiency-scheme accessed 01/10/2014. 
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energy supplies from 27 to two;26 abolishing the footprint report,27 and the league table;28 postponing 
the date for the surrender of allowances;29 and the introduction of a de minimis threshold for gas 
supplies (any gas supplies which represent less than 2% of total supply are now discounted from the 
scheme).30 
 
3.3 The 2013 Order 
 
The new CRC Order came into force on the 20th May 2013.31 It was introduced following the 
consultation undertaken by the DECC in 2012, whereby proposals for reform of the CRC were put 
forward to stakeholders for comment.32 The proposals were implemented, largely unamended, by the 
government.33 It is this, more simplified, version of the CRC scheme that will be considered in the 
present chapter and the wider thesis.  
 
The 2013 Order is comprised of 15 parts containing 96 articles and an additional 9 schedules which 
help to interpret the Order. Article 3 assists with the interpretation of the scheme, and includes 89 
definitions of both technical CRC terms such as "qualifying electricity", as well as more generic items 
of interpretation, seen within the definition of "day" (which is coined as including working days only).34 
The following 'general provisions' within Chapter I of the Order will provide the structure for the rest 
of the chapter: the trading scheme (Art.2); supplies and emissions (Art.4); registration and 
requirements of participants (Art.5); the powers and duties of the administrator (Art.6); and the 






                                                          
26 DECC, Government Response to the Consultation on simplifying the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme, 
December 2012. 




31 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Article 1. 
32 DECC Consultation 2012 (n 19).  
33 DECC Consultation Response (n 26).  
34 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Article 3. 
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3.3.1 The trading scheme 
 
One of the first objectives of the Order is to establish a trading scheme under the CRC.35 The trading 
scheme, which commenced on the 1st April 2014, was to consist of six phases (five phases of five years 
and one final phase of four years).36 However, organisations that fall under the exemption or have 
relief from taxes under the International Organisations Act 1968 do not fall within the scope of the 
Order, and this Order does not apply in any way to those organisations.37 Such organisations include 
but are not limited to international courts and tribunals, diplomats, and organisations of which the UK 




The allowances, which form the currency of the trading scheme, are valid for the year that they are 
issued or any subsequent year.39 This is subject to Art.35(2) which does not permit a participant to 
surrender an allowance which is valid for a subsequent year when they are required to surrender 
additional allowances under Art.74 or Art.77.40 If a participant does require additional allowances, 
then these must be acquired from either a special allocation or trading with third parties.41 All 
allowances are only valid for the purposes of complying with Art.36,42 which requires participants to: 
 
"surrender a quantity of allowances from its compliance account to the cancellation 
account which is at least equal to the participant's CRC emissions for that year."43 
 
This surrender must happen "by the last working day of October after the end of the applicable year" 
via the registry.44 However, should a participant's annual emissions equal less than 1 tCO2, no 
allowances are required to be surrendered.45 The surrendered allowances must be placed within a 
                                                          
35 Ibid, Article 2(1). 
36 Ibid, Article 2(1)(a)-(b). 
37 Ibid, Article 2(2). 
38 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/remanual/re2400.htm accessed 01/10/2014.  
39 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Article 35(1). 
40 Ibid, Article 35(2). 
41 Ibid, Article 35(3). 
42 Ibid, Article 35(1). 
43 Ibid, Article 36(1). 
44 Ibid, Article 36(3). 
45 Ibid, Article 36(2). 
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cancellation account and be cancelled by the Environment Agency.46 The above is subject to the 
following exceptions: when the participant has not yet provided an annual report;47 as part of a 
penalty for failing to provide an annual report;48 when the participant has failed to surrender the 
correct number of allowances and is subject to a sanction;49 and when the participant later discovers 
a shortfall in surrendered allowances and is required to surrender them the following year.50 On the 
contrary, where a participant surrenders too many allowances, these must be kept within the 
cancellation account for cancellation the following year.51 Alternatively, any surplus allowances can 
be repaid to the participant on application to the Secretary of State.52 Records must be kept by the 
administrator for all allowances, and which detail the important dates of the allowance and the 
important information of the allowance-holder.53  
 
The Trading Scheme: 
 
Aside from the establishment of a trading scheme within Article 2, the trading of allowances is only 
dealt with in article 38(2), which states that participants and third parties are permitted to trade 
allowances.54 There is, however, further guidance outside the Order which can be used to better 
understand the trading scheme. If a participant is in need of further allowances, these may be 
purchased from another participant or third party if they are offered for sale.55 It is possible to identify 
the allowances that are 'for sale' by consulting the CRC Registry, which has a 'notice board' facility to 
match up buyers and sellers of allowances.56 Additional security measures have been created for the 
trading scheme to protect buyers and sellers; therefore, a one-time pass code (OTP) is required for 
the transaction to take place.57 The government states that this is "to check the identity of the person 
making the trade and prevent fraud".58 As such, there is also a process to obtain an OTP which requires 
the party to undergo an ID check and register their mobile telephone number with the CRC Registry. 
                                                          
46 Ibid, Article 37(1). 
47 Ibid, Article 37(1)(b). 
48 Ibid, Article 74(4)(b). 
49 Ibid, Article 77(2)(a). 
50 Ibid, Article 78(2)(a). 
51 Ibid, Article 37(2). 
52 Ibid, Article 37(4). 
53 Ibid, Article 38(1). 
54 Ibid, Article 38(2). 
55 See the online guidance for the scheme available at: https://www.gov.uk/crc-energy-efficiency-scheme-
allowances#crc-trading-allowances accessed 10/10/2014.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid.  
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The codes will then be sent to their phone each time a transfer takes place.59 A limitation to the trading 
scheme is that participants may only have three contacts with whom they can trade at any one time, 
and therefore OTP codes will only be generated for three contacts. This is presumably to improve the 
security of the scheme, although no authoritative explanation can be found.60 Further guidance on the 
mechanics of obtaining the OTP and trading allowances can be found within the 'How to trade 
allowances' guidance on the government website.61 
 
3.3.2 Supplies and Emissions – the scope of the CRC 
 
The information that is required concerning the supplies and emissions that fall under the Order is 
outlined within Article 4. 'Supplies' are the provision of energy sources that fall within the scope of 
the scheme, and 'emissions' is the total carbon dioxide that results from the provision of the said 
energy: 
 
"As provided under this Order, Schedule 1 (supplies and emissions) has effect 
concerning— (a) whether a supply is made of electricity or gas; (b) the amount of 
such a supply; and (c) the emissions from such a supply."62 
 
CRC supplies therefore "means the supplies of electricity and gas supplied to a participant and 
participant equivalent".63 The Order also indicates that the lowest value of CRC emissions is zero, 
which would indicate that emissions cannot be offset so that they equate to negative emissions.64"CRC 
emissions" are defined as the emissions that are calculated in accordance with paragraph 33 of 
Schedule 1 of the Order.65 The cited paragraph within the first Schedule states: 
 
"The emissions in tCO2 from an amount of electricity or gas supplied is found by 
applying to that amount the relevant conversion factor".66 
 
                                                          
59 Ibid.  
60 Environment Agency, ‘CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Guidance for Participants in Phase 2’ (September 2015), 
p.46.  
61 https://www.gov.uk/crc-energy-efficiency-scheme-allowances#crc-trading-allowances 
62 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Article 4(a-c). 
63 Ibid, Article 33(2). 
64 Ibid, Article 33(3). 
65 Ibid, Article 33(1). 




"Emissions (tCO2) = Quantity of fuel supply × Emission factor × 0.001".67 
 
All fuel must be converted into kWh before entering the quantity of fuel into the above equation, and 
the government provides participants with a conversion table to aid the process.68 The emission 
factor, published annually by DEFRA, represents the amount of pollution which is created by the two 
fuels: electricity and gas,69and therefore acts to represent the true greenhouse gas value of both 
electricity and gas. The emission factors for the fuels are based upon the trending methods of 
electricity generation - for example, the recent increase in coal consumption has increased the 
emissions factor for electricity due to the more carbon intensive nature of coal.70 The factors are 
currently set at 0.541 for electricity and 0.1836 for natural gas.71 
 
Further clarification and detail on the supplies and emissions that fall under the CRC scheme may be 
found within Schedule 1 of the Order. The schedule outlines the two fuels which fall under the scheme: 
electricity and gas.72 Electricity is supplied following an agreement and the performance of supply 
under that agreement, as long as the electricity is measured by a metering device or classed as an 
unmetered supply (defined a electricity "supplied otherwise than through a metering device"73).74 The 
supply is effective at the time it is made, meaning that the supply counts towards the scheme on the 
day that it is received by the participant.75Likewise, gas is only supplied subject to an agreement to 
supply, a receipt of the supply and that the supply is measured by a metering device - note, there is 
no unmetered supply for gas.76 The scheme not only encapsulates supply from a third party, but also 
self-supply which is where a participant supplies electricity and/ or gas to itself (for example, where a 
site generates its own electricity).77 This supply also falls under the scheme with the exception of 
electricity that is used for the generation, transmission or distribution of electricity;78 and the 
                                                          
67 Environment Agency (n 60), p86. 
68 Ibid, p87.  
69 http://www.carboncredentials.com/crc-emission-factors-phase-2/ accessed 19/10/2014. 
70 http://www.carboncredentials.com/crc-emissions-factors-what-has-changed/ accessed 12/01/2015. 
71https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/278890/crc_conversion_fa
ctors.pdf accessed 19/10/2014. 
72 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Schedule 1, paragraphs 1-2. 
73 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 1(4)(a). 
74 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 1(1)(a-b). 
75 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 1(2). 
76 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 2(1)(a-b). 
77 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraphs 4, 5. 
78 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 4(2)(a). 
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transport, supply or shipping of gas.79 Self-supplied gas is also exempted from the CRC if it is used for 
the transport, supply or shipping of gas;80or if it is used for the generation, transmission or distribution 
of electricity.81  
 
The question of supplies to franchises is covered in Section 3 of the Schedule. The schedule proceeds 
to define a franchise82 and what does not represent a franchise.83 When a franchise does exist, and 
supply is made to the franchise premises, the Order states that the supply is a supply to the franchisor 
and not the franchisee.84 Trusts of land are dealt with in the following section of the schedule and 
concerns supplies to trustees, beneficiaries and operators.85 In this regard, any supply to a land held  
on trust is a supply to the trustee,86unless the beneficiary holds more than half a share of the land 
under trust - in which case, the supply is to the beneficiary and not the trustee.87 This is similarly the 
case for operators that are carrying out a regulated activity in relation to the land under trust and 
receives supplies of electricity or gas for this reason. It is the operator, and not the trustee, who is 
considered to receive the supplies for the purposes of the CRC in this scenario.88 
 
Following the calculation of the supplies of gas and electricity, there is the possibility of having 
deductions from the total individual supplies. This is covered within section 5 of Schedule 1. Any 
electricity which remains unconsumed following supply may be deducted from the overall supply 
providing that it is measured by a meter or a device "which measures electricity supplied but the 
measurements are not used for the purpose of charging for that electricity."89 The position is the same 
for any gas that remains unconsumed.90However, if any unconsumed supply is subsequently 
consumed by an occupier that occupies premises with the permission of the owner of the unconsumed 
supply, this may not be deducted from overall supplies.91 Further supplies that are deducted for the 
purposes of the scheme are any supplies that are consumed outside the United Kingdom, for these 
                                                          
79 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 4(2)(b). 
80 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 5(1)(a). 
81 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 5(1)(b). 
82 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 7. 
83 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 8. 
84 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 9. 
85 Ibid, Schedule 1, section 4. 
86 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 10. 
87 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 11. 
88 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 12. 
89 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 14. 
90 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 15. 
91 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 16(2). 
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supplies fall outside the scope of the CRC.92 This provision is of specific importance to the 7 participants 
during phase one that were registered with an address outside the United Kingdom. Another exclusion 
is the domestic accommodation exclusion, which essentially excludes any electricity or gas that is used 
"for the purposes of domestic accommodation".93 This is defined within the Schedule as being a 
"premises intended to be used as a person's permanent home",94 and also includes certain communal 
areas which are also used solely or partly for domestic accommodation.95 The exception does not 
cover all accommodation, however, and DECC guidance states that such examples of accommodation 
which will still fall under the scheme include but are not limited to: university accommodation; 
nunneries; hotels; and hospitals.96 There is a similar provision concerning caravan sites used for 
accommodation purposes. Under paragraph 19 of Schedule 1, a participant is not supplied with 
electricity or gas under the scheme if the supply is consumed at a caravan site used for 
accommodation.97 The exceptions to supply extend beyond permanent accommodation and also 
provide an exception for supply that is consumed for the purposes of emergency or temporary 
accommodation.98 Emergency and temporary accommodation is defined within the Housing Act 1996 
and is the provision of accommodation by the local authority for those who are homeless.99  
 
Another exclusion under the schedule is the use of supply for transport purposes.100 The schedule 
defines the meaning of the "purpose of transport" and includes the use of supply for any road going 
vehicle, vessel, aircraft or train, conveyor belts exceeding 8km in length and any buildings connected 
to the network service of the railway.101 This exception is subject to the condition that the participant 
may in fact be supplied with an un-metered supply where the participant has decided that the supply 
was not consumed for the purposes of transport (as defined above).102 As stated above, gas is only 
counted as a supply if it used for the purposes of heating.103 This means the: 
 
                                                          
92 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 17. 
93 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 18(1). 
94 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 18(3). 
95 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 18(5). 
96 DECC, ‘Guidance for the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme: Assessing Qualification and Registering for Phase 2’ 
(May 2013), p20. 
97 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Schedule 1, paragraph 19(1). 
98 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 20(1). 
99 Housing Act 1996, Part VII. 
100 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Schedule 1, paragraph 21(1). 
101 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 24(1). 
102 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 21(2), 22, 23. 
103 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 25. 
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 "gas is consumed for the purposes of heating where it is used as part of a process 
where the primary purpose of that process is the generation of heat."104 
 
This does not include any gas that is used in a process which is both for electricity generation and 
heating.105 In addition to the requirement that gas is used for heating purposes, there is also a de 
minimis threshold for gas supply. Therefore, if the supply of gas used for heating represents less than 
2% of the electricity supply, it is not considered to be consumed for the purposes of heating and does 
not count as a supply under the scheme.106 
 
A final group of exceptions include supply that falls under a scheme other than the CRC scheme. For 
example, a supply does not fall within the CRC scheme if it is consumed for the purposes of running 
an installation which is already covered by the European Energy Trading Scheme (EU ETS).107 This is 
likewise if the supply is consumed in order to operate a facility covered by a Climate Change 
Agreement (CCA).108 However, supplies to both will count if the participant decides that the supply 
has not been consumed for the purpose of operating the facilities.109 This decision must be made 
before or when a participant submits their first annual report and may not be changed for the duration 
of the phase.110 A final exception to the supplies that fall under the CRC scheme concerns metallurgical 
and mineralogical processes. During these processes, a supply will not fall within the scope of the 
scheme if it is consumed for this purpose.111 Examples of processes that would fall under a 
metallurgical process include, but are not limited to: the manufacture of iron and steel; precious 
metals production; and the forging, stamping and rolling of metal.112 Mineralogical processes include 
the manufacture of glass and ceramics amongst other processes.113 
 
Whilst the total supplies may be potentially reduced in consideration with the exceptions to supplies 
discussed above, total supply may also be increased under the scheme. For instance, where the 
supplies through a metering device are estimated by the supplier for at least half of the year, and the 
participant cannot prove that the estimates are based upon readings from the meter, an "estimation 
                                                          
104 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 26(1). 
105 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 26(2). 
106 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 27(2). 
107 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 28(1). 
108 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 29(1). 
109 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 28(2), 29(2). 
110 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 28(3), 29(3). 
111 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 29A(1). 
112 Eurostat, NACE Rev. 2: Statistical Classification of Economic Activities (European Communities 2008). 
113 Ibid.  
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adjustment" is added onto the supply.114 This adjustment is valued at 10% of the supply which is 
measured by the participant's meter.115 
 
Finally, schedule 1 considers renewable energy generation and stipulates that any participant that 
generates their own electricity in this way that is eligible either for a Renewable Obligation Certificate 
(ROC),116 or to receive a financial incentive made under the Energy Act 2008 is to be counted towards 
their supply.117 These financial incentives are Feed-in Tariff payments (or FITs) and consist of payments 
for "small-scale low-carbon generation of electricity".118 If renewable energy is used, then this must 
be submitted, along with any ROCs or FITs received within the Annual Report.119 Within a 2013 
Government Consultation on renewables within the CRC scheme, it was suggested that the CRC should 
go further to incentivise the use of renewables within the scheme.120  Therefore, the government 
reformed the CRC in 2014 to assign a zero rating to any renewable energy generated under the scheme 
that is not eligible for a ROC or FIT payment.121 This means that such renewable energy does add to 
the total supplies for the participant. 
 
3.3.3 Participants: registration and requirement s 
 
The initial provisions on registration and the requirements of participants can be found within Article 
5. More detailed provisions for participants are available throughout the Order, and indeed, the 
provisions that relate to participants and their obligations are numerous. This section will therefore 
attempt to summarise the participants' obligations in terms of registration and generally.  
The CRC had 2757 participants registered for phase one of the scheme (an equivalent list for phase 
two has not yet been published).122 The regional demographic of participants is relatively diverse, with 
participants registered in 632 towns in the UK. There is a heavy dominance of participants based in 
London, with 574 participants giving London based addressed to the CRC Registry, but there are also 
                                                          
114 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Schedule 1, paragraph 31(1). 
115 Ibid, Schedule 1, paragraph 31(2). 
116 Ibid, Schedule 1.  
117 Ibid, schedule 1, paragraph 32(1). 
118 Energy Act 2008, s.41(2). 
119 https://www.gov.uk/crc-energy-efficiency-scheme-annual-reporting accessed 19/11/2014. 
120 DECC, ‘Finalising CRC Simplification: treatment of renewable energy and the metallurgical and mineralogical 
sectors - Government Response’ (February 2014), p8. 
121 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Schedule 1, paragraph 32. 
122 Environment Agency, ‘CRC Phase 1 Participant List’ (November 2012). 
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a strong number of regional firms from small towns - for instance, there are two participants based in 




As set out earlier, it is necessary for participants to register for the scheme if they meet the qualifying 
criteria: at least one settled half-hourly meter,123 and an annual supply of at least 6000 MWh.124 If the 
qualification criteria are satisfied, participants are required to register with the administrator (the 
Environment Agency) using the Registry.125Government guidance stipulates that access to the Registry 
is limited to those that possess a Government Gateway ID, which is a username for government 
services.126 There is therefore the requirement to provide the administrator evidence of identity or 
any other information asked for by the administrator.127 All participants must make an application for 
registration no later than 2 months before the beginning of each phase.128 For Phase Two, which 
started on the 1st April 2014, this would have meant that participants should have been registered by 
the 1st February 2014. Those that register late will receive a fine of up to £5000, and then £500 for 
every working day that registration is not completed - this is imposable for up to 80 days following the 
registration deadline creating a maximum fine of £40,000.129 There is a fee for registration which is 
currently set at £950 with an annual subsistence charge of £1290.130 Following a successful registration 





                                                          
123 These meters record energy consumption every half-hour and pass the data back to the supplier. 
124 See online guidance: https://www.gov.uk/crc-energy-efficiency-scheme-qualification-and-registration 
accessed 01/12/2014. 
125 CRC Order 2013(n 2), Article 11(1). 
126 Online guidance (n 124).  
127 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Article 11(2-4). 
128 Ibid, Article 12. 
129 Online guidance (n 124).  
130 Ibid.  




Qualification flow diagram, DECC, Guidance for the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme: Assessing Qualification and 
Registering for Phase 2, May 2013 
 
It is important to note here that registration is mandatory for some public bodies including: 
government departments, Scottish Ministries, the Welsh Government, a Northern Ireland department 
or a public body in relation to which a public authority decision is made (local authorities are therefore 
included within this definition).132 A public body which is a member of one of the above groups also 
falls under the mandatory registration.133 The existence of any other public bodies is to be determined 
on the qualification day of the qualification year.134 These public bodies can apply to register in groups 
                                                          
132 Ibid, Article 14(1)(a-e). 
133 Ibid, Article 14(2). 




as long as they meet the qualification criteria for the qualification year,135 but it is the administrator 
who may determine whether a public body is a member of a group.136 This is also the case for public 
bodies that do not fall under article 14(1) as a mandatory participant, and who do not apply as a 
group.137  
 
The Order also makes provision for universities and colleges under the scheme. The university must 
be wholly or mainly situated in England,138 and whether it is a university or a college of a university is 
determined on the qualification day of the qualification year.139 Once it has been decided that a college 
is part of a university, the colleges of a university become a group for the purposes of the scheme 
regardless of whether they have a separate legal identity.140 If the university and/or colleges do not 
meet the qualification criteria then they do not fall within the scope of the scheme.141 However, if they 
do meet the qualification criteria, they must then decide if any colleges will form an independent 
group,142 and the university must apply for registration informing the administrator of any 




A participant has the obligation to provide an annual report to the administrator using the Registry 
(unless provided for otherwise),144 and before the last working day of July of each reporting year.145 
The deadline for the report is important, because if a participant fails to submit a report then the 
administrator may ‘determine’ (make the report) the report 40 days after the due date.146 For the 
annual report to comply with the scheme, the participant must include the following within the report: 
the amount of CRC supplies, how those supplies were directed to any participant-equivalent member 
                                                          
135 Ibid, Article 16(2). 
136 Ibid, Article 18(1). 
137 Ibid, Article 17(2). 
138 Ibid, Article 19(1)(b). 
139 Ibid, Article 19(2). 
140 Ibid, Article 20(1). 
141 Ibid, Article 20(3). 
142 Ibid, Article 21(1)(a). 
143 Ibid, Articles 22(1), 22(2). 
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of a group; and whether there were any estimation adjustments, renewable electricity generation and 
their respective amounts.147 The administrator will then calculate the participants' emissions.148 
The website guidance on reporting states that the report should include at least two meter readings 
which are at least six months apart.149 Without these two meter readings, the report is estimated only 
and will have a 10% estimation adjustment added onto the supply figure provided by the 
participant.150 In addition to providing details of supply, the annual report has several voluntary 
sections. Participants are invited to provide the following information on a voluntary basis: turnover 
data, details of any carbon management within the organisation, and a comments box for any general 
comments that the participants may have on the CRC.151 Any data that is inputted into the report can 
be amended up until submission of the report, participants are also invited to download a digital copy 
of their report for their records.152 Once the report has been submitted, a copy will be sent to the CRC 
contact for the participant who will be able to check the report for any errors - should any be found, 
it is possible to submit a new report up until the reporting deadline.153 Failure to submit an annual 
report by the deadline will incur a penalty and a publication by the Environment Agency.154 For 
example, Mansfield College received a fine for £2,500 for failing to report in May 2014 and the Harbour 
Exchange Management Company received a fine of £179,952 for the same failure in May 2014.155 The 
penalties for an annual reporting breach can therefore be substantial.  
 
Records and information: 
 
As well as having obligations to report data under the scheme, the participant also has the obligation 
to maintain records.156 All records must be maintained for six years after the end of the year to which 
the record relates,157 and must be adequate, up to date and available for inspection by the 
administrator at all times.158 Records must be kept of any information used for a participant's annual 
report and any information that is relevant to the changes outlined in Schedule 5.159 Schedule 5 
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provides for when governmental departments across the UK create, transfer or merge 
departments;160 or when Government decisions affect a participant that contains a separate 
participant within.161 The Schedule also provides for changes which occur in other public bodies that 
are not Government departments.162 These public bodies must notify the Environment Agency within 
three months should they merge with another participant that is not a Government department 
during the first year of a phase,163 and the newly formed public body must then apply for registration 
as a participant and comply with the Order as if it existed for the whole of Year 1.164 Similar changes 
for non-public participants are dealt with under Part 3 of the Schedule, and essentially create an 
obligation for any newly created qualifying participant to register, inform the Environment Agency and 
keep a record of the change.165 When informing the EA of any of the above changes, guidance states 
that the information provided should include: the nature of the change, the parties involved, which 
participant/ equivalent was bought or sold, who was it sold from, and when the change took place.166 
 
Looking back at the 2013 Order, if a participant discloses its emissions targets to the public (this is not 
obligatory) alongside its performance in accordance with those targets, and a) a person is responsible 
for those matters or b) the participant operates an employee engagement programme, then the 
participant must maintain records of the information disclosed.167 The participant must audit its 
records once a year to ensure that the records comply with the Order and must be evidenced with an 
"audit certificate", which is a certificate signed by a person in a management position and which is 
kept with the records.168 The Environment Agency may also ask to audit the records to ensure that the 
participant is keeping sufficient records.169 The use of audits under the CRC scheme is covered more 
in depth in Chapter Five.  
 
In addition to the requirements to keep records, there are also situations where participants are 
required to provide information to the administrator. There are also situations where the participant 
may make a request for information, for example, the participant may request information from their 
                                                          
160 Ibid, Schedule 5, Part 1. 
161 Ibid, Schedule 5, Part 1, paragraph 12. 
162 Ibid, Schedule 5, Part 2. 
163 Ibid, Schedule 5, Part 2, paragraph 2(1). 
164 Ibid, Schedule 5, Part 2, paragraph 3(3)(a-b). 
165 Ibid, Schedule 5, Part 3. 
166 DECC, ‘Guidance for the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme: Assessing Qualification and Registering for Phase 2’ 
(May 2013), p25. 
167 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Article 41(1). 
168 Ibid, Article 42. 
169 https://www.gov.uk/crc-energy-efficiency-scheme-annual-reporting accessed 01/12/2014. 
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energy supplier.170 A participant may also ask any occupiers to provide such information that is 
required for the participant to be able to comply with their obligations.171 The same applies for 
franchisees, public bodies that form a group and administrators where a group member has gone into 
insolvency.172 The participant is also required to provide information when required on their supplies 
to the administrator, and this is discussed above in relation to the Annual Report.173 More generally, 
a participant is required to provide information to the administrator when they move location, and 
must provide the new address within 10 days of moving.174  
 
3.3.4 The Administrator: powers and duties  
 
The "administrator" of the CRC and any reference to the "administrator" under the scheme may refer 
to the Environment Agency in England, the Natural Resources Body for Wales, the Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency in Scotland and the Chief Inspector for Northern Ireland.175 The 
references vary throughout the Order, and there is a table which informs the reader of when each 
reference applies.176 The relevant administrator of the CRC scheme has numerous duties and powers 




To enable the administrator to carry out its duties and to ensure the running of the scheme, the 
administrator possesses a number of statutory powers. These powers include the discretion to decide 
whether or not a public body is to be considered as part of a group,177 whether a non-public 
undertaking is to be considered as part of a group,178 and other powers relating to the collection of 
information. For instance, the administrator has the power to ask for information regarding 
supplies,179 and for any information relating to the monitoring of compliance by the administrator.180 
The administrator also has the power to inspect any premises in order to monitor compliance with the 
                                                          
170 CRC Order 2013 (n 2), Article 44(1). 
171 Ibid, Article 46(1). 
172 Ibid, Article 47; 48; 49. 
173 Ibid, Part 5. 
174 Ibid, Article 56. 
175 Ibid, Article 9(1). 
176 Ibid, Article 9, Table of provisions. 
177 Ibid, Article 18(1). 
178 Ibid, Article 28. 
179 Ibid, Article 45(1). 
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Order.181 This power is limited with the proviso that reasonable notice must be given by the 
administrator to the participant.182 
 
In addition to the administrator's duties toward the creation and maintenance of the Registry, the 
administrator also possesses the power to prevent the use of the Registry by a participant who is in 
breach of the Order, or who wishes to use the Registry for a criminal offence.183 The administrator 
may also suspend a participant's use of the Registry on the same grounds.184 In terms of publication, 
the administrator has the discretion to publish information on a participant's performance within the 
scheme - this publication is based upon the information held within the participant's annual report or 
any other information collected by the administrator.185 Following the 2012 reforms, this publication 
now takes the form of the Annual Report Publication (ARP), which is the raw data on each participant's 
annual emissions.186 There has only been one ARP so far, the 2013-2014 report, but it contains the 
data for all annual emissions since the scheme started in 2010.  
 
The administrator also has the power to charge participants for activities that are listed within the 
Order as being chargeable.187 These listed activities include: the participant's registration,188 the 
maintenance costs of a participant throughout the years of the phase that it is a participant,189 the 
costs of an account that is other than the compliance account,190 and the costs associated with the 
maintenance of such an account.191 The administrator may also charge for any determinations that 
are made under Art.31(3) (Where the participant has failed to provide an annual report, and so the 
administrator does so on behalf of the participant.192 This power is limited by the fact that the 
administrator may only charge the amount that is listed within a charges document made available by 
the administrator.193 The administrator may only revise its charges document after approval from the 
Secretary of State.194 If the charge is collected by an administrator other than the Environment Agency, 
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182 Ibid, Article 66(2). 
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this charge must be paid directly to the Secretary of State.195 The administrator also has powers of 




One of the first duties of the administrator is to register an applicant as a participant when an 
application has been duly made, and provide the participant with a certificate of registration.196 In line 
with this duty, the administrator must also provide and maintain an up to date list of all the 
participants of the scheme.197 Following the end of a participant's participation in the scheme, the 
administrator must finally cancel the registration of a participant where the participant has 
permanently ceased any scheme activity within the United Kingdom.198 Further duties include the duty 
to maintain a record for all allowances, and which shows: the year of the allowance, the date, to whom 
it was issued, the account it is held in and the cancellation of the allowance (when the allowance has 
been surrendered).199 
 
In addition to the administrator's duties to maintain an up-to-date list of all participants and a record 
of all allowances, the administrator also has the duty to create and operate an electronic Registry.200 
The administrator has a duty to ensure that the Registry is accessible to those who are entitled to use 
it every working day at any other time that the administrator believes reasonable.201 The Registry is 
also to be used as a platform for communication between the administrator, the participants and any 
third party account holders.202 The security of the Registry is also a duty that belongs to the 
administrator, who must "take reasonable steps to ensure that the operation of the Registry is secure 
from misuse".203 This duty includes the ability for the administrator to suspend any accounts on the 
Registry when the security of the Registry is at risk.204 The administrator is under an obligation to make 
any determinations (in relation to its powers stated above)205 in writing and sent to the affected 
persons within 10 days of the decision.206  
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202 Ibid, Article 50(2). 
203 Ibid, Article 51(a). 
204 Ibid, Article 51(b). 
205 Ibid, Article 57(1). 
206 Ibid, Article 57(2). 
82 
 
3.3.5 Group and undertaking liabilities  
 
Group liabilities arise, where for the purposes of the scheme, several undertakings come together as 
one participant under the scheme. Whether a group exists is a matter to be decided on the 
qualification day of the qualification year,207 by the administrator.208 A group may then apply to be a 
participant of the scheme if they meet the qualification criteria of a standard participant (6000 MWh 
of energy consumption and one half hourly settled meter).209 Likewise, if an undertaking applies to be 
a participant of the scheme but is not part of a group, the undertaking may register for the scheme if 
it meets the qualification criteria.210 
 
The Order also has special provisions relating to trusts. An undertaking or public body which is a 
trustee of a trust; and the trustee is required to register under the scheme as a participant, may apply 
for registration as a separate participant in respect of any trust activities.211 This means that, although 
the trustee is required to become a participant on their own merits, they may apply for a different 
registration in relation to their trust activities. Operators are also treated differently under the 
scheme, and may also apply for separate registration in relation to the activities for which they are an 
operator only.212 
 
3.3.6 Penalties and enforcement of the CRC 
 
For the CRC scheme and the Order to be effective, it is enforceable by the administrator. The 
enforcement of the CRC will be covered in more depth in Chapter Five, but this section will outline the 
relevant aspects of the 2013 Order: Parts 11 through to 14. It contains 28 articles on potential 
penalties and the powers that the administrator possesses in order to enforce the scheme, giving 
enforcement a large presence within the Order. These can broadly be separated into four main areas: 
enforcement notices, civil penalties, the criminal offence, and the appeals process. 
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209 Ibid, Article 24(2). 
210 Ibid, Article 25(1)(b). 
211 Ibid, Article 29(2). 
212 Ibid, Article 30(2). 
83 
 
The powers held within Part 11, are exercisable when the administrator "reasonably believes that 
there has been a failure [...] to comply with a provision of this Order."213 The powers include the ability 
of the administrator to require a participant to provide information surrounding a failure to comply 
with Article 40 or 41, by means of a written notice.214 This written notice to provide information may 
be withdrawn by the administrator at any time.215 In addition to information notices, the administrator 
may also serve enforcement notices upon anyone who fails to comply with the Order.216 The 
enforcement notice must be written and contain the following: the provision of the Order in respect 
of which there has been the breach;217 the matter that constitutes the breach;218 the steps that need 
to be taken by the person in breach;219 and how long the person has to take those steps.220 As with 
the information notices, the administrator reserves the right to modify or withdraw the enforcement 
notice at any time.221 If the enforcement notice is not complied with, the administrator has the option 
to do what the person was required to and recover the costs of doing so from the person.222 
 
The Order also provides for civil penalties within the CRC scheme. Therefore, the administrator may 
also serve a penalty notice for a civil penalty where they are liable.223 A penalty notice takes effect 
once it is issued,224 apart from financial penalties which are due 60 days after the notice is given.225 If 
a financial penalty is not paid by the person against whom the notice is served, the administrator may 
recover the amount as a civil debt.226 The administrator retains the power to waive, modify (but only 
by lowering the amount of a financial penalty), or allow more time for the person to pay;227 and if the 
administrator subsequently decides that the person is no longer liable, they may withdraw the notice 
or modify it by lowering the penalty.228 The civil penalties themselves are listed within the Order and 
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consist of: a failure in respect of registration;229annual reports,230 and their inaccuracies;231 a failure to 
provide information;232 a failure to surrender allowances,233 and any later discoveries of failed 
surrenders;234 and a failure to maintain records.235 A holistic list of these penalties is available within 
a guidance document created by the Environment Agency, and lists the penalty for each area of non-
compliance.236 As well as imposing a financial, civil penalty, the administrator may also impose a 
'blocking penalty' until any failure is remedied and any financial penalty is paid.237 The administrator 
may also publicise the person's failures, as long as the time for appeal has expired, or if there has been 
an unsuccessful appeal.238 It is possible to see a list of the civil penalties issued on the Government 
website, and, for instance (as stated above), Mansfield College received a penalty of £2500 for an 
annual reporting breach on the 15th May 2014.239 However, whilst the civil penalties are viewable on 
the government website, there are only three penalties published, and all are recent.240 This might 
imply that the civil penalties are not displayed indefinitely and are not readily accessible following 
their removal; which has implications on the efficacy of publication, the transparency of the tax and 
also the play off between business and environmental concerns - i.e. that the Environment Agency is 
not willing to tarnish business indefinitely for green tax transgressions.  
 
Part 13 outlines the criminal offences which are created by the Order. As such, it is an offence for a 
person to make a statement which is knowingly false or is recklessly false where the statement is made 
in relation to compliance with the Order.241 Non-compliance with an enforcement notice is also an 
offence;242 although this offence has the defence of reasonable excuse.243 It is also an offence to 
pretend to be an authorised person for the purposes of the scheme.244 The final offence listed within 
Art.82 is that it is an offence for a person who is in control of a premises to refuse entry to the 
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administrator or an authorised person where such access is reasonably required.245 These offences 
give rise to criminal penalties which differ between England and Wales, and Scotland (Scotland has a 
much higher imprisonment penalty on summary conviction than England and Wales). In England and 
Wales, the offence of a false statement and failure to comply with an enforcement carry up to a 
£50,000 fine and three months imprisonment on summary conviction;246 or a fine and/ or 2 years 
imprisonment upon conviction.247 The offences of imitating an authorised person and refusing entry 
to the administrator carry a fine (not exceeding the statutory minimum) and three months 
imprisonment upon summary conviction;248 and the same penalty as the other offences upon 
conviction.249 In terms of corporate bodies, if the offence is committed with the consent or neglect of 
an officer of the body corporate (director, manager, secretary, or anyone else in a similar position),250 
then the officer as well as the body corporate will be guilty of the offence.251 The position is the same 
for Scottish partnerships,252 but criminal immunity is granted to the Crown.253 
 
The powers listed above are all subject to the appeals process set out within Part 14 of the Order. An 
appeal may be made against a determination made in relation to article 57 (a determination of 
whether a public body or undertaking forms part of a group, see above), an enforcement notice, and 
an appeal by a public body or undertaking against the imposition of a civil penalty.254 The Order 
provides for three grounds of appeal: error of fact, error of law and that the decision appealed was 
unreasonable.255 The appeal is heard by the First-tier Tribunal for appeals within England and Wales,256 
and by the Scottish Ministers in Scotland.257 If a person brings an appeal, this has the effect of 
suspending any enforcement notice, financial penalty or publication, but will not suspend a 
determination or any other kind of notice.258 The appellate body may either cancel or affirm the notice 
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or determination;259 they may also modify any affirmed decision.260 Any decision made by the appeal 
body must be made on the balance of probabilities, that is to say the evidence must favour one side.261 
Schedule 7 provides further information and guidance on the appeals procedure of the CRC, and is 
split into guidance dependant on what decision is being appealed and who made that decision.262 As 
an example, the guidance for decisions made by the Chief Inspector or the Department of the 
Environment (appeals within Northern Ireland) is held within Section 2 of the Schedule.263 In such 
circumstances, anyone who wishes to appeal to the Planning Appeals Commission (which is the 
appeals body) must do so in writing and must also provide a statement of the grounds of appeal.264 
The written notice must be given within 47 days of the decision to be appealed.265 Following receipt 
of this written notice, the appeals body must then send the administrator a copy as soon as soon as is 
reasonably possible.266 The person making the appeal retains the right to withdraw an appeal, and 
should they do so, the appeals body should inform the administrator.267 
 
The Order also provides guidance on the service of documents within the scope of the scheme. 
Schedule 8 therefore dictates that all documents must be in writing;268 and must be served to a person 
in person, by leaving it at their proper address or by sending it by post or email to that person's proper 
address.269 The case for companies is slightly different, and is covered within paragraph 4 of the 
Schedule.270 
 
3.4 The abolition of the CRC 
 
In the Spring Budget of 2016, the CRC was scrapped and will end in 2019.271 The abolition of the CRC 
followed a short public consultation which took place between September and November 2015.272 
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The consultation sought to engage with the interplay between green taxes (such as the CRC, Climate 
Change Levy (CCL), and the Energy Saving Opportunity Scheme (ESOS)) in an assessment of their 
effectiveness in regards to the then current (as of September 2015,) government priorities of: 
simplicity, productivity, security of energy supplies and decarbonisation.273 The government also 
stated the clear objectives of encouraging the long term investment of capital in order to boost 
productivity; as well as encouraging “the uptake of energy efficiency and low carbon measures” in 
order to achieve the above government priorities.274  
 
In general, the consultation raised a number of concerns from those involved with the scheme.275 
These primarily focussed on three points: 
 
1. The current green tax landscape is too complex, 
2. Uncertain tax policy can undermine investor confidence, 
3. The then current (as of 2015) hierarchy of incentives did not drive people to invest in energy 
efficiency, rather investment in renewables.276  
 
Specifically looking at the CRC, the consultation proposed abolishing the CRC and moving to a single 
tax where the revenues from the CRC were covered by the CCL.277  
 
There were 356 responses to the consultation, from a variety of sectors ranging from public authorities 
to well-known high street names.278 The government response to the consultation was published 
alongside the Spring Budget in 2016, and added more flesh to the decision to abolish the CRC, which 
was announced during the budget itself. In a summary of stakeholder responses, the report stated 
that: 
“The majority of respondents agreed with the proposed move towards a single 
tax. There was broad support from respondents for abolishing the CRC in favour 
of a new tax based on the CCL. Respondents cited several benefits including 
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simplicity, reduction in collection errors and a reduction in administrative 
burdens.”279 
This stakeholder response formed the basis for the government’s response, which detailed the 
abolition of the CRC, effective from April 2019, this being the end of the 2018-2019 compliance year.280 
The reasoning behind the decision was a desire to “reduce the administrative burden of the CRC and 
simplify the tax system”.281 In its place, the CRC will move to become part of a single tax: the existing 
CCL. Furthermore, the rate of the CCL will be increasing from April 2019 in order to recoup the 
revenues from the CRC.282 The rationale behind this being that one, single tax will help encourage 
energy efficiency. 
 
The CRC will therefore come to an end in April 2019 and will be replaced by the CCL with a higher main 
rate. 
 
3.5 The CRC: statistics 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, I am interested in undertaking a statistical analysis of the raw emissions 
data published by the Environment Agency. It is important to point out that this is an initial 
quantitative analysis that does not take into account other variables which could explain any change 
in emissions under the scheme.283 Nonetheless, I believe this analysis remains a useful exercise to 
explore the broader efficiency of the CRC. The statistical analysis will primarily take the form of a 
paired t-test and repeated measures test conducted through SPSS. These tests will be looking at 
whether there is a relationship between the emissions data in each year to determine whether there 
has been a reduction in emissions over the years. The merits of using these tests were set out in 
Chapter 2.  
 
These tests were only conducted based on the participants who had submitted emissions data for all 
six years of the CRC (i.e. had emissions data from 2010 to 2016). As a result, the tests tested 1403 
participants for all six years, rather than every participant of the CRC (where n= 1935).284 A 
consequence of this is that the statistical analysis does not take into account over 1000 participants 
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who have been a part of the CRC, but who have not reported emissions data for all six years. To try to 
combat this, a separate t-test has been conducted on the organisations who have reported data for 
the second phase only, which comprises 1734 participants. 
 
As set out in Chapter two, this chapter will adopt a 1% significance level. A significance of less than 1% 
(or 0.001) enables the rejection of the null hypothesis (which is that the CRC emissions have not 
changed over the relevant years) with a 1% chance of error. That is to say that I can then accept the 
alternative hypothesis (the hypotheses are set out below) with a 1% chance of being wrong. Therefore, 
if any of the tests produce a significance level of less than 1%, the null hypothesis will be rejected.  
First, this section will present a number of descriptive statistics on the emissions data. This will include 
looking at the median and mean (average) emissions for each year in order to paint a broadbrush 
picture of the CRC over the six years of data. Next, this section will present the findings of a number 
of t-Tests conducted on SPSS, which look at how the CRC has progressed each year. Finally, this section 
will present the results of a repeated measures test, which looks at the relationship between each 
year with all other years in order to determine whether there is a statistically significant difference. 
These tests will be able to illustrate whether the emissions under the CRC have changed since the CRC 
began properly in 2010.  
 
Descriptive statistics  
 
In this sub-section, using the six-year emissions data, the total emissions under the scheme will be 
calculated. The median has also been calculated to provide further illustration of how the emissions 
data have changed over the six years of the CRC scheme. In addition, the mean (average) amount of 
emisisons under the scheme will be calculated. This figure is the amount of emissions that the average 
participant releases in a year. This is complemented by an additional calculation which shows how this 


























MEDIAN 13,952 13,022 13,488 12,666 11,820 10,297 
MEAN 35,545 33,175 34,007 32,432 28,632 25,698 
Difference 
in mean to 
prior year 
N/A -2,370 +832 -1,575 -3,800 -2,934 
Table 1: all values are in tCO2 
 
In terms of raw data, there are 13,825,480 fewer tonnes of carbon dioxide reported under the CRC 
scheme from the first reporting year (2010/2011) to the latest available year (2015/2016). However, 
looking at the raw number of emissions reported under the CRC is not capable of painting a general 
picture of participants under the CRC. This is because a drop in raw emissions could be explained by a 
small number of participants. The median shows the middle point in the data set, and the median 
emissions for the CRC again show a general decrease in emissions.  
 
By looking at the mean (the average) emissions reported, I can consider the average emitter under 
the scheme. By looking at how this average has changed over the years of the CRC, I can start to paint 
a picture of the ‘average participant’s’ journey through the scheme. As is illustrated by Table 1, the 
average emissions reported under the scheme drops every year,285 with the exception of the 
2011/2012 to 2012/2013 difference, where there is in fact an increase in average emissions. In 
general, however, the differences in means between each year would indicate that there is a 




Using SPSS, paired t-Tests were conducted on the yearly emissions data to determine whether there 
was a relationship between the emissions at the start of the scheme and the emissions at the most 
recent data point (2015/2016). The paired t-Test was testing the following hypothesis: 
H0:  1 =   2 
                                                          
285 Interestingly, the drops shown in my quantitative analysis are not dissimilar to the 3-5% drop predicted by 
the government: DECC (n 20), p9. 
91 
 
H1:  1 >   2 
If we illustrate this by taking an example t-Test; the null hypothesis (H0) would be that there is no 
significant difference between the years 2010/2011 and the 2011/2012 year. That is to say that the 
emissions for both years should largely be the same. The hypothesis that this thesis attempts to prove 
is that there is a significant difference between the emissions in 2010/2011 and the emissions in 
2011/2012. The CRC aims to reduce emissions, and so the hypothesis is that the emissions are lower 
on an annual basis. As this thesis is only looking at identifying a reduction in emissions, this will require 
a one tailed t-Test.286 Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested are: 
 
H0: Earlier year = Later year 
H1: Earlier year > Later year 
 
This t-Test has been conducted between each of the years in order to see whether there is a significant 
difference between each consecutive year. In addition, a t-Test has been performed to measure the 
start of phase one with the end of phase one (2010/2011 and 2013/2014) and the start of the scheme 
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Sciences (Palgrave Macmillan 2012). 
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95% Confidence Interval 






































9847.208 38423.788 1025.455 7835.618 11858.798 9.603 1403 .000 
 
Table 2: SPSS t-Test results table 
 
The significance levels for each of the years can be found in the final column of the table labelled Sig 
(2-tailed) (the values in this column have been highlighted and are in bold). In all but one year the 
significance is stated as being .000. This does not mean that the probability of wrongly rejecting the 
null hypothesis is zero, but rather than that the probability is less than 0.0005, or 0.05%. The test 
between the 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 has a .003 significance which is 0.3%. Due to the fact that 
SPSS provides the significance as a two-tailed test, these values need to be halved for a one tail test. 
As it is impossible to know the values for the .000 significant years, this thesis will not halve these 
values. The final significance value for the 2011/2012 year is therefore 0.0015, or 0.15%. 
As a result, all of the significance levels are below the 1% level of significance which has been adopted. 
What this means in terms of the above hypotheses is that the null hypothesis (that there has been no 
change) has been disproved, and the alternative hypothesis (that the earlier year is greater than the 









Another method of testing the data is a repeated measures test, which tests multiple data sets where 
the participants are the same for each data set. In particular, the repeated measures test on SPSS 
performs a test for sphericity which looks at whether the mean emissions data between each year is 
statistically different.287  
 
  
Table 3: Repeated measures results table from SPSS 
 
The above table shows us that once again there is a statistically significant difference between means 
for each year of the CRC (each test provides a significance of <0.0005). This means that once again 
there are statistically significant differences between each compliance year under the CRC. This would 
indicate that the CRC is having some impact on carbon dioxide emissions. What the table does not tell 
us is where those differences occurred. To have a look at where the difference occurred, the repeated 
measures test also produces a comparison of each year compared to the other five years (similar to 






                                                          
287 For more information on the repeated measures test, see: Alan Bryman and Duncan Cramer, Quantitative 
Data Analysis for Social Scientists (Routledge 1994), pages 147-150. 
Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:   MEASURE_1   
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
factor1 Sphericity Assumed 95711737910.000 5 19142347580.000 63.918 .000 
Greenhouse-Geisser 95711737910.000 1.544 61991133250.000 63.918 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 95711737910.000 1.545 61935953190.000 63.918 .000 
Lower-bound 95711737910.000 1.000 95711737910.000 63.918 .000 
Error(factor1) Sphericity Assumed 2100877360000.000 7015 299483586.500   
Greenhouse-Geisser 2100877360000.000 2166.174 969856327.100   
Huynh-Feldt 2100877360000.000 2168.104 968993030.700   




Measure:   MEASURE_1   
(I) Year (J) Year 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) Std. Error Sig.b 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Differenceb 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
2010-2011 2 2370.732* 373.006 .000 1639.023 3102.442 
3 1538.053* 373.630 .000 805.120 2270.986 
4 3113.672* 500.728 .000 2131.417 4095.928 
5 6913.329* 907.269 .000 5133.580 8693.078 
6 9847.208* 1025.455 .000 7835.618 11858.798 
2011-2012 1 -2370.732* 373.006 .000 -3102.442 -1639.023 
3 -832.679* 280.148 .003 -1382.233 -283.126 
4 742.940* 332.244 .026 91.191 1394.689 
5 4542.597* 732.860 .000 3104.977 5980.217 
6 7476.476* 838.866 .000 5830.909 9122.042 
2012-2013 1 -1538.053* 373.630 .000 -2270.986 -805.120 
2 832.679* 280.148 .003 283.126 1382.233 
4 1575.620* 282.264 .000 1021.914 2129.325 
5 5375.276* 745.586 .000 3912.693 6837.859 
6 8309.155* 877.532 .000 6587.739 10030.572 
2013-2014 1 -3113.672* 500.728 .000 -4095.928 -2131.417 
2 -742.940* 332.244 .026 -1394.689 -91.191 
3 -1575.620* 282.264 .000 -2129.325 -1021.914 
5 3799.657* 654.472 .000 2515.807 5083.506 
6 6733.536* 776.820 .000 5209.682 8257.389 
2014-2015 1 -6913.329* 907.269 .000 -8693.078 -5133.580 
2 -4542.597* 732.860 .000 -5980.217 -3104.977 
3 -5375.276* 745.586 .000 -6837.859 -3912.693 
4 -3799.657* 654.472 .000 -5083.506 -2515.807 
6 2933.879* 357.772 .000 2232.054 3635.704 
2015-2016 1 -9847.208* 1025.455 .000 -11858.798 -7835.618 
2 -7476.476* 838.866 .000 -9122.042 -5830.909 
3 -8309.155* 877.532 .000 -10030.572 -6587.739 
4 -6733.536* 776.820 .000 -8257.389 -5209.682 
5 -2933.879* 357.772 .000 -3635.704 -2232.054 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no adjustments). 




The table above demonstrates that there is a statistically significant difference (<0.0005, and 0.003 for 
2011/2012 and 2012/2013) between all years in the CRC with the exception of 2011/2012 and 
2013/2014 where the significance is 0.026, or 2.6%. This is above the 1% significance threshold 
adopted and so indicates that there is no significant difference between these two years. This lack of 
significance could be explained by the fact that there is a raw increase in emissions under the scheme 
which would then skew the general trend of decrease in emissions under the scheme. As such, in 
general, this statistical test shows us that for all but two years there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the changes in emissions. The two anomaly years correlate with the descriptive 
statistics and t-tests, which showed an increase in emissions in the 2012/2013 compliance year. For 
all other years, it is possible to say that there has been a statistically significant drop in emissions under 
the CRC scheme.  
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has outlined the core aspects of the CRC in order to provide an overarching 
understanding of how the CRC functions. This has included a consideration of: the allowances; scope 
of the scheme; participant obligations; regulator powers; and the enforcement of the CRC. The 
abolition of the CRC in 2019 is a significant development in the CRC’s life and changes the lens 
through which this thesis will consider the CRC. The fact that the CRC scheme will end in 2019 will 
therefore run throughout this study. Many of the specific aspects of the CRC, as outlined above, will 
be explored in more depth, and alongside relevant literature, later in this thesis. 
  
In addition, this chapter has presented an initial statistical analysis of the CRC. The purpose of this 
analysis was to start to paint a picture on the CRC’s efficiency as a tool to reduce carbon emissions. 
Because of this analysis, I argue that the CRC has had at least some positive impact on carbon 
emissions during this time.288 Further statistical analysis is beyond the time and resources of this 
doctoral study. However, a fuller picture would be able to be painted, if other variables (such as 
turnover, assets etc.) were able to be collected and measured. The rest of this thesis will now turn to 
specific elements of the CRC that formed the core themes running through the qualitative 
(interview) data. Chapter Four will consider the reforms of the CRC and the impacts this has had on 
the scheme’s stability.  
                                                          
288 This echoes the government’s findings that there had been a potential drop in emissions of around 3-5% 
under the CRC during Phase One. DECC (n 20), p9. 
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Chapter Four: Stability, legitimacy and 
credibility 
 
Constantly changing regulation is inefficient regulation.1 This chapter focusses and builds upon two 
different concepts seen in regulatory and tax literature: tax stability/instability; and Elen Stokes’ ideas 
of regulatory domain/dexterity.2 Tax stability refers to the changes in legislation and/ or rate at which 
a tax is levied; whilst regulatory domain and dexterity refer to how regulation has been packaged by 
government – the domain is the stable, existing regulatory field, and the dexterity the changing. In an 
original combination of both concepts, this chapter introduces a novel method to analyse 
environmental taxation and environmental regulation more generally.  Both regulatory domain and 
tax stability are required for the same function in environmental taxation: to present a consistent 
green policy in order to retain credibility in the eyes of those subject to regulation, and therefore 
investment by regulatees into the environmental tax. Assuming that an environmental tax is designed 
with two functions (raising revenue and changing environmentally unfriendly behaviour),3 then 
regulatory credibility is fundamental for any environmental tax in its behavioural changing capacity. 
Through the lens of my study on the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC), I will argue that it is only 
through the promise of secure investment for regulatees (that comes from a stable regulatory 
environment) that taxpayers will be willing to go above and beyond compliance for environmental 
taxes. 
 
This chapter maps traditional economic literature onto the concepts of regulatory domain and 
dexterity put forward by Stokes.4 Much in the same way as Stokes maps the regulatory field of fracking 
to consider the changing and unchanging; a similar exercise has been undertaken in economics 
literature by mapping stability and change through time.5 Identifying change and stability in the 
                                                          
1 For a general discussion of “good regulation” see Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, 
Understanding regulation: Theory, strategy and practice (2nd Edition) (OUP 2012); Robert Baldwin, Martin 
Cave and Martin Lodge, The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010) and, Martin Lodge and Kai Wegrich, 
Managing Regulation: Regulatory Analysis, Politics and Policy (Palgrave MacMillan 2012). 
2 Tax and economic stability has been discussed in a wide range of tradition economic theory; For regulatory 
domain and dexterity, see Elen Stokes, ‘Regulatory Domain and Regulatory Dexterity: Critiquing the UK 
Governance of ‘Fracking’’ (2016) 79(6) MLR 961. 
3 Snape and de Souza also argue that a “levy is not prevented from being a tax by the fact that raising revenue 
is not the government's main reason for imposing it”: John Snape and Jeremy de Souza, Environmental 
Taxation Law (Ashgate, 2006), p169. 
4 Stokes (n 2), 961-963. 
5 Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (CUP 1990), Chapter 13. 
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regulatory arena is therefore not a novel concept. More generally, stability has been considered in 
wider economic literature and has been considered through various lenses including rule of law;6 
institutional stability;7 and property rights.8 The most relevant to legal scholarship is an argument put 
forward by Hayek: 
 
“But the important point is that all coercive action of government must be 
unambiguously determined by a permanent legal framework which enables the 
individual to plan with a degree of confidence and which reduces human 
certainty as much as possible.”9 
 
As such, similarly to how Stokes discusses a regulatory domain, economic literature looks at the 
permanent legal framework. It is the idea that there is an unchanging body of rules which provide 
certainty to those subject to them. What is novel about Stokes’ work is the linking of this change and 
stability to how regulation is packaged to regulatees. Stokes argues that the use of domain and 
dexterity can be used to convey messages (such as sufficiency or confidence) regarding the regulatory 
field. This chapter will further this idea by considering how these messages are received by regulatees.  
In particular, the ability of regulatees to perceive and garner meaning from the stability (or instability) 
of a regulatory field is of particular interest. 
 
This chapter unfolds in three parts. First, by way of context, a brief recap of the changes to the CRC 
will be provided. Second, the themes of reform and stability will be explored through the lens of the 
interview data. My work raises questions in terms of Government credibility, as well as taxpayer 
engagement with the CRC, and environmental taxation more generally. The concepts of tax stability 
and regulatory domain/ regulatory dexterity will be explored as the theoretical framework which 
underpins this chapter. Finally, this chapter will combine these two concepts. Combining the two 
concepts of the regulatory landscape (comprising of regulatory dexterity and regulatory domain) and 
tax stability, stability is demonstrated through a sound regulatory domain. Without this domain (and 
therefore demonstration of stability), the green tax will be perceived as unstable; as such, questions 
of credibility will arise.  
 
                                                          
6 Friedrich von Hayek (edited by Ronald Hamowy), The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press 
2011). 
7North (n 5). 
8 Walter Lippmann, The Good Society (Transaction 1938). 
9 von Hayek (n 6) pp331-332. 
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I wrap together the concepts of tax stability and regulatory domain/dexterity to argue that regulatees 
are perceptive and sensitive to regulatory change. Whilst there remains a role for regulatory dexterity 
in terms of reforming inefficient regulatory schemes, the importance of maintaining a strong 
regulatory domain is not to be underestimated. Stability itself is perceived by interviewees/ regulatees 
to be portrayed by a strong regulatory domain (a body of regulation that remains unchanging); and 
this stability is, through the eyes of the regulatees, also a manifestation of government policy. In the 
case of the CRC, the unstable nature of the scheme therefore translates to a perception of an unstable 
green policy and a lack of commitment to the environment. Without this underlying policy 
commitment to the environment, a green tax will lack credibility, as is the case with the CRC. As such, 
my data has much to offer policy makers looking at what works in the context of environmental 
regulation.  
 
4.1 Context: the changes to the CRC 
 
The regular changes to the CRC form the contextual foundation to this chapter. As set out in the 
previous chapter, in its initial form, the CRC was criticised by the Coalition Government for its 
“administrative burdens” and complexity. 10 The scheme as originally conceived covered almost 30 
fuels, required reporting on 90% of emissions (as opposed to 100% reporting), and ranked participants 
in an annual League Table based upon their performance.11 Following a public consultation, the CRC 
was reformed significantly in 2013, in order “to streamline and simplify the scheme to create a new 
leaner, simplified and refocused CRC.”12 Reforms of note include a drop in the scope of the CRC from 
19 fuels to two (electricity and gas) and the abolition of the Performance League Table. These are 
important later when I turn to my data. For the large part, these changes came into effect at the start 
of the second phase in 2014. Since then, the CRC Energy Efficiency (Amendment) Order 2014 has come 
into force, which makes smaller changes to the scheme.13 Finally, it will be recalled that in 2016 the 
scheme was abolished, as part of a larger energy tax reform, and the CRC will come to an end following 
the 2018-2019 compliance year.14 It is following the announcement of the CRC’s abolition that the 
main part of my CRC study took place.  
                                                          
10 DECC, ‘Consultation on simplifying the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme’ (March 2012), 6. 
11 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order 2010, SI 2010/768, Article 77. 
12 DECC (n 10), 6 and 11. 
13 CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme (Amendment) Order 2014, SI 2014/502. 
14 HM Treasury, ‘Budget 2016’ (2016), para 4.14. 
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Although the CRC will now come to an end in 2019, it nevertheless provides an interesting case study 
of a green tax. In addition, the Climate Change Levy will be expanding to cover the scope of the CRC 
from 2019 onwards – as such, questions of taxpayer engagement and regulatee behaviour in this field 
will continue to resonate beyond the time of the CRC. These insights into regulatees and how they 
react to regulation will have a wider application to other green taxes, and as such is especially 
important given the lack of empirical socio-legal work in environmental law.15 
 
4.2 The changing landscape of the CRC: tax stability and the regulatory 
domain 
 
I had not set out to explicitly discuss the number of reforms to the CRC with my interviewees. The 
multiple reforms did not form one of the questions asked of the interviewees. This aspect of the CRC 
was, however, raised by 27 out of 31 interviewees without stimulus.16 When I came to analyse the 
data from the study four overarching themes emerged which are relevant to notions of stability and 
domain/dexterity: 1) the changing landscape of the CRC was attributable (by the interviewees) to 
political interference; 2) the multiple changes to the CRC inhibit participant/advisor understanding of 
the scheme; 3) the changes reduce the levels of engagement with the scheme by participants; and 4) 
the participants’ perception of the credibility of the CRC also drops in line with the number of changes. 
These four themes will now be explored in turn before turning to the relevant literature as a basis for 
analysis.  
 
As I set out in the introduction, this chapter draws upon the ideas of stability and regulatory domain 
and dexterity; building upon the work of Elen Stokes and wider economic literature. These ideas 
resonate with the changes to the CRC, and specifically, taxpayer reactions to the numerous changes 
that have taken place during the scheme’s life. Economic literature argues that a stable framework is 
necessary for the formation of regulatee expectations and economic growth; whilst Stokes looks at 
how the regulatory landscape in a field is packaged by government. The two ideas are drawn from two 
different fields: economic literature and regulatory literature. It should be noted, that whilst Hayek 
                                                          
15 On which, see: Elizabeth Fisher et al., ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental 
Law Scholarship’ (2009) 21 JEL 213. 
16 Interviewees will be identified by an identifier code which has been attributed to each interview. An 
example of this is CRC M1. The letters prior to the number denote which pool of interview the interview is 




and wider economic literature can be traced back to traditional theorists such as Hume and Smith;17 
Stokes relies heavily on policy documents (rather than other academic literature) as a basis for her 
argument.18 By bringing the two ideas together, this chapter builds upon the debate set out by Stokes 
and Hayek, and analyses the two ideas in light of an existing taxation scheme. This literature, along 
with other, relevant literature, will be woven through the study data to illustrate the effects of 
instability on the CRC. 
 
4.2.1 Political interference with the scheme 
 
The concept of regulatory domain is coupled with regulatory dexterity.19 Stokes discusses how the use 
of domain and dexterity is important in terms of how regulation is packaged by government, using 
fracking (the process – hydraulic fracturing - of injecting water at high pressure into underground rocks 
to extract oil and gas) as a case study. Stokes’ analysis shows how government preference for fracking 
is shown in two ways: one narrative which says existing laws are sufficient to control fracking issues 
(i.e. regulatory domain) and another which introduces new, specific fracking laws which enable 
fracking to advance (i.e. regulatory dexterity). My work builds on this idea and Stokes’ work and 
considers how those narratives are perceived by regulatees.  
Domain and dexterity are antithetical in their meaning; in terms of time, domain represents 
continuity, whilst dexterity is change.20 In terms of focus, domain is broad, whilst dexterity is specific. 
Regarding regulatory response, domain is resisting reform, whilst dexterity introduces new, specific 
legislation.21 The two concepts are therefore contradictory. The high number of changes seen under 
the CRC is more reflective of regulatory dexterity than domain. My participants suggested that political 
interference with the scheme was responsible for the high number of changes: 
 
“So, I actually felt sorry for the people that were trying to do it because they didn’t 
know what they were doing – you’ve got the political masters changing the rules.” 
(CRC P8) 
 
                                                          
17 This chapter will also draw on David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford Philosophical Texts) (OUP 
2000); and Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations Books IV-V (1776) (Penguin Classics 1999), Book V.  
18 For example, Stokes (n 2), 964-965. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid, 962. 
21 Ibid, 962. 
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Economic literature has traditionally advocated against government interference with the economy.22 
Smith’s concept of justice also limited the role of government intervention to the protection against 
foreign foes and the maintenance of justice (which included property stability).23 Government 
intervention should be limited to those interventions that protected this stability, to the point that 
government intervention is seen as a positive when it protects these interests.24 Lippmann provides 
an alternative viewpoint through a property rights lens: 
 
“Only by recognizing that legal rights are declared and enforced by the state is 
it possible to make a rational examination of the value of any particular right. 
The latter-day liberals did not see this. They fell into a deep and confusing error 
when they failed to see that property, contracts, corporations, as well as 
governments, electorates, and courts, are creatures of law, and have no 
existence except as bundles of enforceable rights and duties.”25 
 
Here, Lippmann is arguing that these fundamental property rights (as well as other rights such as those 
under contracts) are, in fact, created by laws; and, as such, can be modified by law.26 This would 
indicate that there are circumstances which would justify the modification of laws and the introduction 
of instability (regulatory dexterity). Hayek agrees with this viewpoint in the sense that the economic 
freedom advocated by Hume and Smith actually means economic freedom under the law, rather than 
an “absence of all government action” full stop.27 Some political and legislative interference is 
therefore to be expected in taxation. 
 
However, due to the fact that this “political interference” was “constantly changing” (CRC P8), this 
resulted in a higher than what participants would consider as normal amount of reforms to the CRC. 
This in turn meant that the changes were perceived as a failing of the CRC: 
 
“A lot of the problems with CRC is the fact that they’ve changed the rules. When 
it came in in 2010 and there was a 2010 order, a 2011 order, a 2013 order and a 
2014 order so it’s a lot of changes.” (CRC R1)  
                                                          
22 Hume (n 17), Book 3, Chapter 2. 
23 Smith (n 17), Book V. 
24 Adam Viner, ‘Adam Smith and Laissez Faire’ (1927) 35(2) Journal of Political Economy 198, 220. 
25 Lippmann (n 8), p244. 
26 Ibid, p245. 
27 von Hayek (n 6), p329. 
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“I think the biggest single thing that created bad reputation for the CRC was the 
constant meddling. If they had brought it in and stuck with all the phases and 
stuck with the broad design, I can understand there would have been some 
minor tweaks, then it would have been a successful scheme I think – but it 
became a political football.” (CRC M9, emphasis added) 
 
Since the frequency of changes was so high, this was considered to be political “tinkering” with the 
scheme (CRC S3, CRC S5, CRC M9). One interviewee linked this tinkering to the wider green taxation 
landscape; where they stated that the government has “a habit of changing taxation” (CRC M6). The 
language surrounding the changes was not impersonal. The changes were seen as intimately linked 
to government interference.  
 
This is not to say that there is not a role for regulatory dexterity in a regulatory field. Amongst the 
backdrop that some government intervention is to be expected in the economic field,28 regulatory 
domain and dexterity can work well together. They can provide justification for one another in the 
sense that “[o]ne reason for invoking 'dexterity', for example, is that it is underpinned by an ostensibly 
sound and solid 'domain'.”29 Dexterity and domain can also protect each other from criticisms: an 
example provided by Stokes is that any concerns that the law is too slow can be alleviated by the 
swiftness of regulatory dexterity.30 In essence, the two concepts can be complementary to one 
another, even though they are so different.31 Stokes argues that, with fracking, both approaches are 
taken as part of a policy agenda: a resistance to reform the existing legislative framework under which 
fracking arguably falls (regulatory domain); whilst introducing specific pieces of legislation to plug any 
gaps left by that overarching regulatory framework (regulatory dexterity).32  
 
The CRC has a single piece of parent legislation – the Climate Change Act 200833 – but sits within, on 
the national level, a wider energy consumption and carbon emissions regulatory framework, and, at 
the international level, a further host of climate change linked emissions agreements.34 Further afield 
                                                          
28 Ibid, p329. 
29 Stokes (n 2), 983. 
30 Ibid, 984. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Climate Change Act 2008 
34 Such key international agreements include: UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 
1992, ratified 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107; United Nations, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997;2005); United Nations, Paris Agreement (2015); European 
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still are energy efficiency regulations such as other taxes on energy consumption/ carbon emissions 
include the European Emissions Trading Scheme; and the CCL (including the regulation of Climate 
Change Agreements).35 Moving away from taxes, the CRC sits alongside other regulatory schemes such 
as the Energy Savings Opportunity Scheme (ESOS).36 Using this wider definition of the ‘energy 
efficiency domain’, I would suggest that the regulatory domain, whilst forming part of a policy agenda, 
is also a physical projection of that policy, and in this case green policy. By maintaining a stable 
regulatory domain, policymakers are able to communicate a commitment to green policy through this 
stability. Regulatees are able to perceive this commitment (through the stability) and are more likely 
to positively engage with the specific instrument within the green policy landscape (in this case, the 
CRC). 
 
The fact that interviewees have explicitly attributed the changes to the CRC to the government mean 
that they make the link between the regulatory changes and government policy. This sort of 
connection may be somewhat unsurprising and what I would otherwise expect even in the absence 
of my data. What this means, however, is that a strong and stable regulatory domain is therefore a 
reflection of stable policy underlying the regulatory field. As will be discussed below, this has impacts 
on the emotional response of the CRC participant towards the government and policy. First, two 
practical impacts of the changes will be considered: the impact on understanding, and the impact on 
engagement with the scheme. 
 
4.2.2 Understanding the CRC scheme 
 
It is not surprising that the constant changes to the CRC have had an impact on the ability of 
participants to understand the scheme. Two main themes emerged from the data regarding such 
knowledge. The first was that the frequency of the changes made it hard to ‘catch up’, and the second 
was the fact that because there have been no substantive changes to the scheme for the past 2-3 
years (apart from the abolition of the scheme) this had allowed participants to settle into a routine. 
This lack of understanding (as participants struggle to stay up to date) under the CRC makes it difficult 
for participants to know how to behave, or how to comply, with the scheme.  
 
                                                          
Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community [2003] OJ L275/32 (as amended  by Directive 2009/29/EC). 
35 Introduced in the Finance Act 2000.  
36 ESOS was introduced under Article 8(4-6) of EU Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU). The scheme is held 
in the Energy Savings Opportunity Scheme Regulations 2014, SI 2014/1643. 
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In the institutional literature, institutions are defined as “are the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”37 As such, 
institutions “reduce uncertainty” by providing a structure that shapes everyday life so that people 
know how to behave – for example, North talks of how we know how to drive a car, how to conduct 
a sales transaction, and how to start a business.38 The same could be said of taxes – institutional 
certainty tells us how we pay our taxes. If, as is the case with the CRC, that institutional stability is 
lacking, then this could affect the participants’ ability to know how to conduct themselves under the 
scheme. Once again, this institutional stability should not come at the expense of stagnation. North 
argues that change is necessary: 
 
“The major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by 
establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human 
interaction. But the stability of institutions in no way gainsays the fact that they 
are changing. From conventions, codes of conduct, and norms of behaviour to 
statute law, and common law, and contracts between individuals, institutions 
are evolving and, therefore, are continually altering the choices available to us 
[…] institutions typically change incrementally rather than in discontinuous 
fashion.”39 
 
Formal rules therefore facilitate desired social exchanges,40 and their stability is important. The 
difficulty here lies in the character rather than the volume of changes.41 As with the rule of law 
approach adopted by Hayek, it is not the fact that the law is changing that is the problem. Following 
institutional stability, changes come incrementally. In the case of the CRC, therefore, it was important 
to avoid regular overhauls of the scheme that would then alter how much tax participants would be 
paying under the scheme. Smith has also considered this concept, as he draws on the idea of 
institutions in his own work.42 In particular, he argues that if taxation is to be imposed, then it should 
be in accordance with the “generally accepted” canons of taxation.43 The key canon of interest here is 
                                                          
37 North (n 5), p3. 
38 Ibid, pp3-4. 
39 Ibid, 6. 
40 Albert de Vaal and Wouter Ebben, ‘Institutions and the Relation between Corruption and Economic Growth’ 
(2011) 15(1) Review of Development Economics 108, 110.  
41 von Hayek (n 6), 331. 
42 Andrew Skinner, A System of Social Science: Papers Relating to Adam Smith (Clarendon Press 1979), p209. 
43 Ibid, 216. 
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the canon of certainty. Here, Smith argues that “the time of payment, the amount to be paid ought all 
to be clear and plain to the contributor and to every other person”.44 
 
With annual changes to the scheme in the first half of its life, some of this certainty is lost as 
participants had to keep track of the CRC rules in order to ensure compliance (CRC P8). Effort and 
resources were required to follow the changes and understand them (CRC M15). 
 
“Because the person working in their business, who’s not from an energy 
background, and hasn’t been kept in the loop with the changes in the legislation 
- I really don’t think would have any chance of truly understanding how CRC 
works.” (CRC M3)  
 
This interviewee discusses the need to closely follow the changes in the CRC, to have a chance of 
understanding the scheme. Keeping up with the scheme is therefore demanding in terms of time and 
resources. As such, the changes were viewed as a burden which acted as a drain on expertise, time 
and physical resources.45 CRC participants have struggled to keep up with the significant changes (CRC 
R1), and so struggled to understand the scheme (CRC P3). Solicitors and consultants also raised the 
problem of coming to grips with the scheme: 
 
“Because there’s been so many changes and there’s been so many changes of 
terminology, it is very difficult sometimes to provide clients with very clear 
advice without boring them and going into lots of detail.” (CRC S2)  
 
The changes make it difficult for advisors to give concise, and accurate, advice on the CRC whilst 
working with their clients. Advisors also had a “tough three or four years” coming to grips with the 
scheme relearning the rules as they changed (CRC M7). Whilst another participant believed that the 
scheme was even too complex for some consultants to understand: 
 
“You’ve got a compliance scheme, you set yourself up, then suddenly they 
change the rules. Then you’ve got to change again. There’s a lot of time and 
effort and you can’t afford to get it wrong. And I'm also aware that some of the 
                                                          
44 Smith (n 17), p416. 
45 One participant claimed that the CRC took around one month of staff time to comply with – which largely 
included “reading and understanding the regulations, which were constantly changing” (CRC P8). 
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consultants out there did not understand it. I know some people took advice 
from consultants which was misleading.” (CRC P8) 
 
The regularity with which the CRC has changed over the years has led to difficulties in understanding 
the scheme, both by participants and by their advisors. This level of regular reform and regulatory 
complexity (even for specialist advisors) may be of concern, and it has potential scheme-wide impacts 
in terms of compliance and engagement. Any incorrect understanding could filter down from the 
advisors to the participants. The regularity of the changes is also resource heavy and requires both 
participants and advisors to actively engage with each issue of new CRC legislation enacted to ensure 
a current understanding of the scheme.  
 
The CRC scheme had settled down following the reforms which were implemented at the start of phase 
2 (April 2014), and no further changes were applied to the scheme prior to the announcement of its 
abolition in March 2016. The CRC therefore experienced its first taste of stability between April 2014 
and March 2016. This period of stability had been picked up by participants without my prompting, in 
what they referred to as “fairly settled down” (CRC M11) and as a “business as usual” (CRC M7) phase:  
 
“Only now really, especially post-ESOS do we feel like we're finally in a position 
where CRC has settled down. It's become a routine. It's been more incentivised. 
There's more focus on energy efficiency improvement, etc.” (CRC M10)  
 
Several interviewees expressed negative emotions towards the abolition of the CRC purely due to the 
fact that they did not want to see another change.46 Specifically because the CRC will be replaced by 
something else (CRC M12) and, as such, this is another regulatory scheme that they will have to come 
to grips with after the CRC has ended. From the data, there seemed to be a level of fear of the 
unknown. These responses show two things. First, that taxpayers can perceive and respond positively 
to stability. Second, that instability coupled with the unknown has created positive emotion towards 
what is currently in place (i.e. the CRC), and negative emotion towards what is to come (i.e. the CCL). 





                                                          
46 CRC M7, M10, M12, M13. 
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4.2.3 Lack of engagement with the CRC  
 
Historically, the argument put forward by Hayek for the need of “a permanent legal framework which 
enables the individual to plan with a degree of confidence”,47 also draws roots from property rights 
arguments. As a tax regime changes, the levying process also changes and can include changes in how 
much tax is levied and/ or the way in which the tax is levied. Stability therefore has “large 
consequences” for property,48 as it will indirectly enhance any property rights.49 It provides a “robust 
private sphere” for taxpayers.50  Hume argues that one of the three fundamental laws of nature is 
stability of possession.51 This stability is key, he argues, to the growth of society: 
 
“There are three different species of goods, which we are possess’d of; the 
internal satisfaction of our mind, the external advantages of our body, and the 
enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquir’d by our industry and good 
fortune. We are perfectly secure in our enjoyment of the first. The second may 
be ravish’d from us, but can be of no advantage to him who deprives us of them. 
The last only are both expos’d to the violence of others, and may be transferr’d 
without suffering any loss or alteration; while at the same time, there is not a 
sufficient quantity of them to supply every one’s desires and necessities. As the 
improvement, therefore, of these goods is the chief advantage of society, so 
the instability of their possession, along with their scarcity, is the chief 
impediment.” (Emphasis added)52 
 
The stability of possession of property is therefore key for societal security; and, according to Hume, 
this stability must be inflexibly applied to the whole of society.53 More specifically to business 
engagement and stability, Smith argues: 
 
                                                          
47 von Hayek (n 6), 331-332. 
48 John Snape, ‘Stability and its significance in UK tax policy and legislation’ (2015) BTR 561, 577. 
49 Ibid, 574. 
50 Ibid.  
51 Alongside transfer of property by consent and the performance of promises: Hume (n 17), p337. 
52 Ibid, p313. 
53 Hume (n 17), p322. 
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“Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which does 
not enjoy a regular administration of justice; in which people feel themselves 
secure in the possession of their property...”54 
 
Smith is arguing here that without some level of stability in possession, business cannot flourish. More 
recent literature also considers the role of tax stability on property,55 where stability has been 
described as “critical to capitalist exchange”.56 An unstable regulatory regime, and particularly a tax 
regime (which requires money to be paid to the Treasury), does not provide this property stability.  
The Mirrlees Review reiterated the importance of stability, stating that, alongside simplicity and 
neutrality, stability was a factor to be considered when assessing a tax system.57 As they put it: 
 
“Tax systems that continually change impose greater compliance costs on those 
who are taxed. They lead to difficulties in making long-term plans. Lack of stability 
can impact negatively on investment decisions by firms and on saving and 
investment decisions by individuals.”58 
 
Regulatory stability “is widely considered to be important to promote investment in general”.59 Black 
argues that businesses should be able to operate in “a stable regulatory environment”.60 Goldsmith 
argues that “uncertainty discourages investment and commerce”;61 and that “guaranteed economic 
rights are a sine qua non [essential] for producing an environment where investors are willing to 
trade”.62 It is the negative impacts of instability in this long-term engagement that is particularly 
interesting. It is important to note here that I am not advocating the permanent stagnation of 
legislation,63 rather, a level of stability that allows for taxpayer investment into the particular 
                                                          
54 Smith (n 17), p510. 
55 See for example: Gavin Kennedy, Adam Smith: A Moral Philosopher and His Political Economy (Springer 
2016). 
56 Arthur Goldsmith, ‘The State, The Market and Economic Development: A Second Look at Adam Smith in 
Theory and Practice’ (1995) 26 Development and Change 633, 636. 
57 Stuart Adam, Timothy Besley, Richard Blundell et al, Tax by Design: The Mirrlees Review (OUP 2011), 22. 
58 Ibid, p44.  
59 Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Reconciling Regulatory Stability and Evolution of Environmental Standards in Investment 
Contracts: Towards a Rethink of Stabilization Clauses’ (2008) 1(2) Journal of World Energy Law and Business 
158, 158. 
60 Julia Black, ‘Forms and paradoxes of principles-based regulation’ (2008) 3(4) Capital Markets Law Journal 
425, 430. 
61 Goldsmith (n 56), 637. 
62 Arthur Goldsmith, Democracy, Property Rights and Economic Growth (1995) 2 Journal of Development 
Studies 157, 160. 
63 See also, Mirrlees (n 57), p44. 
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regulatory scheme. Whilst the abolition of the CRC, and the unknown that follows, has created some 
positive feelings towards the CRC; there has largely been a lack of regulatee engagement with the 
CRC scheme. This disengagement can be categorised into two camps: a general disengagement with 
the scheme by regulatees; and an unwillingness by regulatee organisations to invest financially into 
the scheme.  
 
Stability of policy has the ability to create co-operation and engagement under a regulatory scheme.64 
The converse, with the CRC, saw my participants “fed up” (CRC R1), “discouraged” (CRC P3), together 
with an acceptance that the CRC is just a cost that needs to be paid (CRC M6), and loss of confidence 
in the scheme (CRC S3). One interviewee stated: 
 
“It just bores people. When you do a seminar explaining the rules and what has 
changed year on year, people actually fall asleep.” (CRC M8)  
 
Thus, I saw a general disengagement with a scheme that consistently changes. The emotions of being 
“bored” and “fed up” indicate that the change/ instability is a long-term feature of the CRC scheme. 
That is to say that there have been a sufficient number of changes, that regulatees have had time to 
get used to the fact that the scheme has changed and had time to get bored by the fact that the CRC 
has changed. 
 
This disengagement extends to regulatees investing into the scheme and measures taken by 
participants which promote energy efficiency. The nature of taxation is that it deprives the taxpayer 
of their own property, which is justified through the consent of their elected representatives.65 
Without this certainty under the CRC, investment simply will not happen. One interviewee explains: 
 
“I think a key concern you hear over and over again is certainty and confidence.  
And I think all of these schemes work best if businesses have the confidence to 
invest in equipment and management tools and structures and so on. And I think 
it is difficult to do that when they’re lacking certainty and confidence.” (CRC S3)  
 
As business cases for investment are based on returns, an uncertain scheme means that incentives 
could be removed, or the scheme changed in such a way that the returns are never realised. As such, 
                                                          
64 Peter John, Making Policy Work (Taylor and Francis 2011), p89. 
65 Snape (n 48), 566; See also Hume (n 17), p337. 
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taxpayers are reluctant to invest into energy reducing measures for the CRC, because “there’s no 
certainty about their returns” (CRC S4). This was particularly pertinent due to the uncertainty of the 
future of the scheme, and the fact that there was the risk that the CRC would simply “go away anyway”, 
rendering any significant investment into the scheme pointless (CRC M5). In addition, one interviewee 
suggested that the link between paying the tax and reducing emissions had been lost during the 
changes of the scheme – meaning that they were less inclined to engage and invest in energy reducing 
measures (CRC M6). Regulatory instability thus leads to apathy and disengagement.  
 
The changing landscape of the CRC therefore invokes negative emotions in the taxpayer and a 
disengagement from the scheme. This disengagement is not only emotional but is demonstrated in an 
unwillingness to invest financially into the scheme. This in turn reduces the ability of the CRC to lower 
carbon emissions – as it is through the investment into energy efficiency projects that reductions in 
energy consumption (and thus emissions) can be realised. The CRC is, to some, simply a cost that is to 
be swallowed rather than engaged with.  
 
Due to the fact that the changes in the CRC are seen to be attributable to political interference, the 
disengagement not only has implications for the scheme itself, but also links back to the creators of 
the scheme. There is therefore a potential drop in wider taxpayer confidence in the government. 
   
4.2.4 Lower level of credibility for the CRC  
 
Tax stability was one limb of the Conservative/ Liberal Democrat coalition government policy. Here, 
one of the principles for corporate tax reform was stated to be “maintaining stability” in the 
Corporate Tax Road Map of 2010.66 The link between stability and confidence has also been made by 
Smith: 
 
“Commerce and manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in 
which there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government.”67 
 
Hayek also argues that there needs to be a stability which “enables the individual to plan with a 
degree of confidence”.68 In the area of taxation, this is particularly pertinent as Skinner highlights: 
                                                          
66 HM Treasury, ‘Corporate Tax Reform: Delivering a more competitive system’ (November 2010), p11. 
67 Smith (n 17), p510. 




“Government, while bound by the laws of political economy, is by the same 
token faced with the necessity of understanding them and being capable of 
implementing policies which are appropriate to particular cases […] a point 
which is especially important in the discussion of taxation and debt – areas 
where the government is peculiarly liable to offend the people and to be 
constrained by the necessity of preserving some ‘degree of confidence in the 
justice of government’”.69 
 
In order to preserve a level of confidence, Snape argues that it is important to winnow out the 
unnecessary changes from the necessary; and it is the government’s skill at doing this that represents 
the strength of the tax and how the tax will be accepted.70 CRC M9 highlights their opinion on 
whether some of the changes under the CRC have been necessary: 
 
“The biggest problem with the simplification was actually it probably wasn’t 
necessary. It was done to beat the political drum really. In my experience 80% 
of people out there would be saying ‘don’t touch it, now we understand the 
rules let’s just stick with it’, and that 80% would have included the people 
previously complaining about it. I’ve been to meetings where that has 
happened, so that’s not me making that up. That was a definite effect of what 
was happening at the time.” (CRC M9) 
 
CRC M9 argues that the changes to the CRC were unnecessary and that change was perceived 
negatively in wider meetings they had attended, demonstrating a potentially, wider negative 
consensus around the reforms. It is important in this context, therefore, to consider whether the 
taxpayer considers the changes to the CRC to have been “necessary”.71 Any unnecessary changes are 
“in the language of my times, a matter of credibility”.72 
 
                                                          
69 Skinner (n 42), p230. 
70 Snape (n 48), 564. 
71 As the question is considered from the point of view of the taxpayer, there is the potential for bias. 
However, in order to answer this question, the study triangulates opinions from taxpayers, solicitors and 
advisors. This is an attempt to mitigate bias from one direction.  
72 Snape (n 48), 563-564. 
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An interesting example to illustrate this point more specifically can be seen in the changes to the CRC 
revenues. Although the revenues now go to the Treasury, this was not always to be the case. The 
revenues were originally ring-fenced to go back to taxpayers, depending on their performance under 
the scheme.73 Whilst not held in legislation, a number of interviewees talked of how the top half of 
performers would get their CRC costs plus 10% back, whilst the lower performers would get their 
CRC costs minus 10%. The CRC was therefore designed to be revenue neutral. The government 
changed this in 2010, where it was decided that the revenues “will be used to support the public 
finances, including spending on the environment, rather than recycled to participants”.74 In the 
interviewees’ minds, this has led to a drop in credibility for the scheme: 
 
 “And then as soon as the new coalition government came in, they scrapped that 
within about four months I think, and just said, “No, we’re going to keep the 
money. Whatever you pay for allowances, we’re going to keep it, because there 
won’t be any revenue recycling going on.” And at that point, everybody just said, 
“That’s a tax then.”” (CRC M16)  
 
 “Yeah so the simplification. But the simplification didn’t come across as 
simplification so much as a tax grab.” (CRC M6)  
 
"That's a tax then" and "tax grab" are two phrases that label the CRC in quite a negative way. The idea 
is that the CRC is just a government revenue raising tax. The constant changes illustrated, therefore, a 
shift from an energy efficiency scheme with potential benefits to regulatees to an energy tax. This shift 
undermined the environmental aims behind the CRC,75 and this was perceived by interviewees as a 
proactive policy decision by the government to place revenue raising above environmental aims.  
 
Once the revenue recycling element of the CRC was removed, and the revenues went instead to the 
Treasury, one interviewee questioned the motives of the government: 
 
“But I think if it goes into general taxation and just gets lost, I think you are at 
risk of saying, “You’re just taxing us because you can and you’re not taxing us to 
                                                          
73 This is no longer visible in any guidance document. The only visible evidence that the CRC revenues were 
destined to go anywhere but the Treasury is the fact that the statement was made that the CRC revenues will 
now go to the Treasury. 
74 HM Treasury, Spending Review 2010 (2010), p62. 
75 CRC M2; M6; M13; M16; P1; P3; P4; P5; P6; S1; S4; S5; S6. 
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actually drive change.” So, I think one needs to be very careful how one frames 
the taxation.” (CRC M16)  
 
This incremental move away from the environmental aims of the CRC through various changes forms 
the basis of the loss of confidence. These changes have then been linked back by interviewees to the 
underlying policy of the government. I argue that this change has created a new standpoint in regard 
to stability. The taxpayers, in their minds, have already hypothecated the revenues of the CRC for 
environmental gain (i.e. those that reduced their energy consumption the most would receive more 
money out of the revenues) and this change has clearly been labelled as a strategic policy move by 
government; leading to a drop in confidence. 
 
Beyond the revenue changes of the CRC, the other reforms that the CRC has undergone are also a 
reflection of government policy in the eyes of the taxpayers.76 They interpret the changes and identify 
a shift in policy towards a policy that they are less engaged with: 
 
“I think within the industry we’ve become very disillusioned with what the 
government are doing at the moment and it needs to be what you’re joining up 
to, and if the government has got the policies in place and the right reasons for 
doing it, and then that falls down on the institutions to play their part, then they 
will do. But at the moment, it’s a pure tax and we see the government going in 
a certain direction, it makes it very difficult to get people to engage really.” (CRC 
P5, own emphasis added)  
 
This means that, in Stokesian terms, the packaging of regulation, in terms of how changes to the CRC 
have been portrayed, is important.77 Participants are able to interpret these changes, and perceive 
them to be manifestations of wider government policy. As such, what are seen as the frequent and 
unnecessary changes have led participants of the CRC to question the motives and policy of the 
government: 
 
"From a university’s point of view, certainly from some people, I think they see 
it as just a way of generating income and maybe more of a taxation, particularly 
                                                          
76 In the interviews, several interviewees believed that the government was not interested in climate change 
regardless of their public commitment to the problem. This would indicate that the taxpayers place more 
weight on actions rather than words – i.e. the changing landscape of the CRC. 
77 Stokes (n 2), 986. 
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this government, and maybe it’s more about just getting the money in, rather 
than necessarily the commitment to improve the carbon performance of 
organisations, because we don’t necessarily see other drivers from government 
on this." (CRC P6) 
 
"[T]he very strange position of a government who’s making commitments about 
energy or carbon reduction, but at the same time effectively dismantling an 
otherwise successful renewables sector without thinking it through" (CRC S5) 
 
The interviewees have identified a disparity in what the government was claiming to do (help combat 
climate change), and what the reforms to the CRC and other environmental schemes have reflected in 
practice. There was the view that the government was "reneging" on its environmental promises, in 
favour of generating revenues from taxes (CRC P1). The instability of the CRC also has, in participants' 
eyes, a presence throughout the energy efficiency landscape. CRC S4 summarised as follows: "for God’s 
sake let’s have a proper coherent energy policy that ties in together." In 2015, the Conservative 
government held a public consultation on "reforming the business energy efficiency landscape" with a 
view to "to simplify and improve the effectiveness of the landscape".78 This move to potentially further 
change the CRC (and which later resulted in the abolition of the CRC), was viewed with some scepticism 
by interviewees. When asked whether they would respond to the consultation, one interviewee 
opined: 
 
"I think all the clients I work for, everybody thought it (the CRC) was going to be 
cancelled. So they all thought, “Oh there’s no point responding because it’s 
going to be cancelled”, do you know what I mean?" (CRC M7) 
 
M7 insinuates here that the government already had a policy agenda before the consultation began; 
and as such, there was little point in trying to change that agenda through a consultation response. 
This was reiterated by CRC P4, who was "cynical" that the consultations would ever change the position 
of the government. As such, not only has there been a disengagement with the CRC a specific piece of 
regulation, but also a disengagement with wider policy. The result of this is, is that the CRC no longer 
has any credibility as an environmental scheme (CRC S5) and participants see the government as 
disingenuous due, in part, to the multiple and many CRC changes.  
 
                                                          
78 HM Treasury, ‘Reforming the Business Energy Efficiency Landscape (September 2015), Preface. 
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4.2.5 Converging concepts: tax stability and the regulatory domain  
 
As I have just set out, without prompting, participants wanted to talk about the numerous changes to 
the CRC and, and more importantly, they attributed the changes to political interference with the 
scheme (i.e. change without any ‘good’ cause). There have been two practical responses to these 
changes: 1) there is now a general lack of understanding of the CRC; and 2) these changes mean that 
participants are less engaged with the scheme. The CRC is considered too unstable to invest in energy 
reducing programmes and guarantee their payback. However, this link back to political interference 
runs deeper, and has manifested into an emotive response: a lack of confidence in wider government 
'green' policy. This connection with the underlying policy means that, in the participants' eyes, the CRC 
scheme as a whole lacks credibility. It is this emotional consequence of the changes that are 
particularly interesting and resonates with aspects of tax and regulatory literature to which I now turn. 
 
In his speech to the Department of Energy and Climate Change in 2010, David Cameron stated that he 
wanted “to be the greenest government ever”.79 These words were repeated verbatim by 
interviewees during the study (CRC P3, M6, M13, S4), but with incredulity.80 The CRC has undergone 
much reform during its lifetime, but so has the energy efficiency landscape more generally.81 The CRC 
instability has therefore spread throughout the regulatory domain. As a result, what is left is an 
overarching climate change framework which actually comprises of piecemeal, regularly changing 
legislation and secondary schemes, lacking the constant regulatory domain that Stokes discusses. This 
lack of stability (or domain) has led interviewees to doubt the policy commitments which have been 
communicated publicly by the government. The individual scheme, in this case the CRC, loses 
credibility, and as a result, suffers a drop in engagement from participants of the scheme. They are far 




                                                          
79 David Cameron, Speech to the Department of Energy and Climate Change on 14 May 2010, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-decc accessed 15/12/2016. 
80 Interestingly, a similar level of incredulity can be seen in academic scholarship regarding the idea of a “Green 
Brexit”. For example, Cameron Hepburn and Alexander Teytelboym, ‘Climate Change Policy after Brexit’ (2017) 
33 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 144, 146. 
81 For instance, new schemes have been introduced (such as ESOS, and the CRC itself) and older schemes have 
been altered (for example, there have been changes to CCAs). 
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4.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has explored how taxpayers have perceived the series of regular reforms to the CRC. 
Taxpayers have made the link between the regular changes to the CRC and political motivation. This, 
in turn, has allowed the taxpayer to “map” what they think the underlying, wider policy behind energy 
efficiency is. This perceived policy preference diverges from the “green government” image that the 
government is keen to portray; and taxpayers have started to disengage, not only from the CRC, but 
from energy efficiency policy in general. The data shows a reduction in taxpayer confidence, and a 
wider correlating reduction in government credibility. 
There has already been empirical work conducted on how regulatees respond to regulation.82 Stability 
has also been discussed in other fields. For example, Gracia discusses the role of stability being defined 
through relational interactions between the regulator and regulatee to build stability from the ground 
up: 
 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, relative stability and certainty in the tax 
compliance game emerges from the relational interactions, or collusion, of the 
dominant player (tax professionals and the tax authority), which maintains 
HMRC’s illusion of legitimacy to control, act and regulation the field.83 
 
The ability to improve and maintain legitimacy would have been useful for the CRC. However, as the 
problem here stems not from the regulator, but the government, it would be difficult for the 
Environment Agency to build up stability and therefore improve legitimacy themselves. Such 
legitimacy has been described as “a crucial aspect of organizational success within an organizational 
field”.84 
 
The concept of legitimacy also figures in the work of Gunningam and Sinclair. They specifically raise 
the legitimacy of regulation as a motivational factor for regulatees.85 However, this motivation for 
compliance runs much deeper: to the legitimacy of policy. They argue: 
                                                          
82 See, in particular: Neil Gunningham, Dorothy Thornton and Robert Kagan, ‘Motivating Management: 
Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection’ (2005) 27(2) Law and Policy 289; and, Neil Gunningham 
and Darren Sinclair, ‘Regulation and the Role of Trust: Reflections from the Mining Industry’ (2009) 36(2) Law 
and Society 167. 
83 Louisa Gracia, ‘Boundary work and tax regulation: A Bourdieusian view’ (2012) 37(5) Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 304, 317. 
84 Jens Beckert, ‘Agency, Entrepreneurs, and Institutional Change: The Role of Strategic Choice and 
Institutionalized Practices in Organizations’ (1999) 20(5) Organization Studies 777, 791. 




It may also be that a prosecution policy that is perceived to be fundamentally 
unfair is undermining the general belief in the legitimacy of regulatory 
requirements. Certainly there is evidence from other studies that if regulated 
enterprises mistrust the regulator and believe that regulations are being used 
strategically, with regard to purposes and values with which they fundamentally 
disagree, then they are far less motivated to comply with these requirements.86 
 
Evenksy builds on this by saying: “more generally, where government is perceived as unjust, 
individuals will dismiss the authority of government”.87 Lacking this confidence, Evensky argues that 
people will not “buy-in”, and so commit to the scheme.88 As such, where the regulatory scheme or 
policy underlying it is perceived to be unfair and/or unreasonable, the law loses legitimacy and the 
regulatees lose the commitment to comply.89 The prosecution policy that is perceived to be unfair in 
their work can be widened, using my work, to governmental policy. The legitimacy of this policy that 
underpins the CRC can have wide ranging impacts on compliance. Whilst Gunningham and Sinclair 
discuss legitimacy in terms of unfairness, I believe this stretches to arbitrary and unnecessarily 
changing policy. Here, unnecessary (or, to merge vocabulary, unreasonable) changes result in a drop 
in credibility.90 For Gunningham and Sinclair, unreasonable policy leads to a drop in legitimacy. The 
connection between the two: they both result in less engagement from regulatees.  
 
How the regulatory field is packaged is then important as a means of potentially overcoming this loss 
of credibility and engagement. Interviewees demonstrated a disengagement with general 
governmental ‘green’ policy due to its lack of consistency, and this in turn has led to a disengagement 
with the specific CRC scheme itself. Drawing together the concepts of regulatory domain and 
dexterity, interviewees demonstrated that the stable (domain) and the changing (dexterity) also 
reflect policy decisions. Stable policy is reflected in stable regulation, whilst unstable policy is reflected 
in a constantly changing regulation. 
 
                                                          
86 Ibid.  
87 Jerry Evensky, Adam Smith’s Essentials: On Trust, Faith, and Free Markets (2011) 33(2) Journal of the History 
of Economic Thought 249, 260.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Gunningham and Sinclair (n 82), 185. 
90 Snape (n 48). 
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In the interviewees’ minds, the changes to the CRC were unnecessarily frequent. The CRC would, 
therefore, be considered an unstable tax according to Snape.91 When I expand this to the bigger 
picture, the government’s green policy is also seen by interviewees as unstable, due to the prevalence 
of regulatory dexterity. As such, Snape’s comments on credibility and instability resonate in a 
regulatory landscape that lacks constancy, or domain. If an individual tax’s instability can call in to 
question its credibility, so can the instability of the wider policy that underpins it; as interviewees 
made the link between the unstable CRC and unstable green policy. As such, any loss of credibility in 
terms of the CRC also resonates throughout the government’s green policy. A lack of stable policy in 
this context has made taxpayers question the motivations of the government in introducing and 
reforming the CRC. This, in turn, has resulted in a disengagement with the CRC, or a drop-in motivation 
to go beyond compliance, demonstrated through a reluctance to invest in energy efficiency schemes. 
The instability of the regulatory landscape in this area has a direct impact on businesses being able to 
guarantee a payback, or return, on their investments. 
 
As such, how regulation is packaged is critical. What the CRC shows is that the action or inaction of 
the government in terms of changing regulation forms the basis of how the regulatory landscape in 
an area is perceived. For those subject to regulation, a resistance to reform, or a regulatory domain, 
portrays an image of stability; whilst regulatory dexterity portrays instability. That is not to say that 
regulatory dexterity in itself is an inherently bad thing. However, the data suggests that taxpayers will 
not be able to identify a coherent policy without an underlying regulatory domain to link this policy 
to.92 Take this underlying regulatory domain away, and taxpayers can lose confidence in policy – for 
this regulatory domain is the clearest physical representation of policy. As such, policy and the 
regulatory landscape in a certain field (i.e. green energy or climate change) should be packaged as 
stable and unchanging in its early phases. Once this has been established, individual taxes in that 
regulatory landscape can be reformed to iron out any specific inadequacies, and dexterity can be 
introduced.  
 
With stability comes taxpayer engagement and understanding. Taxpayers are much happier to go 
beyond compliance, and invest in energy efficiency projects, when the stability is there to ensure such 
projects will provide a guaranteed payback. An individual scheme that changes too regularly will also 
be hard to follow for taxpayers and can lead to taxpayers losing interest in the environmental 
objectives of the scheme. Having a stable, overarching energy efficiency policy may offset some of 
                                                          
91 Ibid.  
92 Whilst stability and the CRC were not covered in any depth, the DECC study into the CRC did also call for a 
more stable policy: DECC, CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Evaluation: Final Synthesis Report (July 2015), p13. 
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these effects in individual schemes, like the CRC, that are later considered to be inadequate by 
policymakers. As such, dexterity can be combined with domain to produce regulatee perceptions of 
stability and confidence. The following chapter will build on this chapter by considering the levels of 
trust and the regulator-regulatee relationship between participants of the CRC and the Environment 









Chapter Five: Trust and Competence 
 
The previous chapter on stability outlined the importance for the government to package its 
regulation carefully, as taxpayers are perceptive and form judgements on the government and its 
policy and regulatory choices. Linked to this idea is the concept of trust. This chapter will argue that 
just as the perceptions on policy can impact on taxpayer engagement, so can taxpayer perceptions of 
the regulator. In the case of the CRC, the regulator is primarily the Environment Agency (see Chapter 
Three for a more detailed discussion on which body acts as the CRC regulator in different contexts). 
Drawing on my interview data, this chapter will argue that a strong regulator-regulatee relationship 
would help the taxpayer to engage with the tax.  
Questions surrounding the competence of the Environment Agency in relation to the CRC were raised 
by regulatees and advisors during interviews. Whilst the term “expertise” or “competence” was not 
raised explicitly, interviewees talked of their relationship and contact with the Environment Agency. 
This contact, which was usually in the context of taxpayer queries, regularly tested the competence of 
the regulator. Expertise has been coined as the ability to contribute to a field of scientific knowledge,1 
and that is not what is being considered here. The questions here primarily focus on the EA’s ability 
to deal with participant queries and understand and portray understanding of the CRC scheme more 
generally.  
This chapter will first outline the scholarship on trust. Second, this chapter will explore the support 
that is provided to taxpayers by the Environment Agency. Finally, through the framework of trust, 
taxpayers’ perceptions of the regulator will be considered to argue that a regulator-regulatee 
relationship built on trust is key to improving taxpayer engagement.  
5.1 Trust Literature 
 
The role of trust and environmental regulation has recently been considered by Joanne Hawkins in her 
doctoral thesis entitled “The Legitimisation of Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation: Power, Prejudice and 
                                                          
1 H M Collins and Robert Evans, ‘The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience’ 
(2002) 32(2) Social Studies of Science 235, 258; Sidney Shapiro, ‘The Failure to Understand Expertise in 




Public Participation”.2 In this empirical work on how local communities respond to fracking regulation, 
Hawkins builds on the trust literature to argue that trust is made up of both cognitive and social trust; 
and that both are required for a meaningful relationship of trust between regulator and regulatee. 
She further argues that trust is vital where “risk is part of the narrative”.3 Whilst the CRC is not 
surrounded by the same risks as fracking,4 there are still risks in investing in technology, expertise and 
other resources, in order to reduce energy and comply with the scheme.5 This chapter will argue that 
trust is also vital for an engagement with the CRC. First, the literature on trust will be considered. 
Trust plays a key role in processes where the tasks are too complex for individuals to manage 
themselves.6 It has been argued that trust is important for sustaining “individual and organizational 
effectiveness”. 7  Both the psychological and sociological approaches argue that trust is necessary for 
effective societal interaction.8 Psychologists argue that: 
“People who trust more are less likely to lie and are possibly less likely to cheat 
or steal. They are more likely to give others a second chance and to respect the 
rights of others. The high truster is less likely to be unhappy, conflicted, or 
maladjusted, and is liked more and sought out as a friend more often, both by 
low-trusting and high-trusting others.”9 
It has been argued in the e-commerce sector that a lack of trust can lead to a disengagement with e-
commerce.10 Whilst this is a vastly different sector to the environment, this chapter will argue that a 
positive relationship of trust between the Environment Agency remains to be crucial for sustaining an 
effective regulator/ regulatee relationship. This, in turn, makes regulatees more willing to engage with 
                                                          
2 Joanne Hawkins, ‘The Legitimisation of Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation: Power, Prejudice and Public 
Participation’ (PhD Thesis, University of Bristol, 2012) available at 
http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do;jsessionid=802E776BF2CD561228DDE1122B41E0F0?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos
.702939 accessed 11/10/2017. Some of her work has since been published: Joanne Hawkins, ‘Fracking: 
Minding the Gaps’ (2015) 17(1) ELR 8. 
3 Ibid, Chapter Three. 
4 Risks of fracking include but are not limited to: impacts on climate change; groundwater contamination; air 
pollution from the flaring of gas; and damage to property from seismic activity (earth tremors). See: DECC, 
‘Fracking UK Shale: Planning Permission and Communities’ (DECC, 2014), p4. 
5 See also Chapter Four on stability which also discusses how stability can affect investment. 
6 Wouter Poortinga and Nick Pidgeon, ‘Trust in Risk Regulation: Cause or Consequence of the Acceptability of 
GM Food?’ (2005) 25(1) Risk Analysis 199, 199. 
7 Daniel McAllister, ‘Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in 
Organizations’ (1995) 38(1) Academy of Management 24, 24. 
8 Roger Kasperson, Dominic Golding and Seth Tuler, Social Distrust as a Factor in Siting Hazardous Facilities and 
Communicating Risks (1992) 48(4) Journal of Social Issues 161, 167. 
9 Julian Rotter, ‘Interpersonal Trust, Trustworthiness, and Gullibility’ (1980) 35(1) American Psychologist 1, 1. 
10 D Harrison McKnight, Vivek Choudury and Charles Kacmar, Developing and Validating Trust Measures for e-
Commerce: and Integrative Typology (2002) 13(3) Information Systems Research 334, 335. 
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the regulation, and not attempt to cheat, the regulation. In the case of the CRC, this affects the general 
levels of engagement with the scheme, and in particular, as raised by interviewees, a trust in the 
scheme’s enforcement and audit mechanism.  
The literature on trust is varied, and can be found within psychology, sociology, and economics.11 In 
sociology, trust “has long been recognised by sociologists as an essential and somewhat taken-for 
granted element of social relations”;12 and work here considers the relations among people rather 
than any one individual psychological state.13 The definition of trust varies and is rarely well set out,14 
with most scholars tailoring the definition of trust according to their subject discipline.15 Examples of 
definitions can be seen with the following: 
“a person’s expectation that an interaction partner is able and willing to behave 
promotively toward the person even when the interaction partner is free to 
choose among alternative behaviors that could lead to negative consequences 
for the person.”16 
And;  
“the degree of confidence you feel when you think about a relationship.”17  
Attempts to define trust have been described as a “confusing pot pourri”;18 and each approach to trust 
has different elements and considerations.19 It is not the purpose of this chapter to come to a definitive 
conclusion on the correct definition of trust. However, as trust will form the lens of analysis, some of 
the approaches will be considered. 
A distinction has been made by McAllister between cognition based trust and affective trust.20 
Cognition based trust is a choice to trust based on good reasons, which constitutes evidence of 
                                                          
11 See, for example: Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes (Yale 
University Press 1973); Rotter (n 9); Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (Rutgers University Press 
1983); J D Lewis, Andrew Weigart, ‘Trust as a Social Reality’ (1985) 63(4) Social Forces 967; Roger Blackeney, ‘A 
Transactional View of the Role of Trust in Organizational Communication’ (1986) 16(2) Transactional Analysis 
Journal 95; D Harrison McKnight et al, (n 10). 
12 Brian Wynne, May the Sheep Safely Graze? A reflexive View of the Expert-Lay Knowledge Divide in Risk, 
Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology (Sage 1998). 
13 J Lewis and Andrew Weigert, ‘Trust as a Social Reality’ (1985) 63 Soc. F. 967, 968. 
14 Kasperson et al. (n 8), 164. 
15 Harrison McKnight et al. (n 10), 336. 
16 Michael Koller, ‘Risk as a Determinant of Trust’ (1988) 9(4) Basic and Applies Social Psychology 265. 
17 John Rempel and John Holmes, ‘How do I trust thee?’ (Feb 1986) Psychology Today 28, 28. 
18 Harrison McKnight et al. (n 10), 335; Shapiro (n 1), 625. 
19 For a useful visual on the composition of key approaches to trust, see: Harrison McKnight et al. (n 10), 338. 
20 McAllister (n 7). 
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trustworthiness.21 Therefore, competence and responsibility (which are said to be easily evidenced) 
have traditionally been “central” to an understanding of trust.22 On the other hand, affect based trust 
considers the emotional bonds between individuals and organisations.23 It consists of people investing 
emotionally, and expressing genuine care and concern for others.24 These emotional bonds can also 
form the basis for trust.25 McAllister et al. conducted a study looking at the extent of cognitive-based 
and affect-based trust where they discovered that some level of cognitive-trust was required in order 
to allow affect-based trust to then develop.26  
The elements of cognitive and affect-based trust can be seen in Kasperson et al’s consideration of 
social trust; which comprises the following four elements.27 First is ‘competence’. In my study, this 
correlates to the ability of the Environment Agency to regulate the CRC. Whilst Kasperson et al 
acknowledge that mistakes are made; consistent failures (or the perception thereof) will demonstrate 
a lack of competence. The second element is ‘caring’, as it is important for the Environment Agency 
to demonstrate a caring attitude towards the participants of the CRC. This is particularly important 
when there is a power imbalance in the relationship, as is the case in the regulator/ regulatee 
relationship. Third, is the element of ‘predictability’. Here, it is important that CRC participants’ 
expectations are fulfilled. Whilst complete consistency would be contradictory, complete 
inconsistency “nearly always results in distrust”.28 The final element is commitment, which is the 
commitment to a goal and the fulfilment of any obligations. In my study, this is the commitment to 
both regulating the CRC and a commitment to energy reduction. 
Kasperson et al argue that trust operates simultaneously at a cognitive, emotional (see the discussion 
on affect-based trust above) and behavioural level.29 The four elements of trust above form the 
foundations of these three types of trust, which they argue, must be fulfilled for the maintenance of 
trust.30  
First, a brief introduction to the CRC Helpdesk, which is the main point of contact between the 
Environment Agency and CRC participants, will be provided. It will be argued that these four factors, 
as applied previously in legal scholarship,31 resonate with the interview data and the CRC. These 
                                                          
21 McAllister (n 7), 25-26; Lewis and Weigart (n 11), 971. 
22 McAllister, ibid, 25. 
23 Ibid, 26. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, 51. 
27 Kasperson et al. (n 8), 170. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid, 171. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Hawkins (n 2), Chapter 3.  
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factors provide a much wider definition of trust than cognitive trust alone and are necessary in order 
to develop trust between the regulator and regulatee. Without trust, it is difficult for a positive 
regulator/ regulatee relationship to develop, which in turn leads to disengagement on the part of the 
regulatee.  
 
5.2 The CRC Helpdesk 
 
The CRC has a helpdesk, staffed by the Environment Agency, which is available to contact should the 
taxpayers have any questions regarding the CRC. This help is advertised clearly on the gov.uk website, 
which provides an email address and telephone number which taxpayers may use to get in touch with 
the helpdesk.32 In addition to the helpdesk being advertised on the government website, the CRC 
helpdesk regularly contacts taxpayers via email in a CRC newsletter. This newsletter, which provides 
updates on the law and reminders for important CRC deadlines,33 also sets out contact details on how 
to contact the helpdesk in the future.  
Interviewees were asked about their contact with the Environment Agency, and in particular, how 
much contact they had with the CRC helpdesk each year. The general consensus from the interviewees 
was that taxpayers generally had little contact with the Environment Agency each year. The contact 
that was made between taxpayers and the regulator was concentrated in bursts around the main 
compliance dates for the CRC year: 
“In terms of the CRC, well it’s one of these annual things isn’t it, so you have a 
mad moment when it comes to submission when things don’t quite work right 
on the website or whatever and then you don’t speak to them again for another 
six months.” (CRC M1) 
“Amy: So, in terms of the CRC, do you get in touch with the EA at all? 
Interviewee: Maybe once a year if there is a specific question that I’ve got 
regarding the CRC admin, but because we are into the third or fourth year of 
doing it now, it’s fairly settled down.” (CRC M11) 
                                                          
32 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/crc-energy-efficiency-scheme-qualification-and-registration#contact-crc 
accessed 22/05/2017. 




Some interviewees did not contact the Environment Agency at all: 
“I don’t think we’ve actually contacted them.  We just carry on and do our own 
little thing, really.  So, we don’t really need the Environment Agency” (CRC M13) 
In general, contact with the CRC Helpdesk was generally quite sporadic, and focussed on specific 
questions regarding compliance with the scheme. This infrequent contact was not reflected in the 
interview with the regulator, who claimed that at peak times the Environment Agency was receiving 
400-500 emails a week regarding the CRC. It could be that my largely self-selecting sample of 
interviews is a potential explanation for this difference in appearances. What was consistent between 
the interviewees was the subject matter of the queries. The regulator was mainly dealing with 
administrative questions of compliance, such as password resets, questions relating to the registry, 
and changing the name of the CRC contact in the organisation. The questions asked of the regulator 
were therefore important in terms of securing compliance with the CRC, but were not complex, and 
were procedural rather than substantive. With this in mind, the rest of this chapter will consider this 
contact in more depth. How taxpayers perceived this contact with the regulator raised questions of 
competence, or lack thereof, on the part of the Environment Agency. 
 
5.3 Trust and the CRC 
 
5.3.1 Competence: Issuance of competence  
This chapter has already considered the use of Kasperson et al’s work in Hawkins’ thesis. As I have set 
out above, Kasperson et al argue that trust occurs at the cognitive, emotional and behavioural levels 
at the same time.34 This, in turn, leads to a hierarchy of situations where trust occurs: 
“Thus, general societal processes, situation-specific experiences, and continuing 
validation affect the levels of trust or distrust in institutions, and by extension, 
influence the possibility of developing or recovering trust.”35 
Thus, it is not only the individual-individual communications between the Environment Agency and 
the participant which have the ability to affect trust. More general group social interactions and 
institutional interactions also contribute to trust. The Environment Agency therefore has the 
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35 Ibid.  
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opportunity to demonstrate its competence on three levels with the CRC: first, in how it responds to 
specific participant queries; second, in its group communications to all participants; and third, in its 
general publications as an institution (for instance, via formal guidance documents and web guidance). 
These three forms will all be considered to explore how they potentially affect the perceived 
competence of the Environment Agency. 
The CRC helpdesk provides community update emails to keep participants in the loop of key changes 
and key deadlines. The regulator sends these emails on a semi-regular basis, when there is something 
to say (CRC R1); and they are used as both an information tool and enforcement tool. In its interview, 
the regulator (CRC R1) talked about using these emails to identify when emails were bouncing back 
because the email address was no longer valid (if the CRC contact had left the organisation for 
instance). They would then use this as a starting block to approach participants to update their registry 
and ensure they were on track for compliance (CRC R1). In general, these emails were positively 
received by participants. CRC P2 found these updates useful: 
“Yeah, they send through what are called participant updates very regularly and 
those are basically telling you when the deadlines and what should be done next 
all that kind of things. I mean it's quite difficult to fall out of the loop really.” 
(CRC P2) 
The emails allow the Environment Agency to provide all the information that is needed for participants 
to comply with the scheme (CRC P3). These emails also help to build a relationship (discussed below) 
between the Environment Agency and participants of the CRC. 
The Environment Agency has also issued guidance for each phase of the CRC, as well as website 
guidance for the various compliance stages of the scheme.36 This guidance has been described as 
“plentiful”, but difficult to find since the guidance moved onto the gov.uk website (CRC M14). The 
quality of this guidance was questioned by CRC P8: 
“The EA guidance I felt was very poor for CRC. Interestingly, it’s actually quite 
good for EU ETS. And I do remember filling in a survey from the Environmental 
Agency at one time, which was asking about both schemes and basically saying 
to CRC was very, very poor and EU ETS was quite good.” (CRC P8) 
This interviewee also considered the CRC guidance too in-depth and over complex (CRC P8). This 
perceived complexity of guidance actually creates further queries and contact with the regulator: 
                                                          
36 For example Environment Agency, CRC: Guidance for Participants in Phase 2 (December 2013). 
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“Yeah [we have been in touch with the Environment Agency]. Definitely for 
understanding the guidance.  We've spent a lot of time over the years back and 
forth reinterpreting, getting one answer from one individual compared to 
another answer from another.  I've built some good relationships.  [My 
colleague] especially has built a number of good relationships with people 
[example given], who's helped write the legislation and the guidance, and 
[another employee of EA] and quite leading people who at the time in the EA 
were leading on that.” (CRC M10) 
This is a positive experience of to-ing and fro-ing between regulatees and the regulator building a 
stronger relationship through query communication. In that sense, therefore, the guidance has 
provided a launch pad for discussion. It is interesting that what is considered to be bad guidance has 
led to communications between the regulatee and regulator which in turn lead to good relationships. 
The attitudes of the Environment Agency have also been picked up on as a positive: 
“When I phoned them, they were incredibly helpful I have to say. So, if I’ve ever 
had to phone them they’ve been really helpful, if I’ve emailed them you get a 
response back.” M2 
This positive, “caring” attitude will be discussed in more depth below but is conducive to a positive 
regulator/ regulatee relationship. The Environment Agency is not perceived as an absent regulator; 
they do communicate with their regulatees.  
However, not all queries raised by participants have resulted in such a positive relationship. In fact, a 
number of interviewees questioned the ability of the Environment Agency to answer these queries: 
“There isn’t that many people around on the EA side who actually understand it [the CRC]” (CRC M7). 
This was repeated by CRC M11:  
“When you phone up the EA telephone number, you speak to people who don’t 
know anything about the CRC and so they basically say: ‘oh, I’ll have to find out 
about that and get back to you’. I get the impression that there are perhaps only 
two people from the EA who know how [the CRC] works and what you are 
supposed to be doing.” (CRC M11) 
In addition, whilst the Environment Agency is “helpful”, they are not seen as being “particularly 
knowledgeable” or “the authority on all things CRC” (CRC M3). This is, effectively, the regulatee 
questioning the competence of the regulator. One interviewee talked about the responses they had 
received from the CRC and described them as very “standard emails” (CRC M2); whilst another 
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discusses how expertise, in the form of experienced staff, has been moved away from the CRC 
following the introduction of ESOS (i.e. staff from the CRC have moved onto ESOS) (CRC M7). One 
solicitor questions the ability of the Environment Agency to regulate the CRC at all: 
“To me, the CRC, because it essentially functions as a tax, the environment 
agency is not the best regulator for it because they don’t have the understanding 
of complex corporate structures, they don’t understand how large international 
group companies work, and they just simply don’t have sufficient understanding 
to be able to effectively regulate it.” (CRC S1) 
The helpdesk (the public facing, CRC branch of the Environment Agency) is therefore perceived by 
some of the interviewees as providing generic responses to queries. Communications between the 
regulator and the regulatee have therefore called into question the ability of the EA to competently 
respond to regulatees. Next, I will explore the attitude of the regulator in more depth, in order to 
consider whether it could be deemed to be caring.  
 
5.3.2 Caring: The regulator/ regulatee relationship  
 
A caring attitude on the part of the regulator is especially important where “dependent individuals 
rely upon others with greater control or authority”.37 In the case of the CRC, the Environment Agency 
has the role of the regulator, which clearly creates a power imbalance between the Agency and 
participants of the CRC. In addition to a caring attitude being essential for the growth of trust, this 
section will also argue that a de minimis, active relationship needs to be established the EA and the 
CRC taxpayer. At the moment, there are a number of interviewees who claim to have no relationship 
with the EA, and this makes it difficult for the regulator to convey a caring attitude.  
A by-product of how regulatees perceive communications, and whether the regulatees trust the 
regulator, is the impact that this has on the overall regulator/ regulatee relationship. The literature 
around this relationship is well established. Ayres and Braithwaite have helped to define and explore 
the fluidity of regulator/ regulatee interactions in their work on ‘Responsive Regulation’.38 They have 
also helped to emphasise the complexity of these relationships, with multiple compliance motivations 
                                                          
37 Kasperson et al. (n 8), 170. 
38 Julien Etienne, ‘Ambiguity and Relational Signals in Regulator-Regulatee Relationships’ (2013) 7 Regulation 
and Governance 30, 30. 
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on the part of the regulatee and the regulator.39 The regulator/ regulatee relationship is therefore 
fluid and complex, and requires a respectively flexible approach to enforcement (see below for an 
exploration of regulatory enforcement literature). Beyond enforcement interactions, however, this 
complexity continues into other regulatory encounters.40 A range of factors can easily affect the 
regulator-regulatee relationship, and these include formality in interactions,41 as well as the 
involvement of third parties.42 
Hutter discusses this in terms of environmental regulation: 
Inspectors interpreted the reception they received from the regulated according 
to the nature of their relationship. For instance, difficulties in parking could be 
interpreted as a company being awkward or as an understandable pressure on 
parking. Being asked to sign a visitor’s book would be seen either as a sensible 
precaution in case of fire or as obstructionist and rude. Inspectors also reacted 
differently to offers of coffee and lunch according to the social distance they 
wished to maintain between themselves and the regulated. Where there was a 
close and co-operative relationship inspectors would expect to be offered coffee 
and possibly lunch.43 
In the passage above, a number of seemingly insignificant exchanges have taken place between the 
regulator and regulatee. Yet, it is clear that the regulator has drawn some deeper meaning from these 
encounters. There is somewhat of an ambiguity in regulatory literature on the meaning of regulatory 
encounters.44 This ambiguity is also echoed in associated empirical literature, which argues that there 
is ambiguity for both regulatees and regulators in regulatory interactions.45 Etienne argues: “What it 
means to have a cooperative rather than a conflictual relationship is not always clear”.46 How 
regulatees and the regulator “make sense” of this relationship is closely linked to motivation.47 For 
                                                          
39 Ibid.  
40 See studies in: Bridget Hutter, Compliance: Regulation and Environment (OUP 1997); Michael Herzfeld, The 
Social Production of Indifference (Chicago University Press 1992); Fiona Haines, Corporate Regulation: Beyond 
“Punish or Persuade” (Clarendon Press 1997). 
41 Keith Hawkins, Law as a Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory Agency (OUP 2002) 
42 Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, ‘Regulation and the Role of Trust: Reflections from the Mining 
Industry’ (2009) 36 Journal of Law and Society 167. 
43 Hutter (n 40), p188. 
44 Etienne (n 38). 
45 Keith Hawkins, ‘Compliance Strategy, Prosecution Policy, and Aunt Sally: A Comment on Pearce and Tombs’ 
(1990) 30 British Journal of Criminology 444; Hans de Brujin, Ernst ten Heuvelhof and Marieke Koopmans, Law 
Enforcment: The Game between Inspectors and Inspectees (Universal Publishers 2007). 
46 Etienne (n 38), 32. 
47 Ibid, 33; AW Kruglanski, ‘Motivated Social Cognition : Principles of the Interface’ in ET Higgins and Arie 
Kruglanski (Eds) Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles (Guildford Press 1996). 
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example, Etienne highlights the example of self-interest, whereby a regulatee will interpret 
interactions in terms of gains and losses if they are driven by self-interest.48 As the regulator and 
regulatee may not always be driven by the same interests, there are quite often motivational 
inconsistencies.49 As such, regulators may attempt to alter these motivations, especially in situations 
where regulatory exchange and interaction is frequent and ongoing – allowing for the regulator to 
influence the regulatee on more than one occasion.50  
The work here refers to these repeated interactions as “relational signals”, whereby the regulatees 
and the regulator can come to understand one another and their interactions, even if their motivations 
are different.51 These repeated interactions are therefore important, and are even more important for 
an understanding of enforcement to be established between the regulator and regulatee.52 The use of 
relational signals during these repeat encounters can be used positively (to express satisfaction with 
the relationship) or negatively (to express a lack of satisfaction). Hutter demonstrates this range of 
possible signals: 
“An Industrial Air Pollution Inspector explained to a newly registered business 
that he would use first names and be known by his first name while he was 
satisfied with their environmental control. But if he had cause for dissatisfaction 
he would refer to the regulated by their formal titles and expect to be similarly 
addressed by them.”53 
Hutter therefore explains how the use of formality (or lack of) can help communicate positive or 
negative signals to regulatees. In addition, regulatees are quite able to perceive these relational 
signals.54 The use of these signals during the repeated encounters of a regulator-regulatee relationship 
can therefore help each party understand a common goal. As both parties become aware of the 
different positive and negative signals, they are both more able to manage the relationship.55 They can 
also start to control one another. Etienne argues, “in relationships built on trust, threats or actual 
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sanctions are perceived negatively”.56 As such, prosecution is only used as a last resort by regulators.57 
The use of these relational signals potentially poses the risk of regulatory capture, where the regulator 
becomes controlled and/ or dominated by its regulatees.58 This is because the “features of regulatory 
encounters that foster the evolution of cooperation often also encourage the evolution of capture and 
corruption”.59 However, whilst capture should be borne in mind;60 the risk of capture does not detract 
from the importance of also establishing a meaningful regulator/ regulatee relationship. 
The interaction between regulator and regulatee therefore frames the messages that regulatees 
receive from the regulator. The regulator-regulatee relationship defines much of what happens under 
a regulatory scheme. The rest of this chapter will consider how interviewees view the regulator-
regulatee relationship under the CRC, and how this affects their engagement with the scheme.  
As mentioned above, the Environment Agency exhibits a positive attempt to respond to and help 
participants. More than this, some participants have perceived a genuine desire on the part of the 
regulator to help regulatees.  
“And I think early on… I think there was a genuine…I think even now there’s a 
genuine attempt to help us through the process.  I don’t think anybody’s leaving 
us on our own to sink or swim or anything like that.”  (CRC M12) 
This gives the perception that the Agency has the capacity to show concern for the participants of the 
CRC, which is important for the portrayal of a caring attitude.61 One interviewee also identified the 
fact that a positive relationship with the regulator was of mutual benefit to both the regulator and the 
regulatee: 
“So, it is a two-way thing, they benefit, we benefit. It’s a sensible approach and 
I’d say it’s a good example of where regulators and industry should be working 
well together, and I think they do on the CRC.” (CRC M16) 
M16 perceives the working relationship between the Environment Agency and participants to be 
successful under the CRC. CRC M11 describes the Environment Agency as an “invisible regulator” 
where “as a professional, [they] feel that [they] could be there and the [Environment Agency] be here” 
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57 Ayres and Braithwaite (n 50). This is also the case for the CRC. As of March 2016, the EA had not brought any 
prosecutions under the CRC. Freedom of Information request NR6994 dated 9th March 2016, see Appendix 7. 
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– i.e. that the Environment Agency felt like one of them in the professional sphere. Having a positive, 
successful regulator/ regulatee relationship under the scheme would facilitate the sharing of expertise 
in a two-way flow between the Environment Agency and the CRC participants.  
This positive attitude to help participants expressed by M16, M12 and others is somewhat ajar to 
alternative interviewee views. Namely, a number of interviewees raised the fact that they thought the 
Environment Agency used communications as a starting point for audits. That is to say, that if a 
participant approached the regulator with a query on compliance, for example, they would then be 
far more likely to be audited as a result. This view is not the perception of a caring regulator and is not 
beneficial to the building of trust. It is, however, difficult to see how this view could be dispelled 
without making the audit process more transparent to the regulatees. It is also perhaps just part and 
parcel of the use of intelligence in a risk-based system of regulation. The use of audits by the 
Environment Agency will be considered in further depth during the below discussion of the 
predictability of the regulator.  
Moreover, it is hard to establish a caring regulator when some regulatees have no active relationship 
with the Environment Agency at all, despite the fact that all participants receive the community emails 
(providing they have an up-to-date email address on the CRC registry) and have access to the online 
guidance. This would indicate that for some taxpayers, this broad-brush contact is not enough.  A 
distant and/ or absent regulator is hard to portray as a caring regulator. Participants may only feel the 
need to contact the regulator if they are audited (CRC M5) or may not contact the Environment Agency 
at all (CRC M14). This lack of relationship was not perceived by the regulator, who described their 
relationship with regulatees as “on the whole pretty good” (CRC R1).  
Examples of relationships which are strong under the CRC can be seen in the number of working 
groups that have been set up in some sectors (for example, logistics) and liaise more frequently with 
the Environment Agency (for example, they are specifically consulted before changes). These working 
groups are usually organisations in the same sector grouping together. The interviewees participating 
in working groups were positive and talked about a strong relationship with the regulator: 
“Also, my colleague I passed on - she's our compliance director - she sits on the 
operations liaison board with the Environment Agency.  I think she's the only 
consultant, or one of two consultants, to be there.  I guess it's testament to the 
relationship that we've built up with them around CRC, ESOS and wider 




“Yeah, we have a good relationship with the Environment Agency. I sat on the 
LLG for five years so I know, I’ve seen three or four different Chairs from the 
Environment Agency, so I know all the people really well and I have their 
personal emails, so if they want a question answered, if they say, “We’re 
thinking of doing it this way, what do you think?” they’ll ask the LLG.” (CRC M16) 
Whilst the use of groups to forge stronger regulator/regulatee relationships could be a way forward, 
it would be impossible to use this as a basis to improve relationships on a large scale given the number 
of regulatees (which now stands at 1935 for Phase Two).  
 
5.3.3 Predictability: the audit example  
 
Interviewees specifically raised audits by the Environment Agency in the context of predictability. As 
such, the audit process for the CRC will be used as a lens in which to frame the predictability discussion 
to follow. The audit forms part of the enforcement procedure for the CRC scheme, and so enforcement 
literature will first be explored to provide some context to how regulatory schemes are enforced. In 
Chapter One, an introductory overview of regulatory literature was provided, and the following 
section builds on this.  
 
5.3.3.a The enforcement context 
 
The predictability of how a regulatee is going to be treated is important for creating a trusting 
relationship.62 The Environment Agency has the power to audit participants’ records,63 and 
participants are required to maintain evidence packs ‘just in case’ an audit is carried out.64 The audit 
is a tool for enforcement under the CRC as it allows the regulator to identify any non-compliance. 
                                                          
62 Ibid, 170. 
63 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order 2013, SI 2013/1119, Article 42. 
64 Environment Agency, CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme guidance for participants in Phase Two (2015) pages 52-
53, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/507731/LIT_9008.pdf 
accessed 10/10/2017.  
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Effective enforcement has been described as being “vital” for an effective piece of legislation.65 By 
way of context, the literature on regulatory enforcement has been developed and built upon in a 
number of landmark ideas: responsive regulation; smart regulation; and really responsive regulation. 
Macrory has also done extensive work on the enforcement of environmental regulation.66 Here, he 
looks at the use of sanctions and argues that they are “an essential feature of a regulatory 
enforcement toolkit and are central to achieving compliance by signalling the threat of punishment”.67  
The idea of responsive regulation was first introduced by Ayres and Braithwaite and is based on three 
core ideas: 1) a tit-for-tat strategy should be adopted meaning that regulation is both tough and 
forgiving;68 2) there should be access to a hierarchical range of sanctions, and; 3) the height of the 
enforcement pyramid is important.69 In particular, the hierarchical range of sanctions was illustrated 
in Ayres and Braithwaite’s enforcement pyramid,70 and comprises of a base made of the lesser 
sanctions (such as persuasion and letters) which increase with severity as you proceed up the 
pyramid.71  
The CRC would appear to take a responsive approach to regulation. During its interview the regulator 
(CRC R1), outlined the pathway for enforcement. First a number of letters (which became increasingly 
more strongly worded) would be sent to participants before any notices were issued. This would then 
be followed up with civil penalties or prosecution if necessary. Following a Freedom of Information 
Request that I submitted to the EA dated the 9th March 2016,72 a total of 439 enforcement notices 
were issued in phase one,73 and 131 notices (up to March 2016) in phase two.74 Throughout the whole 
scheme up to March 2016, 22 civil penalties have been issued, and no criminal prosecutions have been 
brought. The number of civil penalties and prosecutions (which would be towards the top of the Ayres 
and Braithwaite pyramid) is therefore vastly lower than the number of reminder emails, letters and 
notices that have been issued by the regulator.  
                                                          
65 Neil Gunningham, ‘Enforcement and Compliance Strategies’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin 
Lodge (Eds) The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010), p120. 
66 Richard Macrory, Regulation, Enforcement and Governance in Environmental Law (Cameron May 2008). 
67 Ibid, 37. 
68 John Braithwaite, ‘Convergence in Models of Regulatory Strategy’ (1990) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 
59, 59.  
69 Ayres and Braithwaite (n 50). 
70 Ibid, p35. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Freedom of Information request NR6994 dated 9th March 2016. This FOI is limited to data on England and 
Wales only.  
73 However, of this number, all were issued for a failure to surrender allowances and largely in the final year 
before the end of phase 1 (267 notices). See Appendix 7. 
74 Again, the issue of notices was largely for a failure to surrender allowances (124 notices). See Appendix 7. 
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In the taxation arena, there has been a noticeable shift from traditional command and control 
approaches to responsive regulation approaches in a number of jurisdictions.75 This shift was driven 
by challenges to the legitimacy of taxation schemes (via increasing amounts of tax evasion);76 and the 
failing integrities of tax authorities which were seen to have a “culture of fear and punishment” under 
command and control regimes.77 The shift away from command and control regulation for taxes has 
encountered challenges specifically with the adoption of responsive regulation to take its place.78 
Responsive regulation was met with resistance when it was first introduced, as the very nature of 
responsive regulation required a culture change within a sector that “stifles innovation”.79The 
adoption of responsive regulation in the tax arena does not diminish the significant criticisms that 
responsive regulation has encountered. For instance, Gunningham has argued that one of the 
shortcomings of responsive regulation is that the enforcement pyramid only allows for a relationship 
between regulator and regulatee, and does not allow for third party interaction.80 In addition, Black 
argues that the pyramid does not rank sanctions in terms of context – for some, naming and shaming 
may be more of a sanction than a fine.81 
An alternative to command and control regulation and responsive regulation is smart regulation. Here, 
Gunningham attempts to correct some of the criticisms of responsive regulation. As such, smart 
regulation incorporates five ideas: 1) A mix of policies and instruments is preferential; 2) using less 
interventionist instruments is preferential; 3) a three-dimensional enforcement pyramid, “which 
considers the possibility of regulation using a number of different instruments implemented by a 
number of parties”;82 4) the use and empowerment of third parties as regulators, and; 5) a 
maximisation of opportunities for regulatees.83 Black argues, however, that this approach still does 
not deal fully with real life problems of regulatory enforcement,84 and proposes an alternative 
approach. Her ‘really responsive regulation’ approach requires the consideration of five criteria for 
enforcement: 
1) The “attitudinal settings” of the regulatee; 
                                                          
75 See for example Jenny Job, Andrew Stout, and Rachael Smith, ‘Culture Change in Three Taxation 
Administrations: From Command and Control to Responsive Regulation’ (2007) 29(1) Law and Policy 84. 
76 Ibid, 88. 
77 Ibid, 89. 
78 The examples of Australia, New Zealand and East Timor were considered: ibid.  
79 Ibid, 93. 
80 Gunningham (n 65), p265. 
81 Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation (2008) 71(1) MLR 59, 86. 
82 Gunningham (n 65), 266. 
83 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation (Clarendon Press 1998), Chapter 6. 
84 Ibid, p61. 
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2) The institutional setting of the regulatory scheme; 
3) The different logics of the tools and strategies available under the scheme; 
4) The assessment of the scheme’s own performance; and 
5) The modification of any of the above criteria.85 
Black’s work on really responsive regulation resonates with Macrory’s work on the role of the 
regulator which he argues should encompass seven characteristics: 
“Seven characteristics (regulators should): 1) publish an enforcement policy; 2) 
measure outcomes not just outputs; 3) justify their choice of enforcement 
actions year on year to stakeholders, Ministers and Parliament; 4) follow-up 
enforcement actions where appropriate; 5) enforce in a transparent manner; 6) 
be transparent in the way in which they apply and determined administrative 
penalties; and, 7) avoid perverse incentives that might influence the choice of 
sanctioning response.”86 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine the regulatory approach that should be taken for the 
enforcement of the CRC. At present, the CRC adopts a somewhat responsive approach to regulation, 
as indicated by both the regulator and the enforcement statistics. This chapter will now consider how 
the predictability in the use of the audit process can impact on trust. 
 
5.3.3.b Predictability and the CRC 
 
Predictability in this scenario is linked to two things: a) the quality of audits, and b) the frequency of 
audits. Interviewees expressed uncertainty as to the depth and competence of the Environment 
Agency auditor demonstrated when an audit is carried out, and those that had not been audited 
expressed uncertainty as to when and why they would be audited. This combination could have 
considerable impacts on taxpayer engagement with the scheme, and how it is complied with. In terms 
of rigour and competence, one interviewee talked about how they felt they could have cheated the 
audit process (CRC P3).  
                                                          
85 Criteria taken and paraphrased from: Black (n 81), 61. 
86 Macrory (n 66), pp40-41. 
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In addition to the quality of audits, the interviewees also questioned their frequency. Whilst there is 
no mention of the frequency of audits in the phase two CRC guidance, interviewees were under the 
impression that audits were to be carried out every couple of years for all participants. Instead, only 
two interviewees out of the participant interviews had been audited (the consultants had all come 
across audits in some fashion, but this perhaps makes sense if they were advising the bigger CRC 
participants). CRC M14 stated that they had expected to be audited by this point (2016) in the scheme, 
but had still not been. As such, there is a lack of predictability in terms of the frequency of audits. This 
unpredictability was termed as a “worry” for CRC M2; whilst CRC M5 did not think that there were 
enough audits. A practical consequence of this unpredictability is that participants are less inclined to 
keep their evidence packs up to date. For instance, CRC M11 kept their evidence packs up to date 
during phase one, but has decided that the risk of being audited is now too low to continue with 
updating. CRC M4 now does the evidence pack “as fast as [they] possibly can” and now maintains a 
“poor quality” evidence pack. Thinking in terms of ‘really responsive regulation’, this is perhaps a 
useful indication of the scheme’s own performance from the eyes of the interviewee (here, that 
resource limitations meant that the EA were not able to audit as much as initially planned (CRC R1)). 
Building on the frequency of audits is the linked point on how audits are triggered. As set out earlier, 
interviewees voiced concerns that the Environment Agency was using communications and 
interactions as the basis for conducting audits. This view obviously impacted on participants’ 
willingness to forge a relationship with the Environment Agency: 
“One of the challenges of the CRC is that organisations tend to not want to 
make themselves too visible – so you tend to get, the relationship you keep as 
brief as possible […] there is no point in raising your head above the parapet 
and inviting another audit because it just means more time doing that activity. 
So even if it is as simple as that, there is no point in inviting that […] It’s kind of 
a risk thing as in you’re not sure that there is a risk there, so you think that 
unless you need to do it [contact the Environment Agency] you might as well 
pretend there is a risk there and not do it.” (CRC M9) 
“Yeah. And a lot of people I know don’t contact the EA anymore with questions 
because they feel that the EA has got a tick list somewhere. And the more times 
you phone up and ask questions, the more it puts you in the pot of, “You don’t 
know” as opposed to the pot, “Oh my God I’ve got lots of complicated questions 
because I’ve got lots of complicated clients and I’m trying to do right by them in 
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asking for clarification.” And that should be seen as a positive not as a negative.” 
(CRC M7) 
This “tick list” also triggers when errors in compliance are voluntarily sent to the regulator so that they 
can be rectified. CRC M7 also discussed how they knew “that the EA has mostly audited people who 
have re-submitted”, that is after the EA was aware that there were errors in the original submission. 
This is the negative side of predictability, and demonstrates that communication and the perception 
of a routine tick list can actually disengage participants and reduce levels of trust. It encourages 
participants to keep a low profile, reduce communications with the regulator and so minimise any 
relationship with the Environment Agency in order to reduce the risk of an audit and possible 
associated enforcement actions. 
Whilst interviewees discussed this audit “tick list” in a negative way, this process has been previously 
communicated to participants by the Environment Agency. The process of selection for audits is listed 
in the phase two CRC guidance as including the following factors:87 risk of non-compliance, complexity 
of organisational structure, and compliance history.88 Some attempt has been made by the EA to bring 
transparency to the risk-based process in this guidance. However, the three bullet-point list is buried 
in 176 pages of guidance and may not have been taken on board by the participants/ interviewees. 
This part of the guidance was not raised by the interviewees during the interviews. 
Overall, in the interviewees’ eyes, a significant amount of uncertainty surrounds the audit process. 
Interviewees have expressed concerns over the quality, but more often the quantity of these audits. 
Practical ramifications of this could be the belief that it is possible to cheat the audit process, which is 
a significant disengagement with the CRC scheme. Whilst interviewees did not discuss cheating the 
audit process per se, they have begun to identify that this lack of predictability can be used to their 
advantage. 
 
5.3.4 Commitment: Wider issues  
 
In terms of commitment, the interviewees attributed some of the lack of expertise and relationship 
with the Environment Agency to wider problems affecting the regulator. Namely, the lack of resources 
at the disposal of the Environment Agency. Interviewees were aware of the cuts made to the 
                                                          
87 Note that this is also in the Phase One guidance. Environment Agency, CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme 
guidance for participants in Phase 1 (2013), p60. 
88 Phase Two Guidance (n 64), p55. 
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Environment Agency, and they attributed these cuts to a loss of resources which then affected the 
relationship between the regulator and regulatees. This lack of resource was perceived to have limited 
the powers of the Environment Agency as a regulator of the CRC (CRC M2). 
In particular, interviewees noted the loss of the CRC Helpdesk telephone line, and the move to email 
focussed contact for the CRC helpdesk. The phone line was considered to be a key resource to 
participants: 
“I used to phone in an awful lot, and they used to explain over the phone, which 
helped massively. But that arm doesn’t exist anymore; you can’t actually phone 
in anymore. So, anybody new coming in, trying to explain I think would be very 
difficult if they had a query. If there are people there in their work teams who 
don’t understand something and they’re not able to explain it there will be a 
chance there will be missed reporting.” (CRC M5) 
And;  
“Yes. I’ve spoken to them a lot over the last few years. They’ve been pretty good; 
pretty responsive. I understand that they changed recently to not allowing 
telephone contact, and instead requested emails to be sent […] it would have 
been a lot more helpful if we’d had a human being to speak to. But I understand 
that they’ve probably been cut massively, like other government departments, 
and they don’t have that resource there.” (CRC M3) 
The phone line was seen as “a help” (CRC P3) to participants who had queries, and its removal has a 
correlating potential to impact on the understanding of CRC participants and the regulator-regulatee 
relationship. This loss of the phone line was also attributed to the wider cuts to the Environment 
Agency by CRC M3. As such, the lack of expertise of the regulator in terms of the ability for participants 
to access that expertise is not blamed on the Environment Agency. Nonetheless, the loss of the phone 
line has wider repercussions.  
The shift to email communication gives the perception that the CRC helpdesk is now poorly manned: 
“They’ve already reduced the number of people on the CRC helpdesk to like one person, or something 
ridiculous for the entire country” (CRC P2). This also impacts on the perceived waiting time for a 
response which was quoted by one interviewee as ten working days (CRC M3), but in reality, may well 
be much shorter. Indeed, the regulator stated that the average response time for emails was one and 
a half days (CRC R1).  
In terms of justifying the move to email based communicated, the regulator stated: 
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“We actually set up a help desk both on phone and e-mail in the first few years. 
We’ve taken the phone line away. We are just doing e-mail; we found it’s more 
efficient and more effective. At times, we were probably getting – at the peak 
period we were getting four or five hundred [queries] a week.” (CRC R1) 
The EA was confident in its ability to deal with the volume of emails sent to the CRC helpdesk. There 
is therefore a disparity between what the interviewees have perceived by the loss of phone line, and 
the Environment Agency’s logic behind the move. In the regulator’s eyes, the removal of the phone 
line was an efficiency move and helped them to deal with higher volumes of queries than the phone 
lines. There was therefore at least some issue of poor communication regarding the change, as the 
interviewees have viewed the changes in a negative light and perceive the changes to be cutbacks to 
the scheme. It could be a question of marketing, in the sense that the EA did not ‘sell’ the move to 
emailing. Or, it could be that the interviewees see the move to email as a drop in the standard of 
service that the EA provides as regulator.  
Linking this idea to the financial incentives, which will be seen in Chapter Seven, one solution to this 
was put forward by two interviewees: reinvestment of some revenues back into the resources of the 
Environment Agency. CRC P7 stated: 
“Possibly supporting organisations like the Environment Agency and Defra 
which are getting severely cut the government at the moment, perhaps some 
money could be funded back into there; because I do think they’re an important 
resource for things like that.” 
And;  
“So, beef up the Environment Agency, take the liability away from local 
authorities and I think you might see more effective regulation. There’s nothing 
wrong with the regulations, the regulations are only good as those who enforce 
them.” (CRC S4) 
This may appear to be a case of turkeys voting for Christmas, as a bigger, more powerful regulator is 
then a bigger force to contend with for regulatees. However, when coupled with the fact that the 
interviewees wanted the support and competence of the EA, a better resourced EA seems less of a 
death wish. This approach would work hand in hand with tax hypothecation discussed alongside 
incentives. By investing the revenues of the CRC back into the regulator, it gives the Environment 
Agency more resources. This in turn, allows them to provide services to participants; which in turn 
provides the regulator more opportunities to provide expertise to participants. This would potentially 
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allow for a higher level of trust between the participant and the regulator. It gives the perception of a 
more “effective regulator”, which is key to effective environmental regulation (CRC S4). 
It is important, therefore, to consider how taxpayers and regulatees perceive a regulator which is 
struck with wider issues such as resource cuts, which impact on its ability to provide expertise. In the 
case of the CRC, the cuts to the Environment Agency, and more specifically to the CRC Helpdesk, have 
given participants the impression that the regulator is now more inaccessible. When this is combined 
with the perception that the helpdesk provides only generic advice to queries, and is not authoritative 
on the CRC, we are left with a regulator that is seen to lack both expertise and resources.  
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Kasperson et al explore a framework for trust which resonates well with the interview data from the 
CRC study. This framework is one of many frameworks available for trust.89 As such, it is not the only 
approach that could be taken. However, the data from my CRC study raises questions of commitment, 
competence, caring-ness and predictability, and as such, Kasperson’s model fits the interview data 
best: 
1. Competence – It is through the communications between the Environment Agency and the 
participants, that the incompetence of the Environment Agency was perceived. This 
communication includes guidance issued by the regulator, community emails and responses 
to enquiries. 
2. Caring – Interviewees talked of the generally helpful attitude of the Environment Agency. CRC 
M12 stated: “I think even now there’s a genuine attempt to help us through the process”. 
3. Predictability – A manifestation of predictability was raised through the use of the audits 
procedure.90 More specifically, participants believed that contacted the Environment Agency 
raised a flag against their name which then resulted in an audit.  
4. Commitment – Interviewees drew upon wider issues of commitment such as lack of resources 
and commitment to policy. 
 
                                                          
89 For a useful overview of the different possible approaches, see Harrison McKnight et al. (n 10). 
90 The Environment Agency has the power to audit participants under Article 65 of the 2013 Order (n 63).  
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Not all of these factors raise questions of a lack of trust for the CRC. Indeed, some of these factors 
were seen as positives (and so building blocks of trust) by interviewees. In addition, building trust 
through one factor may come at the expense of another,91 and as such, the factors are for guidance 
only.  
By applying this framework, this chapter has highlighted some areas which could be improved in order 
to strengthen the levels of trust between the Environment Agency and the participants of the CRC. 
Namely these are: the quality of responses provided by the EA to participant queries to demonstrate 
competence; and, the perceived resources of the regulator, whether that is experienced staff with a 
working knowledge of the CRC, or the resources to carry out a more systematic and thorough auditing 
of regulatees. At the same time, this chapter has also highlighted the areas in which the participants 
are already content with the Environment Agency such as the general helpful attitude of the EA 
towards regulatees. By continuing to build on these areas, as well as by improving on areas of concern, 
this chapter argues that the regulator will be able to foster a stronger regulator- regulatee 
relationship. In addition to the above discussion, this chapter has also highlighted key relevant areas 
of literature including regulatory literature on enforcement and literature on regulator-regulatee 
relationships. By drawing on a Freedom on Information request, this chapter has also begun to paint 
the enforcement and compliance picture for the CRC. 
Overall, this chapter has focussed on the four key areas of social trust as put forward by Kasperson et 
al: competence, caring, predictability and commitment.92 The data from my study would appear to 
confirm the importance of these four elements in establishing a meaningful relationship of trust 
between regulator and regulatee. This echoes the work of Hawkins, who also applied and confirmed 
Kasperson’s concept of social trust in her work.93 In terms of competence, regulatees questioned the 
quality of online guidance and the ability of the EA to respond to specific queries relating to the 
scheme. Communications between the regulator and regulatee have, in the eyes of the interviewees, 
called into question the competence and commitment of the EA. On the other hand, a number of the 
interviewees did consider the EA to have a caring attitude, once a meaningful relationship had been 
established. This was demonstrated by interviewees discussing the fact that the EA wasn’t ‘out to get 
them’ in terms of enforcement. Where the regulator struggles with the CRC is the apparent lack of a 
meaningful relationship between the regulator and regulatees of the scheme. This lack of relationship 
(despite regular community email updates) could impact on regulatees’ perceptions of enforcement. 
Here, interviewees raised the issue of predictability through the example of the CRC audit. 
                                                          
91 Kasperson et al. (n 8), 171. 
92 Ibid, 170 
93 Hawkins (n 2), Chapter Three. 
143 
 
Interviewees questioned the frequency and quality of the audits. Whilst the audit process has been 
communicated to regulatees, this did not seem to prevent some from doubting the integrity of the 
process. 
Finally, interviewees did not attribute any perceived lack of commitment to the regulator. Instead, 
interviewees considered the EA to lack resources, and that this lack of resources links back to a 
bigger policy picture. As such, there is the possibility that interviewees see a shift of resources and 
resource cuts as a lack or drop in commitment to the environment by the government.  The next 
chapter will shift the focus back to CRC participants, and will consider whether nudging could be 
used to increase CRC engagement. 
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Chapter Six: Nudging and Behavioural 
Change 
 
This chapter will consider the role of incentives in changing taxpayer behaviour. As one of the aims of 
the CRC is to reduce energy consumption, by effectively taxing each linked tonne of carbon emissions, 
the CRC aims to change behaviour.1 In its current form, it does this through a negative incentive – that 
is, by attaching an additional cost to the use of energy. The more energy that is consumed, the higher 
the cost will be. The increased cost provides an incentive in reducing the burden of the CRC, by 
lowering the amount of energy consumed.  
In addition to more traditional incentives, many of my interviewees raised the ideas of reputation and 
information during their interviews.2  Reputation in this sense, as they are businesses, means 
widespread public opinion; whilst information referred to the provision of performance and 
enforcement information by the regulator. These concepts flagged up the potential for the use of 
social nudges (an intervention that seeks to influence choice rather than remove choice) to change 
participant behaviour in addition to (and not instead of) the cost incentive already offered by the CRC.  
This chapter will consider, through the lens of the CRC study data, the role that nudging could have to 
play in an environmental tax scheme. This chapter will begin by outlining the literature and theoretical 
framework which form the basis of nudging. This will include a consideration of libertarian 
paternalism, as well as what constitutes a nudge. Following on from an understanding of what a nudge 
is, this chapter will apply the literature to the CRC to analyse how nudging could be useful in effecting 
behavioural change. Overall, it will be argued that there is a secondary role for nudging alongside a 
tax. By harnessing the power of reputation, a social nudge can drive behavioural change through 
competition and collaboration. Taxpayers can compete with their fellow taxpayers in a bid to be ‘seen 
to be green’,3 and sectors come together to collaborate and pool resources. As the CRC targets 
                                                          
1 The CRC was described as “an important enabling tool for the public sector to deliver its carbon 
reduction targets” in HM Government, Meeting the Energy Challenge:  A White Paper on Energy (May 2007), 
p278. The 2010-2015 Government website also states that the CRC aims to “improve energy efficiency” in 
larger organisations -  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-
energy-demand-reduction-in-industry-business-and-the-public-sector/2010-to-2015-government-policy-
energy-demand-reduction-in-industry-business-and-the-public-sector accessed 19/09/2017. 
2 Reputational drivers have also been considered as important and described as a “strong driver” by 
government; although only constitute 13% of the drivers for energy efficiency under the CRC (cost being the 
largest): DECC, CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Evaluation: Final Synthesis Report (July 2015), pp10, 38.  
3 Compare this to competition-based regulation, as seen in Wendy Wagner, ‘Using Competition-Based 
Regulation to Bridge the Toxics Data Gap’ (2008) 83 Indiana Law Journal 629. Here, Wagner explains 
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businesses and not individuals, reputation can only really drive change if the harmful behaviour 
resonates with the public. 
 
6.1 Nudging Literature 
 
In the seminal work of Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler,4 the concept of nudging was introduced as 
an alternative to command and control regulation and economic market instruments. Richard Thaler 
has recently won the Nobel Prize for economics for his work on the subject.5 The concept of nudging 
seeks to influence choices to change unwanted behaviour, rather than stopping behaviour through 
mandates; as whilst laws and regulations have been historically good at stopping unwanted behaviour, 
they have been less effective at starting wanted behaviour.6 As the CRC is aiming to improve energy 
efficiency and not curb the use of energy full stop, it is argued that the CRC is, in a way, attempting to 
start a new behaviour: energy efficiency.7  
Work on nudging is growing and has been since 2009 when Sunstein and Thaler introduced the 
concept of a nudge. Since then, a wealth of literature on the subject has developed. A google scholar 
search of ‘nudging AND sunstein’ brings up nearly 13,000 results from a wide range of areas including: 
                                                          
competition-based regulation as follows: “in competition-based regulation, regulators provide a venue for the 
"better" chemicals to prosper at the expense of the "worse" (untested or unnecessarily risky) chemicals by 
adjudicating claims of environmental superiority”, 640. Nudging is subtler than this and would not entail the 
regulator producing specific certificates of “environmental superiority” for products (641). The notion of 
competition is, however, similar here.  
4 Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (UK: 
Penguin 2009). 
5 https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/09/nobel-prize-in-economics-richard-thaler accessed 
11/10/2017. 
6 David Halpern, Inside the Nudge Unit: How small changes can make a big difference (WH Allen 2015), p21. 
7 The alternative view to this is, of course, that the CRC is trying to stop some energy use. However, as the 
amount of energy reduction is not specifically mentioned in the CRC, it makes sense that it is trying to promote 
energy efficiency rather than stop energy consumption. 
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ethics,8 health,9 and finances.10 Sunstein himself has written prolifically on the subject, with 71 articles 
on nudging.11 This has become a rich field in a short amount of time.  
In addition, the topic has received considerable political attention. In 2009, President Barack Obama 
signed a memorandum with the aim of exploring the role which behavioural sciences could have in 
the development of regulatory policy.12 Following this, Cass Sunstein headed up the regulatory division 
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (in the US Whitehouse), between 2009 and 2012.13 
In the UK, former Prime Minister David Cameron set up the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), known 
better as the ‘nudge unit’, and which is now a separate company that researches and tests nudges.14 
On a more international scale, the OECD has also published a policy document on nudging;15 and the 
European Commission has shown an interest in the subject.16 
Relevant to this thesis, there has been a keen academic interest in nudging for the environment.17 The 
first link between nudges and the environment dates back to the start of the field, with Thaler and 
Sunstein dedicating a chapter to “saving the planet”.18 Now, nudging has a presence in core 
Environmental Law textbooks.19 More specifically, the role of nudging, individuals and ‘green 
consumerism’ has also been considered by Quigley and Stokes.20 These ‘green nudges’ aim to promote 
                                                          
8 For example, Cass Sunstein, ‘The Ethics of Nudging’ (2015) 32 Yale Journal on Regulation 413. 
9 Obesity is an often used example, see: Paul Rozin et al, ‘Nudge to nobesity I: Minor Changes in Accessibility 
Decrease Food Intake’ (2011) 6(4) Judgment and Decision Making 323; Theresa Marteau, ‘Judging Nudging: 
Can Nudging Improve Population Health?’ (2011) 342 British Medical Journal 263; Geof Rayner and Timothy 
Lang, ‘Is Nudge an Effective Public Health Strategy to Tackle Obesity? No’ (2011) 342 British Medical Journal 
(Online). 
10 Morris Altman, ‘Implications of Behavioural Economics for Financial Literacy and Public Policy’ (2012) 41(5) 
Journal of Socio-Economics 677; Sue Lewis and Anne-Flore Messy, ‘OECD Working Papers on Finance, 
Insurance and Private Pensions’ (OECD July 2012); Schlomo Banartzi and Richard Thaler, ‘Behavioral Economics 
and the Retirement Savings Crisis’ (2013) 339 Science 1152. 
11 Based upon a google scholar search dated 21st September 2017. 
12 Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Memorandum Regarding Regulatory Review, 23rd April 2009.  
13 Although his time there was not without criticism, see: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/04/science/earth/cass-sunstein-to-leave-top-regulatory-post.html 
accessed 21/09/2017. 
14 Albeit in partnership with the Cabinet Office. See http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/about-us/ accessed 
01/09/2017. 
15 OECD, Behavioural Economics and Environmental Policy Design (OECD July 2012). 
16 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/conferences/behavioural_economics2/programme_en.htm 
accessed 21/09/2017. 
17 Robert Lee, ‘Regulation and localism’ (2011) 23 ELM 166; Rachel Croson and Nicolas Treich, ‘Behavioural 
Environmental Economics: Promises and Challenges’ (2014) 58 Environmental and Resource Economics 335, 
337. Further environmental nudge literature can be seen in footnotes 19-23. 
18 Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), Chapter 12. 
19 Stuart Bell et al, Environmental Law (9th Edition) (OUP 2017), pp259-260. 
20 Murieann Quigley and Elen Stokes, ‘Nudging and Evidence-Based Policy in Europe: Problems of Normative 
Legitimacy and Effectiveness’ in Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony (eds), Nudge and the Law: A 
European Perspective (Hart 2015). 
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environmentally friendly behaviour amongst individuals.21 The interplay between environmental 
taxation and nudging has also been considered at an individual level (that is, on taxes on individuals 
rather than businesses).22 The academic focus on nudges in the environmental field has centred on 
the role of defaults, 23 which are mechanisms that aim to change the default option, that is, the status 
quo if a proactive decision is not made.24 However, this thesis is primarily concerned with the use of 
social norms, in particular reputational elements, to drive behavioural change in environmental 
regulation. 
This section will first explore the theoretical hurdles to nudging, which are anti-paternalism and the 
Harm Principle. Next, this section will delve deeper into the concept of nudging itself. Finally, the use 
of nudges in the UK, and their potential use in the CRC will be explored.  
 
6.1.1 Theoretical framework: Libertarian Paternalism  
 
Sunstein and Thaler label nudging as a form of libertarian paternalism.25 Paternalism can be loosely 
defined as:  
“The interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring 
exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the 
person being coerced.”26 
A policy or piece of regulation is therefore paternalistic if it aims to influence the choices of a class of 
persons for their own good.27 Delving deeper, this can be further characterised into pure and impure 
paternalism. Pure paternalism is where the class of people whose liberty has been restricted is the 
                                                          
21 Rachel Croson and Nicolas Treich, ‘Behavioural Environmental Economics: Promises and Challenges’ (2014) 
58 Environmental and Resource Economics 335. 
22 Dora Costa and Matthew Kahn, ‘Energy Conservation “Nudges” and Environmentalist Ideology: Evidence 
from a Randomized Residential Electricity Field Experiment’ (2013) Journal of the European Economic 
Association 680. 
23 See for example: Aristeidis Theotokis and Emmanouela Manganari, The Impact of Choice Architecture on 
Sustainable Consumer Behavior: The Role of Guilt (2015) 131 Journal of Business Ethics 423; Johan Egebark 
and Mathias Ekstrom, Can indifference make the world greener? (2016) 76 Journal Environmental Economics 
and Management 1. 
24 For more information on status quo and defaults, see Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), pp37-38. 
25 Halpern (n 6), p21. 
26 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Paternalism’ (1972) 56(1) Philosophy and Public Policy 64, 65. 




same as the class of people who are intended to benefit from the restriction.28 In impure paternalism, 
the class of persons who benefit from the interference is different.29 Taking the CRC as an example, a 
tax is being imposed upon larger emitters only to benefit all (the idea being that this helps to mitigate 
climate change, which affects everyone), making it an example of impure paternalism. This is echoed 
in nudging, which includes examples of nudges which are aimed at benefiting others, and not just the 
person being nudged.30  
John Stuart Mill expressed objections to the idea and use of paternalism: 
“Neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to 
another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his 
own benefit what he chooses to do with it.”31 
Therefore, power should not be exercised over members of a civilised society to influence or change 
their life decisions. The quality of their decision is independent of the ability to make the decision and 
the preservation of choice should prevail regardless of whether the chooser then makes a bad 
decision.32 The exception to this, as put forward by Mill, is to “prevent harm to others”.33 In general, 
the approach adopted by Mill can be labelled as anti-paternalistic; and an “objection to paternalistic 
interferences with a man's liberty”.34 The absolute opposition to paternalism has been labelled the 
Harm Principle, and has been heavily criticised as the following text illustrates. 
The main criticism of Mill’s work is that it is premised on the lack of proof that humans are so aware 
of their own interests that “no compulsion or restraint put upon them by any others for the purpose 
of promoting their interest can really promote them”.35 Following Mill’s Harm principle, there was a 
general decline “in the belief that individuals know their own interest best”.36 Thaler and Sunstein 
reiterate this point in their more recent literature. They justify paternalism by stating that whilst there 
has been no evidence that human choices are rational, there has been evidence that they are 
potentially irrational: 
                                                          
28 Dworkin (n 26), 68. 
29 Ibid, 68. 
30 See the “Don’t Mess with Texas” anti-littering campaign discussed in Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), p60; and 
Daniel Hausman and Brynn Welch, ‘Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge’ (2010) 18(1) Journal Political 
Philosophy 123, 125. 
31 John S Mill, On Liberty (Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer 1869), p136. 
32 Dworkin (n 26), 75. 
33 Mill (n 31), p22. 
34 Dworkin (n 26), 64. 
35 James F Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Smith, Elder 1874), p26. 
36 HLA Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (Stanford University Press 1963), p32. 
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“The presumption that individual choices should be free from interference is 
usually based on the assumption that people do a good job of making choices, 
or at least that they do a far better job than third parties could do. As far as we 
can tell, there is little empirical support for this claim. Research by psychologists 
and economists over the past three decades has raised questions about the 
rationality of the judgments and decisions that individuals make.”37  
This research38 is coupled with the argument that some form of paternalism is always inevitable.39 If 
the world is not rational, then simply the use of a ‘default setting’ (for example, in England, the default 
is that you are not an organ donor unless you opt to be)40 will affect choice and be a form of 
paternalism.41 These arguments form the basis of Thaler and Sunstein’s justification for libertarian 
paternalism,42 which is paternalism modified by liberalism.43 The libertarian aspect is the “insistence 
that, in general, people should be free to do what they like”.44 As such, the focus is on preserving choice 
and liberty, whilst acknowledging that it is “legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people’s 
behaviour” to improve their lives.45 Nudging is therefore based in the idea of libertarian paternalism.  
Universal agreement with Thaler and Sunstein’s interpretation of libertarian paternalism does not 
exist. Hanson for example, argues that whilst literature treats nudges and libertarian paternalism as 
one and the same,46 this is not necessarily the case. Hanson further argues that without defining the 
line between nudges and libertarian paternalism, nudging leaves itself open to “accusations of 
slippery-slopes, claims of conceptual inconsistency, and warnings that nudges may quickly turn into 
shoves”.47 Hausman and Welch also question the role of libertarian paternalism. They argue that if a 
                                                          
37 Thaler and Sunstein 2003 (n 27), 176. 
38 See, for example: Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (eds), Choices, values, and frames (Cambridge 
University Press 2000); James Choi et al., ‘Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and 
the Path of Least Resistance’ in James Poterba (Ed), Tax policy and the economy, Vol. 16. (MIT Press 2002) pp. 
67-113; and, Ted O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin, ‘Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin 
Taxes’ (2003) 93(2) American Economic Review 186. 
39 Thaler and Sunstein 2003 (n 27), 176. 
40 Although Wales was the first country in the UK to adopt an opt-out system – i.e. the default is that everyone 
is an organ donor from the 1 December 2015. For more information, see: 
http://organdonationwales.org/Organ-Donation-is-changing-in-Wales/Who-will-the-system-change-apply-
to/?lang=en accessed 09/03/2017. 
41 Thaler and Sunstein 2003 (n 27), 176-177. 
42 This is covered in more detail, with arguments relating to welfare and autonomy in: Cass Sunstein, ‘Why 
Nudge?’ (Yale University Press 2014). 
43 Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), p5. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Pelle Hanson, The Definition of Nudge and Libertarian Paternalism: Does the Hand Fit the Glove? (2016) EJRR 
1, 2. 
47 Ibid, 3. 
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policy is paternalistic only if it limits the choice of what people can choose, then no nudges are 
paternalistic.48 Unhelpfully, a relationship between nudging and libertarianism paternalism has not yet 
been determined.49 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to dive into a debate on the exact definitions and boundaries 
between nudging and libertarian paternalism. It suffices to say that Thaler and Sunstein base their 
original concept of nudging in libertarian paternalism, but that this approach is not accepted by all 
scholars.  
 
6.1.2 The concept of nudging  
 
While behavioural psychology has talked of the same concept for much longer, the concept of a 
‘nudge’ was first labelled as such by Thaler and Sunstein in 2009. Halpern argues that Thaler and 
Sunstein’s work has advanced the work on nudging in three ways: 1) as Thaler and Sunstein are not 
psychologists, it helped to push nudging out of the realms of pure psychology; 2) they blended the 
ideas from psychology with concepts from ‘behavioural economics’; and, 3) their ideas directly 
engaged with policy.50  
Thaler and Sunstein define a nudge as follows: 
“A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that 
alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options 
or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, 
the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates.”51 
It is a “means of encouraging or guiding behaviour” without “heavy financial incentives or sanctions”.52  
Nudging therefore uses choice architecture to alter decisions to a more preferred choice without 
removing any of the choices from the decision-maker.53 
Therefore, this chapter does not consider the pure, financial incentive that is the tax of the CRC (i.e. 
the payment made to the Treasury for the purchase of allowances) as there is no choice involved in 
                                                          
48 Hausman and Welch (n 30), 128. 
49 Hanson (n 46), 16. 
50 Halpern (n 6), p39. 
51 Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), p6. 
52 Halpern (n 6), p22. 
53 Cass Sunstein, Simpler, The Future of Government (Simon and Schuster 2013), page 39. For more on the two 
systems, see: Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (Penguin 2012), Part 1. 
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paying the tax. Instead, both nudging and this chapter will be considering more subtle methods of 
changing behaviour which will run alongside the CRC and form part of the regulatory package of the 
CRC. It is a consideration of behavioural changing mechanisms which are above and beyond the 
payment of a tax. 
A choice architect “has the responsibility for organizing the context in which people make 
decisions”.54A nudge is therefore the influencing of choices in a way which prioritises a choice, which, 
in the eyes of the architect, is a better choice for the chooser. The basis of their idea lies in the fact 
that humans make errors. They split the world into “humans” and “econs”.55 “Econs” can think through 
all possibilities and information, in order to come to an informed decision.56 “Econs” are driven by 
incentives rather than emotion.57 Life decision makers are human:58  
“Human beings can be myopic and impulsive, giving undue weight to the short 
term (perhaps by smoking, or texting while driving, or eating too much 
chocolate). What is salient greatly matters. If an important feature of a situation, 
an activity, or a product lacks salience, people might ignore it, possibly to their 
advantage (perhaps because it is in the other room, and fattening) and possibly 
to their detriment (if it could save them money or extend their lives) […] they 
are greatly affected by default rules, which establish what happens if they do 
nothing.”59 
This builds upon the criticisms of Mill’s work, in the sense that humans do not make perfect decisions.  
In the UK, the concept of introducing psychology into policy is not an entirely novel one. A cabinet 
office discussion paper published in 2004 explored the different theories of behavioural change, which 
included criticisms of the ‘Rational Man’ model (which, like Mill’s work, assumes that humans 
“rationally seek to maximise their own welfare”).60 The paper also started to explore where these 
theories could start to be applied in the areas of health, crime, employment and education. As a report 
                                                          
54 Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), p3. 
55 Ibid, p7. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid, p9. 
58 Ibid, p14. 
59 Sunstein (n 42), p9. 
60 David Halpern et al., ‘Personal Responsibility and Changing Behaviour: the State of Knowledge and its 
Implications for Public Policy’ (Cabinet Office 2004), p15. 
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which predates ‘Nudge’, it draws upon Thaler and Sunstein’s earlier work on ‘libertarian 
paternalism’.61  
In 2010, the Institute for Government published ‘MINDSPACE’, which provided a checklist to 
policymakers, 62 to ensure that they take into account the most “robust effects” on human behaviour 
when making policy:63  
Messenger 
 
We are heavily influenced by who communicates 
information 
Incentives Our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable 
mental shortcuts such as strongly avoiding losses   
Norms We are strongly influenced by what others do 
Defaults We „go with the flow‟ of pre-set options 
Salience Our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems 
relevant to us 
Priming Our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues 
Affect Our emotional associations can powerfully shape our 
actions 
Commitments We seek to be consistent with our public promises, and 
reciprocate acts 
Ego We act in ways that make us feel better about 
ourselves 
Source: Institute for Government and the Cabinet Office, MINDSPACE: Influencing behaviour through public 
policy (2010), page 8 
 
The Institute for Government draw upon the previous work of DEFRA in the field and DEFRA’s ‘4 Es’ 
framework (Enable, Engage, Encourage, Exemplify),64 to create a framework for ‘MINDSPACE’. The ‘4 
Es’ are actions that should underpin any attempt by the government to change behaviour.65 The 
MINDSPACE report builds upon this by adding two further Es – Explore (before the 4 Es) and Evaluate 
(after the 4E s).66 This provides the framework within which the tools provided by MINDSPACE may be 
applied. 
                                                          
61 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron’ (2003) 70(4) The University 
of Chicago Law Review 1159. 
62 Institute for Government and the Cabinet Office, ‘MINDSPACE: Influencing Behaviour through Public Policy’ 
(2010). 
63 Ibid, Executive Summary. 
64 HM Government (DEFRA), Securing the Future: Delivering UK Sustainable Development Strategy (2005), p26. 
65 MINDSPACE (n 62), p9. 
66 Ibid.  
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The Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) (also known as the ‘Nudge Unit’) was created in 2010 by the then 
Conservative/ Liberal Democrat coalition government. Originally a team within the cabinet office, the 
BIT team is now a private company,67 and has been labelled “the global poster child for the latest 
behavioural turn in policy and regulation”.68 The Nudge Unit had three objectives: 1) to make public 
services more cost-effective and accessible; 2) to introduce more realistic models of human behaviour 
into policy; and, 3) to enable people to make “better choices”.69 The Nudge Unit in the UK developed 
and built upon Thaler and Sunstein’s work in ‘Nudge’, UK policy documents,70 and wider academic 
literature;71 and developed the following acronym: E – Easy; A – Attract; S – Social; T – Timely 
(otherwise known as EAST).72 The concept of ‘Easy’ relies on the use of defaults (much like in Nudge) 
to change behaviour.73 The use of images of personalisation can be useful in attracting attention, as 
humans are more likely to change their behaviour if they are ‘Attracted’ to it.74 It is ‘Social’ if you can 
show that most people behave in a certain way.75 It is also important to time any influence for when 
people are most receptive.76 
As has been previously set out, the CRC forms part of the UK regulatory toolkit for climate change, and 
the CRC aims to change behaviour to help the UK meet its international climate change commitments. 
Whilst this chapter does not consider the role of the financial incentive under the CRC; it will consider 
the role of secondary tools which can complement the tax and further behavioural change. During my 
interviews, interviewees often referred to the performance of others under the scheme – and, more 
importantly, a desire to perform better than their competitors under the scheme. As the CRC 
previously had a reputational element (in the form of the publicly available Performance League 
Table), it is interesting that participants engage with and seek to know how others are performing 
under the scheme.  It is this social side to the CRC which will be considered in this chapter, to argue 
that exploiting the social nature of the CRC could be important to enhance the positive behavioural 
                                                          
67https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-launches-competition-to-find-a-commercial-partner-
for-the-behavioural-insights-team accessed 19/09/2017. 
68 Quigley and Stokes (n 20), p61. 
69 http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/about-us/ accessed 13/03/2017. 
70 MINDSPACE (n 62).  
71 See for example Robert B Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (Revised Edition) (Collins 
Business, 2007). 
72 Behavioural Insights Team, EAST: Four Simple Ways to Apply Behavioural Insights (2014), p4. Available at 
http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/publications/east-four-simple-ways-to-apply-behavioural-insights/ 
accessed 16/03/2017. 
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid, p5. 
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change impacts that the CRC could have. This chapter will now consider the interview data in light of 
nudging literature.  
 
6.2 Nudging and the CRC 
 
6.2.1 Reputational element of the CRC 
 
In the environmental context, nudges have often been bypassed for more interventionist measures 
to control pollution and other environmentally harmful behaviours.77 Whilst Sunstein and Thaler’s 
work focusses largely on the use of defaults,78 the data from the CRC study indicate the potential role 
for social norms. Here, the idea is that the “social environment influences behaviour”.79 The concept 
of social norms was initially split into two categories by Thaler and Sunstein: 1) Information, where if 
enough people take a certain approach this will convey the idea that it is the way to do things; and, 2) 
peer pressure, which is particularly important if the human cares what others think.80 With the CRC, 
my interview data suggests that it is the second form of social nudging which is primarily at play.  
Social norms “matter for individual choices”,81 “as people are constrained by reputational forces and 
concern about the perception of others”.82 They help us not only to understand behaviour, but also 
its regulation.83In later literature, building on Thaler and Sunstein’s work, the concept of social norms 
has been developed to include further considerations. The first category relates to social norms and 
the choices that other people are making. Sunstein and Reisch argue that if a chooser is aware that 
most other people are choosing green energy (for example), then they are far more likely to follow 
                                                          
77 Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), p193. 
78 As explained above, this default rule is the status quo – it is the decision that applies if the human does not 
make any further decisions. 
79 Sunstein (n 42), p118. 
80 Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), pp58-59. 
81 Anne-Lise Sibony and Alberto Alemanno, ‘The Emergence of Behavioural Policy-Making’ in Alberto 
Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony (eds), Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective (Hart 2015), p4; Cass 
Sunstein, ‘Nudges.gov: Behavioural Economics and Regulation’ in E Zamir and D Teichman (eds), Oxford 
Handbook of Behavioural Economics and the Law (OUP 2014). 
82 Alberto Alemanno and Alessandro Spina, ‘Nudging Legally: On the Checks and Balances of Behavioural 
Regulation’ (2014) 12(2) International Journal of Constitutional Law 429, 430. 
83 Sibony and Alemanno (n 81), p4. See also M Vandebergh et al, ‘Regulation in the Behavioural Era’ (2011) 95 
Minnesota Law Review 715. 
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suit.84 Sunstein and Reisch also tackle the question of expression, arguing that, for some, their 
decisions are based upon a desire to express certain values (in this case being green – they want to 
“make a statement”).85 Finally, signalling could drive behaviour, or, as Sunstein and Reisch explain, 
people act if it improves their social status.86 Here, they point out: 
“Socially visible actions, such as driving electric sports cars, are naturally more 
useful for status signalling than switching to green electricity, installing a high 
efficiency heat pump in the basement, or opting for car sharing. “Buying green” 
is often done for status reasons, while “behaving green” is usually less visible 
and status-laden.”87 
This is problematic for using signalling under the CRC as behaving green is not as visible as, for 
example, buying a shiny new wind turbine. Under the scheme, participants are required to reduce 
energy consumption, but this has no status value unless this is publicised and engaged with.  
Criticisms have been raised against nudging by the advocates of more traditional regulation. Baldwin 
argues that nudging lacks the transparency that is seen in the process of introducing more traditional 
forms of regulation.88 There is also a trade-off in autonomy when using nudging in favour of the 
desired behaviour, as the decisions are shaped for the decision-maker to bypass conscious individual 
judgment. Nudges can therefore be an expression of the capacity of individuals and their ability for 
“autonomous and responsible decision-making”.89 In addition, I am conscious that nudging and 
behavioural economics might be being stretched “to solve problems it wasn’t meant to address”.90 
The concept of nudging targets “individual behaviour”, rather than behaviour in an organisational 
setting.91 If interpreted at face value, it would mean that the concept of nudging would translate 
poorly into the business context. However, during the main stage of interviews, I asked participants: 
Is it just you working on CRC, or do you have a team? For most interviewees, they (usually with the job 
                                                          
84 Cass Sunstein and Lucia Reisch, ‘Automatically Green: Behavioural Economics and Environmental Protection’ 
(2014) 38(1) Harvard Environmental Law Review 127, 129.  
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid, 130. 
87 Ibid.   
88 Robert Baldwin, ‘From Regulation to Behaviour Change: Giving Nudge the Third Degree’ (2014) 77(6) MLR 
831, 844. 
89 Karen Yeung, ‘Nudge as Fudge’ (2012) 75(1) MLR 122, 146; see also Karen Yeung, ‘The Forms and Limits of 
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90 George Loewenstein and Peter Ubel, ‘Economics Behaving Badly’, New York Times, 14 July 2010 available at 
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91 Martin Lodge and Kai Wegrich, Managing Regulation: Regulatory Analysis, Politics and Policy (Palgrave 
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title of energy manager, or similar)92 were working alone or in a team of two. The biggest CRC team 
was a team of four (CRC P8). A solicitor also added: 
“With many larger clients, there tends to be a person that is responsible for 
sustainability that deals with CRC and related things, so it tends to be quite a 
centralised function rather than something that many people are involved in. 
Most clients tend to have their expert which is usually one or two people.” (CRC 
S2) 
CRC staff units in the businesses involved in the scheme tend to be very small. Their job roles are 
specifically linked to the environment. These are the people that are steering the environmental and 
energy efforts of the firm and they are individuals.93 In addition, the very limited role of senior 
management in participants of the CRC means that all substantive decisions relating to the CRC (except 
for the financial sign off for the purchase of allowances by the Finance Director) are taken by the 
energy managers. As such, any nudges that were introduced under the CRC (or a similar scheme) 
would, de facto, be targeting an individual (or limited number of individuals) rather than the whole 
business. Therefore, nudges have the potential to have some behavioural changing effect in 
businesses as well as individuals. This potential to nudge the powerful (i.e. business rather than the 
individual) is a unique concept that is not found within nudging literature. 
The CRC used to have a reputational element in the form of the Performance League Table (PLT). 
Another potential use of nudging can be seen in the publication of offences and civil penalties by the 
Environment Agency.94 The rest of this section will consider these nudges, as well as whether nudging 
has a future role to play in environmental taxation. 
 
6.2.1.a Performance League Table 
 
The PLT was introduced at the start of the CRC scheme, and ranked participants in terms of their 
performance under the scheme.95 The PLT created a public reputational element to the scheme, 
                                                          
92 See Chapter Two (Methods and Methodology) for more on participant demographics.  
93 With the caveat that they have to get funding through their finance director/ board. 
94 There is therefore an interesting intersection here between nudging and the use of sanctions. The use of 
informational nudges is probably a blend of a nudge and punitive function. Naming and shaming will be 





whereby participants could compare and contrast their performance with others. The government 
concluded that there was “some evidence” that the PLT acted as a reputational driver.96 It should be 
noted here that this was originally coupled with an economic incentive: those that did well under the 
scheme in terms of the PLT stood to gain their CRC payment plus 10% back.97 
In 2012, the government proposed the abolition of the PLT.98 The PLT received two main criticisms 
from interviewees: 1) that the table was not presented in a format that easily allowed for comparison; 
and 2) that the table did not accurately portray information (i.e. the table was easily skewed).99 These 
criticisms were reflected in the interview data: 
“The [League Table] has to be tempered a little bit with, ‘Yes, but we’ve been 
able to exclude this group and we’ve been able to exclude that group and maybe 
other people can massage their figures as well’.” (CRC M13) 
And; 
“I think the existence of a League Table was a good idea, the League Table as it 
stood didn’t provide, wasn’t usable, but I think that instead of just scrapping it 
they should have tried to improve it. But I think they thought it was too big of a 
challenge, so they gave up.” (CRC P3) 
Interviewee M13 explicitly highlights that the table could be skewed through the ‘massaging’ of data, 
whilst P3 accepts that the table in its original format was not useable. CRC M9 described the PLT as “a 
distortion which created anomalies that were not really fair on organisations”. Some interviewees 
never bothered to look at the table (CRC P7); or only looked once or twice (CRC M11). The PLT was 
therefore not ‘easy’, it was not simple enough that participants could engage with the table.100 An 
easy nudge, reduces any “hassle factor” and “simplifies messages”.101 There was the underlying 
concern that the data within the table could be tinkered with, meaning that participants could not 
take the table at face value.  
What is interesting, is that P3, along with a few other interviewees saw the removal of the PLT as 
having a negative impact on the scheme. Whilst the table as it stood was not viable, once removed, 
CRC M8 believed that the purpose of the scheme had also been removed, indicating that the 
                                                          
96 DECC (n 2), p62. 
97 This economic incentive will be discussed in Chapter Seven. For now, it is the reputational element which 
will be explored.  
98 DECC, Consultation on simplifying the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme (March 2012), p66. 
99 DECC, Simplification of the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme: Report of Stakeholder Events (2012), p24-25. 
100 BIT EAST (n 72). 
101 Ibid, p4. 
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reputational element of the scheme had the potential to drive behavioural change. The reputational 
element of the scheme was lost (CRC M12). This sense of loss is developed below, in how the ‘social’ 
element could be exploited. 
 
6.2.1.b Publication of offences 
 
Any civil penalties or convictions under the CRC scheme are published.102 The publication contains the 
name of the participant, the reason why the civil penalty was issued, and the penalty amount. By way 
of initial observation, only 16 penalties are currently (March 2017) published on the gov.uk website. 
To put this figure into context, there are over 2000 participants of the CRC. The penalties are often 
published long after the year to which they relate (for instance, Aquaterra Leisure received a penalty 
of £250 for failure to surrender sufficient allowances for the 2013/2014 compliance year – this was 
published in January 2017).103 The publication is therefore not “timely” – people are more responsive 
to costs and benefits that take immediate effect.104 The delay in receiving a penalty can affect the 
manner in which people respond to it especially if the penalty is received months or years before it 
was published. This creates a potential disconnect between the penalty, the publication and its 
potential social influence.  
Whilst the publication of offences was argued to be “particularly important” (CRC R1); the disconnect 
between publication and its impact has been noted by interviewees: 
“I cannot recall any article whereby it's indicated that a certain entity has been 
prosecuted for failure to partake or register or submit annual reports or what's 
necessary to comply with the CRC.” (CRC M14) 
Whilst the penalties are published, they are not always obvious to participants. One interviewee 
recalled an email communication from the regulator, stating that ‘fines had been issued’, but that it 
was still “really hard to judge” who and how many were receiving penalties (CRC M10). In addition 
to the EAST framework, Sunstein argues that as a ‘rule of thumb’, any disclosure should be “concrete, 
                                                          
102 Civil penalties: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/climate-change-regimes-civil-penalties-
imposed/crc-energy-efficiency-scheme-civil-penalties accessed 21/03/2017. To date, no criminal prosecutions 
have been pursued against a CRC participant.  
103 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/climate-change-regimes-civil-penalties-imposed/crc-energy-
efficiency-scheme-civil-penalties#aquaterra-leisure accessed 21/03/2017. 
104 BIT EAST (n 72), p6. 
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straightforward, simple, meaningful, timely and salient”.105 In the case of the CRC, it is primarily the 
last two criteria, which are an issue. It is important for a nudge to be salient to those being nudged.106 
Indeed, “sensible regulatory policies, especially those that involve disclosure, are attentive to the 
importance of salience.”107 Without salience, people might ignore the feature that the regulator is 
trying to highlight: in this case, the regulator is trying to draw attention to non-compliance, yet it is 
not being engaged with.108 Participants are therefore not ‘attracted’ to the publications. 
Though the PLT and the publication of offences may not have been explicitly labelled as nudges, they 
appear to be attempts to alter the behaviour of CRC participants without mandating or providing a 
concrete incentive. However, the nudges were not effective in relation to the government frameworks 
provided for nudging: they were not easy, attractive or timely. What they did however harness was 
the power of ‘social’. This chapter will now consider the potential benefits of introducing another social 
nudge into the CRC scheme, and into environmental taxation schemes more generally. 
 
6.2.1.c Alternatives raised by interview 
 
An alternative social nudge was raised during interview: 
“You can almost give them like a, you know, like a washing machine type rating, 
you know, an A, a B, a C – you know, something like that.” (CRC R1) 
Informing people of what others are doing is a useful method to help change behaviour.109 A washing 
machine type rating would potentially provide an easy (people have come across this type of ranking 
before, and have been awarded letter grades throughout school), and attractive (especially if this 
energy efficiency ranking was required to be displayed, as this would mean shareholders would view 
the ranking, and potentially the public if on a website) social nudge. However, giving a letter grade 
rating is arguably no longer a nudge, but a paternalistic measure, as you have the government making 
substantive judgments on who gets what letter.110 Instead, Thaler and Sunstein suggest the following 
nudge for climate change: 
                                                          
105 Sunstein (n 81), Chapter 28. 
106 Ibid; BIT EAST (n 72), p19; Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), p107; Sunstein (n 42), p9. 
107 Sunstein (n 81). 
108 Sunstein (n 42), p9. 
109 Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), p71. 
110 Sunstein (n 42), pp65-66. 
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“With this example in mind, we can now sketch an initial, low-cost nudge for the 
problem of climate change. The governments of many nations should be 
creating a Greenhouse Gas Inventory (GGI), requiring disclosure by the most 
significant emitters. The GGI would permit people to see the various sources of 
greenhouse gases in the relevant nation and to track changes over time. Seeing 
that list, governments could respond by considering legislative measures.”111 
This alternative approach to climate change also relies on the disclosure of information – or the use of 
social norms. It is different from the PLT, as the PLT ranked participants on both their emissions and 
other variables. It is similar, however, to the ARP (which replaced the PLT) which publishes the raw 
emissions data annually. The ARP is limited to the CRC, however, and so is linked to the profile of the 
scheme.   
The use of social norms more generally could have several positive impacts on behaviour. Sectors could 
work together to achieve a sector wide ranking and/ or pool resources. Businesses would want to be 
the same letter/ grade or better than their competitors. It also acts as a connection between the public 
and the behaviour: the layman in the street would be able to understand that an A-grade company is 
greener than a C-grade company. These ideas of collaboration, competition and connection also came 
up during interview and will be explored below. Whilst a social nudge should fulfil the EAST 
framework,112 it should also facilitate collaboration, instigate competition, and, connect the behaviour 




Humans left to their own devices do not cooperate.113 Yet, there are many positives to be gained from 
such cooperation; which tends to arise through stable policy (see Chapter Four) and incentives for 
people to work together.114 A social nudge, which has reputational consequences, has the potential to 
act as this incentive. Interviewees highlighted the start of a collaborative movement amongst 
participants in certain sectors, suggesting that the CRC may have prompted participants to come 
together. A difficulty with collaboration arises where it is challenging to relate to the different 
organisations, because they are all different, with different reasons behind their emissions figures (CRC 
                                                          
111 Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), p203. 
112 BIT EAST (n 72). 
113 Peter John, Making Policy Work (2011 Taylor and Francis), p89. 
114 Ibid.  
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P5). Indeed, collaboration does appear to be limited by sector, as there is “no point comparing apples 
with oranges” (CRC P2).  
Collaboration can create a sense of community, however, with sectors coming together and working 
together: 
“And also I suppose the collaborative point is important, so we've talked to 
other companies, the other water companies; we do talk to each about the CRC 
and how it affects us and we come up with common points of feedback that get 
fed through the Water UK response. So that's another area where we've 
invested time to try and understand it between ourselves.” (CRC M15) 
The water company example shows that they have worked together to understand the CRC scheme. 
This collaboration was also seen in other sectors (logistics, hospitality and education). This practical 
observation builds upon existing psychological literature: that people are more influenced by the 
behaviour of those who are similar.115 That is, if sectors come together and collaborate, they would 
further be influenced by the behaviour of their fellow sector members, above the general influence of 
others in the CRC scheme.  
Sharing ideas will also help engage and create behavioural change. The sense of community is an 
important one. In the agricultural sector, there appears to be a strong sense of community, with 
farmers knowing “exactly what their neighbouring farmers are up to” (CRC R1). This sense of 
community could provide a stronger foundation for the use of disclosures – i.e. the publication of 
offences. What affects an individual in terms of reputation, might also affect a sector, facilitating 
further collaboration.  
If the trading scheme element of the CRC had continued and worked as a trading scheme, this would 
also have enabled collaboration between organisations (CRC M6). This may suggest that the abolition 






                                                          





A social nudge may, according to the interview data, also have the potential to improve performance 
and energy reduction through competition. This echoes wider literature on corporate social 
responsibility, which argues that: 
“There are characteristics of the industry in which the corporation is embedded, 
such as the level of competition therein, which can make corporations more 
likely to imitate what others are doing with respect to some set of policies.”116 
Businesses change their behaviour to preserve their reputation.117 Competition in itself can help 
“fracture these high stakeholders and pit them against one another".118 Participants strive to improve 
when compared against others, and this desire to improve equates to a behavioural change in terms 
of energy reduction. This is because, as a starting block, behaviour is greatly influenced by the 
perceived behaviour of other people;119 and “describing what most people do encourages others to do 
the same”.120 As well as being able to see the behaviour of others, a reputational element also casts 
eyes onto the participant’s own behaviour – and even just the suggestion that someone is watching 
has the potential to change behaviour.121 Any reputational element may also be used as a signalling 
device. Just as a reputational element (such as performance tables, or the publication of performance 
information for example) allows one to perceive the behaviour of other people, it can also be used to 
demonstrate trends in behaviour and signalling what “most people do”.122  
A social nudge that allows participants to compare their performance to others (like a PLT, or other 
ranking system) was deemed “worthwhile” (CRC M13). It also enables participants to track the 
progress of their own performance: “it’s useful for me to talk to my members and say, “Yeah.  Yeah.  
We’ve moved so far up the league table”” (CRC M13). The ability to compare progress, in turn, allows 
for competition between participants; with “companies going against other companies trying to 
compete in how efficient they are” (CRC M8). 
                                                          
116 Sarah Soule, Contention and Corporate Social Responsibility (CUP 2009), p45. 
117 Although “the importance of reputation varies across companies and sectors”. See work on corporate social 
responsibility: David Vogel, The Market for Virtue: The Potential Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(Brookings Institution Press 2007), p.53. 
118 This concept, found within competition-based regulation, resonates here: Wagner (n 3), 658. 
119 Sunstein (n 81). 
120 BIT EAST (n 72), p5. 
121 Halpern (n 6), p119. 
122 Ibid, p21. 
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This competition drives participants to want to be the best in their field:123 
“Some companies it’s a big differentiator for them, so, for example, we do a lot 
with (another organisation), and I know, for them, they want to be a leader in 
this area because they are actually advisors on sustainability and energy 
efficiency, so they want themselves to be a leader in it, so it’s a reputational 
thing for them.” (CRC S1)  
“Certainly, amongst the real estate investor clients that I work with, there is a 
massive drive always to be top quartile of whatever it is that is being looked at. 
So, any CRC league table that had existed, all my clients would have wanted to 
be top quartile in it and, more importantly, they would all want to be able to say 
that they were higher than each other. So, I think that would have driven a lot 
of competition amongst people to actually generate savings and things.” (CRC 
S6) 
It was perceived that this is especially important for larger organisations that are captured by the CRC 
who “like to showcase themselves as being the best” (CRC M4). This desire to be better than their 
peers is the foundation of a reputational element, as they are presenting an image when eyes are on 
them.124 Interviewees valued some form of reputational element, such as the PLT, being introduced 
into the scheme:  
“But it was better news when they thought that they could put themselves on a 
league table and have a better reputation as a consequence of the action they 
were taking.  But there we are.”  (CRC M12) 
The removal of this reputational element was perceived as a negative by M12 in the sense that 
organisations now do not have the incentive to change their behaviour in terms of reputation. The 
reputational drivers that came out of the PLT cannot be “under-estimated” (CRC S6). Following on from 
this sentiment, it is potentially a shame that the PLT (and ergo the CRC) was abolished. 
However, this reputational element holds very little value if it is not understood by the wider, general 
public. As such, an understandable connection needs to be forged between the environmentally 
unfriendly behaviour and the public. If the public understand and value the reduction in energy, then 
a company that does not engage in energy reduction could negatively affect their public image.  
                                                          
123 Just like businesses wanted to create the best chemical in competition-based regulation: Wagner (n 3), 658. 





“If we get all hot under the collar about something that the public don’t care 
about, you are not really going to get the support.” (CRC R1) 
A reason why social norms can work is that people “think that others are closely paying attention to 
what they are doing”; and as such, that their behaviour is under scrutiny and judgement from others.125 
This is why Thaler and Sunstein argue that if choice architects are seeking a change in behaviour, then 
they could “simply” publish the performance of others.126 This is all well and good in inciting 
competition amongst the participants (who all hopefully understand the CRC), but this publication 
could have a wider impact on the reputation of the participant. If an organisation is concerned about 
its reputation, then a nudge will not be able to affect that reputation unless there is a connection 
between the behaviour to be changed and the public.  
In this case, energy reduction and/ or emissions reductions need to be “socially relevant”; it needs “to 
be an issue that people are worried about” (CRC R1). This poses a problem when dealing with the 
participants of the CRC. Whilst a number are high profile organisations, the rest either report under an 
organisation name that is different to their high-street trading name,127 or they are middle sized, 
unknown-to-the-public organisations: 
“Who cares whether a particular hospital has high emissions or who cares if a 
company that only sells to business has high emissions. So, I think it depends 
whether you’re likely to be affected by publicity or not.” (CRC M2) 
It is difficult to incite a public emotional response to energy reduction when most of the companies 
are not public facing. Instead, it is possible to draw upon one advantage highlighted by CRC S6: who 
said that his/ her organisation was “driven by our own desire to tell clients in our tenders and pitches 
that we were doing this kind of thing”. Placing an emphasis on energy efficiency in winning work could 
make the connection between energy reduction and reputation for some.  
For those CRC participants that are public facing, the emphasis needs to be on public disclosure (CRC 
M10). Any information that builds a picture of how the company works can provide the public with a 
                                                          
125 Thaler and Sunstein (n 4), p65. 
126 Ibid, p71 
127 For example, Kingfisher PLC actually includes B&Q, a well-known high street name. Kingfisher PLC is not a 
well-known high street name. Yet, Kingfisher PLC emitted 183 933 tCO2 in the 2013-2014 ARP (39th largest 
emitter (in terms of raw data) out of over 1935). 
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better understanding of how that organisation works (CRC P3). However, a hurdle to this is still a public 
understanding of the information being presented to them. In terms of the CRC, “most people don’t 
even know what it is” (CRC M1). Every single interviewee stated that they did not believe the layperson 
in the street would be aware of the CRC.128 The CRC therefore has a low profile. A resolution to this is 
to work towards “one version of the truth”: 
“I talked about if I designed a new scheme I would have clarity and a high level 
of disclosure. ‘One version of the truth' is a term we often use, is really 
important, and that's what we should be aiming for.” (CRC M10) 
Letting go of specific scheme disclosure (in terms of public disclosure only) and simplifying disclosure 
into one understandable figure that translates across all energy efficiency schemes could take a step 
towards allowing the public to get to grips with energy efficiency. It is unclear whether the government 
intends to take this step in the short or long-term, but a single reporting mechanism and publication 
mechanism could improve public engagement. 
If there was one method of portraying energy efficiency data, it would still be difficult to get the public 
to engage with that information. This is where technology, and specifically social media, could play a 
bigger role in nudging: 
“Brand and reputation which can be particularly damaged, as with social media, 
it is far easier to portray negative impressions for relatively small 
misdemeanours, so that’s become much more important.” (CRC S5) 
Beyond the scope of the CRC, social media has a role to play in all energy efficiency schemes and taxes. 
The Environment Agency can publish offences and publish performance data on a readily accessible 
platform, which already has a wide audience.129 This is already done for other ‘big offences’ (notably 
involving rivers),130 yet, a search of the Environment Agency’s tweets shows no such publication for 
any penalties issued under the CRC or even tweets on energy.131  
                                                          
128 CRC M12 built on this with: “It doesn’t always mean anything to the person in the street.  But they don’t 
know what a kilowatt hour of energy is either.  So, I don’t think it really matters.” This would indicate that 
public awareness on energy full stop still has some way to go.  
129 The Environment Agency has almost 500 000 followers on Twitter; over 30 000 likes on Facebook; and even 
has an Instagram account. Figures accurate on 24th March 2017. 
130 See for example a tweet from 22nd March 2017 by the Environment Agency: “#ThamesWater ordered to 
pay record-breaking £20 million for polluting #River Thames with 1.4 billion litres of raw sewage.” 
https://twitter.com/EnvAgency/status/844526162848239616 accessed 24/03/2016. 
131 Search conducted on 24/03/2017 and looked back through February and Mach 2017’s tweets. Separate 
searches of relevant hashtags (#CRC, #carbonreductioncommitment) showed a limited engagement in the 
private sphere, but no input from the Environment Agency.  
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6.2.4.a Naming and Shaming 
 
If a connection is made between energy reduction and the reputation of the organisation, then naming 
and shaming can be a powerful social nudge. Linked to the competition element of a social norm, the 
connection to reputation brings the possibility of damage to a brand image. It brings an additional 
‘nudge’ to the table, above and beyond the tax already in place: 
“I think originally, when they were going to name and shame everybody and all 
of that, I thought it would have been good. But it’s just a tax now, short and 
simple.” (CRC P5) 
Even with a connection to reputation, naming and shaming still relies on the organisation’s views on 
publicity – “some organisations will be unconcerned by bad publicity” (CRC P7). In terms of the PLT, 
there was some scepticism regarding the larger emitters: “You know who the big polluters are and 
they will always be that way” (CRC P5). Although, anomalies in the table can cause publicity: 
“I go back to the first year the company I worked for did its early action metrics 
and ended up as one of the top 22 companies and I remember there was a big 
hoo-ha because was it Virgin was right at the bottom?” (CRC M2) 
It is possible for participants to engage in a social nudge and pay attention to how other organisations 
are performing. This will especially be the case in a social nudge that incites collaboration, competition 
and connects the behaviour to the organisation’s reputation. The competition engages participants in 
a reputational element, which gives them something additional to gain from good performance. By 
inciting collaboration, participants are working together as sectors to share ideas, which also promotes 
energy reduction. Any form of disclosure needs to make that link back to the reputation (be that to 
the public or other businesses), for without this, organisations have nothing to gain from an improved 
performance.  
 
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has explored the concept of nudging and where this literature sits in academic 
scholarship. What is perhaps equally interesting is the fact that nudging has also received significant 
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political attention. Resources from both the US and the UK have gone into setting up policy units which 
consider the potential role of nudging in modern regulation.  
Nudging itself aims to influence choice without mandating behaviour through choice architecture. 
Nudges can, for the purposes of this thesis, be separated into two camps: defaults and social norms. 
This chapter has been concerned with exploring the potential role of the latter alongside more 
traditional economic measures. Social norms are the need to be seen to be doing the right thing, as 
well as the concern for how our behaviour is perceived by others. Whilst the literature focusses on 
individual behaviour, this thesis sees no reason why these principles cannot be translated across to 
business – at least in terms of social norms.  
Interviewees raised the PLT and the publication of offences as current and potential means of driving 
change. As these measures both impact on reputation, there is the potential for the use of social 
nudges under the CRC. This is built upon by interviewees discussing how the PLT instilled a level of 
competition between participants of the scheme; and how the scheme could benefit from something 
similar now that the PLT has been abolished. In addition, my data speaks of sector collaboration and 
the pooling of resources to achieve energy reductions. A social nudge which utilises reputation has 
the potential to drive additional change (above and beyond that achieved by a tax alone) by 
encouraging competition and collaboration amongst participants. This competition and collaboration 
would not be possible, however, unless the social nudges had the potential to damage reputation. For 
this to happen, there needs to be a connection built between the harmful behaviour, the public, and 
the business’ reputation. If the public do not perceive a high consumer of energy to be a bad thing, 
then being a high energy consumer will not affect reputation. More specifically, the public may not 
judge performance under a specific scheme (in this case the CRC) unless they are aware of the CRC. 
The profile of the CRC, and the number of discrete carbon reporting mechanisms may render it 
virtually impossible for a member of the general public to even be aware that the scheme exists; let 
alone consider the performance of a business under the CRC. The chapter that follows builds on the 
ideas of nudging and considers the wider role that incentives could play under the CRC scheme.   





Chapter Seven: Incentives 
 
The previous chapter considered the use of nudges as a way of engaging taxpayers with the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment. These nudges are subtle ways of influencing choices. Another, more direct, 
measure was highlighted by interviewees. During interviews, the word “incentive” was mentioned 229 
times, and at least once by every single interviewee; highlighting it as an important matter for CRC 
regulatees. In addition, seven interviewees further discussed the notion of “reward” in terms of an 
incentive. This chapter will consider the role of incentives in changing taxpayer behaviour. As we know, 
one of the aims of the CRC is to reduce energy consumption by effectively taxing each linked tonne of 
carbon emissions. In its current form, it does this through a negative incentive – that is, by attaching 
an additional cost to energy, the more energy that is consumed, the higher this cost will be. This 
therefore gives the incentive of reducing the burden of the CRC, by reducing the amount of energy 
consumed.  
First, this chapter will introduce the idea of incentives more generally. Second, and by engaging with 
my data, this chapter will consider the use of negative incentives under the CRC and whether this has 
been well received by taxpayers. Third, the role of positive incentives will be explored. Specifically, 
this will include a consideration of the role of hypothecated taxes, as well as the provision of financial 
reward for taxpayers. 
Overall, this chapter will argue that whilst it is acknowledged that the negative financial incentives 
already provided for by the CRC (in the form of a tax) have some impact on driving behavioural change, 
this could be improved by introducing positive incentives under environmental taxes like the CRC. If 
the CRC’s primary focus is to reduce carbon emissions, participants of the CRC appear to be more 
willing to engage with positive mechanisms as opposed to negative mechanisms. It would appear that 
the use of positive incentives is also capable of communicating a deeper commitment to the 
environment, rather than just having the revenue raising function of the tax.  One such positive 
incentive is the ring-fencing of revenues. This chapter will consider a range of suggested incentives, in 
order to argue that how the revenues are labelled is important. My data suggests that if taxpayers see 
that the revenues of an environmental tax are, in some way helping to improve the environment 
(notably, this does not need to be all of the revenues, and does not require a strict hypothecation of 




7.1 Incentives Literature 
 
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary.”1 
“So if you’re trying to force change, you have to give people a reason for change, 
and I don’t think being a good citizen and saving the planet, frankly, is a big 
enough reason for most people. Most people just want to have some money in 
their pocket.” (CRC M16) 
Financial and fiscal incentives are not classed as nudges as they introduce specific economic incentives 
on certain behaviours.2 As such, anything that goes beyond the nudges discussed in the previous 
chapter is counted as an incentive rather than a nudge. The CRC in its current form consists of an 
incentive through the additional financial burden which is introduced with the purchasing of 
allowances. This places a cost on each unit of carbon dioxide emissions, which is a financial driver to 
reduce emissions.3 There is a distinction to be made between incentives that discourage behaviour 
(negative incentives or penalties), and incentives that encourage behaviour (positive incentives or 
rewards).4 Taxes and fines are examples of the former, whilst subsidies and grants fall under the latter 
type of incentive.5 The CRC, as a tax, is therefore a negative incentive – it discourages the emission of 
carbon dioxide. 
Taxes can be used to penalise polluters.6 For smaller businesses, these taxes could constitute a 
significant incentive in themselves.7 However, Feld and Frey argue that this should be coupled with 
further incentives in order to uphold what they say is the psychological tax contract.8 This tax contract 
comprises of the idea of tax morale, which is a “complicated interaction between taxpayers and the 
                                                          
1 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (ebook) (2009 Yale University Press), 
p264. 
2 Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness (UK: 
Penguin 2009), p6. 
3 David Driesen, Alternatives to regulation? Market Mechanisms and the Environment in R. Baldwin, M. Cave, 
and M. Lodge (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford, 2010), p206. 
4 Behavioural Insights Team, EAST: Four Simple Ways to Apply Behavioural Insights (2014), p4. Available at 
http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/publications/east-four-simple-ways-to-apply-behavioural-insights/ 
accessed 16/03/2017, p25. 
5 Ibid.  
6 R Baldwin, M Cave and M Lodge, Understanding regulation: Theory, strategy and practice (2nd Edition) (OUP 
2012), p111. 
7 Neil Gunningham, ‘Regulating Small and Medium Sized Enterprises’ (2002) 14(1) Journal of Environmental 
Law 3, 21. 
8 Lars Feld and Bruno Frey, ‘Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of 
Incentives and Responsive Regulation’ (2007) 29(1) Law and Policy 102. 
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government establishing a fair, reciprocal exchange that involves the giving and taking of both 
parties”.9  They argue that without further incentives, tax payers with low morale will not pay their 
fair share.10 Therefore, incentives are needed to enforce taxation and ensure tax compliance.11 
The BIT team, which was set up in 2010 to research the role of behavioural economics (and specifically 
nudges, see chapter six) in policy have commented on the role of incentives for future policy. They 
state: 
“There is also a case for considering ‘incentives’ more broadly than we normally 
do. The processes for carrying out a behaviour can make it more or less 
attractive, quite apart from the end reward on offer.  For example, it has been 
shown that people are more honest when responding to survey questions about 
their drinking through text messages than a phone interview.”12 
There is therefore a potential need to consider and research incentives more often as an alternative 
to traditional regulatory approaches. The field of regulatory literature is vast, as is the literature which 
discusses the use of alternatives to command and control regulation. Here, advocates of the use of 
incentives claim that an incentive-based regime is cheaper to administer than more traditional 
command-and-control regulation.13 In terms of specific fields, the use of incentives has been 
considered in health care,14 policing,15 business,16 and the environment,17 to name a few. 
However, legal scholarship on incentives still remains a sparse field compared to other work on 
regulation. For example, incentives are covered in less than half a page in ‘An Introduction to Law and 
Regulation’;18 and is only mentioned in passing in key regulatory textbooks.19 There are two key 
                                                          
9 Ibid, 104. 
10 Ibid, 106. 
11 Ibid, 105. 
12 BIT EAST (n 4), p27. 
13 Baldwin et al. (n 6), p112. 
14 Edward Norton, ‘Incentive Regulation of Nursing Homes’ (1992) 11(2) Journal of Health Economics 105; John 
Braithwaite, Toni Makkai and Valeri Braithwaite, Regulating Aged Care: Ritualism and the New Pyramid 
(Edward Elgar 2007).  
15 Adrian Cherney, Juani O’Reilly and Peter Grabosky, ‘Networks and Meta-Regulation: Strategies at Governing 
Illicit Synthetic Drugs’ (2006) 16(4) Policing and Society 370; Julie Ayling, Peter Grabosky and Clifford Shearing, 
‘Harnessing Resources for Networked Policing’ in J Fleming and J Wood (Eds), Fighting Crime Together: The 
Challenges of Policing and Security Networks (University of New South Wales Press 2006), pp60-86. 
16 Michael Clarke, Regulation: The Social Control of Business between Law and Politics (Springer 1999), Chapter 
5. 
17 Neil Gunningham, ‘Reconfiguring Environmental Regulation’ in Pearl Eliadis, Margaret Hill and Michael 
Howlett (eds), Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance (McGill-Queen’s University Press 
2005), pp333-352. 
18 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (CUP 2007), pp114-115. 
19 Baldwin et al. (n 6). 
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articles on the use of incentives in regulation by Braithwaite and Grabosky,20 and these will form the 
foundation of this chapter’s analysis. The lack of legal scholarship in applying the ideas put forward by 
Braithwaite and Grabosky, particularly in the environmental field, should be noted. This chapter 
therefore goes some way to building on their work, by applying their key concepts to the CRC. 
 
7.2 Negative incentives (financial drivers) 
 
This section will consider the role of negative incentives, and specifically, financial drivers. The cost of 
the CRC has been highlighted as the scheme’s biggest driver for behavioural change.21 The participants 
of my study have expressed seemingly mixed and contradicting messages on the cost of the CRC, the 
cost of energy, and whether the tax has drawn their attention to energy reduction. The message to 
take away from this section is that the CRC has not been the clear cut financial incentive that it was 
perhaps hoped to be by government. The rest of this section will now consider how the tax element 
of the CRC has been perceived by its participants, as well as whether they think that the rate of the 
CRC has been high enough to drive behavioural change.  
 
7.2.1 The ‘Carrot and Stick’ Analogy: The Financial Stick  
 
A ‘carrot and stick’ analogy was referred to by over a third of interviewees,22 and provides a good 
imagery for the discussion below. The concept derives from the idiom which makes reference to the 
cart driver who uses both a carrot (dangling in front of a donkey pulling the cart) and a stick to motivate 
the donkey. It also forms part of motivation theory, first attributed to Jeremy Bentham, which 
identifies that some individuals act for reward, whilst others from fear:23  
                                                          
20 Peter Grabosky, Regulation by Reward: On the use of Incentives as Regulatory Instruments (1995) 17 Law 
and Policy 257; John Braithwaite, Rewards and Regulation (2002) 29(1) Journal of Law and Society 12.  
21 DECC, CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Evaluation: Final Synthesis Report (July 2015), p38. 
22 CRC P1, P3, P4, M1, M7, M9, M12, M13, M15, M16, S3, S6. 
23 This forms one of three main motivation theories. The other two are Hierarchy of Needs (put forward by 
Abraham Maslow) and Motivation-Hygiene Theory (attributed to Frederick Herzberg). For the purposes of this 
chapter, only the Carrot and Stick theory will be considered due to its prevalence in the interview data. 
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“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well 
as determine what we shall do.”24 
Translating the concepts to the carrot and stick theory, the pain represents the stick, whilst the 
pleasure, the carrot. Bentham argues that these concepts are the only way in which behaviour can be 
changed.25 
Building upon this, the carrots and sticks represent extrinsic motivational factors from the activity/ 
behaviour to be changed. Intrinsic motivation is different and links to the activity itself – it is intrinsic 
if the activity is “is undertaken for one’s immediate need satisfaction”.26 This motivation of the 
individual may not always align with the needs of the organisation. As such, “to discipline the effects 
of undesirable intrinsic motivation, external interventions via carrots and sticks are needed”.27 
However, the use of extrinsic motivational tools has been argued to then undermine intrinsic 
motivation, or the attitude of the individual.28 That is to say that once rewards have started, humans 
will continue with the desired behaviour only whilst they believe rewards will follow, creating an 
expectation of reward.29 
This section will initially consider the use of sticks as motivation for behavioural change. Both 
Braithwaite and Bentham have made the argument that sticks (or punishments) are more effective at 
changing behaviour than rewards.30 The CRC in its current form already makes use of sticks, in the 
sense that there is a tax to pay, with sanctions for non-compliance. Interviewees engaged with the 
use of this stick, and explicitly refer to the tax element of the CRC as the stick of the scheme: 
“It is an interesting one because people always go, “Oh, the CRC, that tax. We 
need to reduce our energy use to avoid that tax.” And I always say, “Well no, 
you need to reduce your energy use, full stop. Whether you are avoiding tax or 
not is irrelevant.” So all the tax does is it focuses people, it is a useful stick for 
                                                          
24 Jeremy Bentham, ‘From An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’, in John Stuart Mill and 
Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarianism and Other Essays (1987 Penguin), p65. 
25 Ibid, p83. 
26 Margit Osterloh and Bruno Frey, Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Forms (2000) 11(5) 
Organization Science 538, 539. 
27 Ibid, 540. 
28 Bruno Frey and Reto Jegen, ‘Motivation Crowding Theory’ (2001) 15(5) Journal of Economic Surveys 589. For 
more detail see Mark Lepper and David Greene (Eds), The Hidden Costs of Reward: New Perspectives on the 
Psychology of Human Motivation (1978 John Wiley and Sons). 
29 Edward Deci and Joesph Porac, ‘Cognitive Evaluation Theory and the Study of Human Motivation’ in Mark 
Lepper and David Greene (Eds), The Hidden Costs of Reward: New Perspectives on the Psychology of Human 
Motivation (1978 John Wiley and Sons), pp154-155. 
30 Braithwaite (n 20); Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Reward, eds. J. and H.L. Hunt (1825), pp6, and 51-52. 
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someone like me, who is always going to the operations and saying, “What are 
you doing to reduce your fuel consumption? What are you doing to reduce your 
electricity consumption?” M16 [own emphasis] 
Here, CRC M16 explains that the tax allows them to approach more senior managers in the company 
and tackle the question of energy efficiency; it provides them with additional weight to their energy 
efficiency argument. This is one of the key benefits of the financial stick; it has allowed those with 
responsibility for operationalising the CRC to approach more senior management and propose energy 
efficiency projects. It “has given an additional incentive to say, ‘this is why you should do it’” (CRC M3). 
It creates engagement at board level (CRC M10), and the cost has helped keep the carbon 
management on senior management’s agenda (CRC M12). It is an additional cost which has to be 
factored into new projects, which promotes energy efficiency (CRC M14).  
Interviewees suggested that the cost of the CRC also had some impact on their decision to reduce 
energy consumption. This is based on the simple idea that if they reduce their energy consumption, 
they pay less under the CRC (CRC P6, CRC M1):  
“So, it's a way of pricing carbon pollution, so the more energy you use, the more 
carbon you release into the atmosphere and the more you get taxed for it. So 
there's a direct financial incentive to reduce the amount that you use so that 
you'll be taxed less.” (CRC P2) 
The CRC adds a salient cost which is “on top of our bills” and which helps drive energy reduction (CRC 
M12). This cost can be quite significant for the larger emitters, which adds to the drive to reduce 
energy consumption (CRC M2, CRC M15, CRC M16). The CRC also has the advantage that, because it 
is an additional figure on top of energy bills, it provides a supplementary sum which needs to be signed 
off higher up in an organisation (CRC M2). This, coupled with the concern that energy prices are rising 
more generally, adds further weight to the cost of the CRC (CRC P7, CRC S1). 
This is the “financial stick” of the CRC – it promotes behaviour by charging more if an organisation 
consumes more energy, or less if there is a reduction in energy consumption. It creates a behaviour 
that could be perceived as largely “money driven” (CRC M8). This is perceived as fundamental for 
changing the behaviour of private organisations: “Private sector yeah, they definitely are engaged 
because at the end of the day they just see it as money” (CRC M4).  One disadvantage of this financial 
driver is that it potentially focusses the attention too narrowly on the costs of the CRC: 
“So when you’re looking at the CRC tax, people get really bent out of shape 
because it’s a tax and they really pay attention when you talk about it. The reality 
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is that if they’re paying £1,000 in CRC tax, they’re paying £10,000 in energy, so 
surely the biggest opportunity is the £10,000, not the £1,000! And yet people 
don’t see it like that, they just focus on the tax, which is good for me, it’s easy 
for me to get their attention, but it’s bloody daft, because they’re only attacking 
10% of the problem.” (CRC M16) 
The costs of the CRC therefore detract from the principle of reducing energy more generally. This 
contrasts with the idea above that the costs of the CRC do drive a reduction in energy consumption, 
and suggests that while the CRC does open the eyes of organisations, the scheme has not managed to 
penetrate deeper into the culture of reducing energy to reduce energy costs. As such, the CRC has 
indirectly drawn attention to the issue of energy consumption by drawing attention to the costs of the 
CRC. When discussing an alternative with no costs attached, CRC M10 opined:  
“The fact that there's no monetary value attributed to what you are reporting in 
these other schemes, there's less reason to have it as accurate.  So, I've always 
seen that a strength of the CRC, is that it has created amongst the participants 
in CRC a real, better understanding of their energy consumption and their 
energy performance.” 
The fact that there is a tax attached to the CRC drives engagement with the CRC. There is generally a 
desire to save money by reducing energy (as discussed above), which also has the indirect 
consequence of improved data collection (CRC M15) as regulatees are required to collect data on and 
report on their energy consumption in order to calculate how many allowances they need to buy.  
The financial stick of the CRC is therefore an incentive because of the costs that are attached to the 
CRC. This drives organisations to reduce energy, and keeps energy on the agenda at a more senior 
level.  However, for some of the interviewees, this cost is only “marginal” (CRC P8). The rate at which 
the CRC is levied (i.e. the price that is attributed to each allowance) has the potential to increase or 
decrease the size of the stick. How carbon pricing impacts on negative, financial incentives will now 








7.2.2 Size Matters – Carbon Pricing 
 
Many interviewees raised the price of carbon under the CRC during interviews. Literature on optimal 
taxation dates back to Pigou and his theory of externalities.31 Applied to environmental taxation, 
Pigou’s work equates to: a “tax (subsidy) per unit on the externality-generating activity equal to its 
marginal external damage (benefit)”.32 In practice, this is difficult to achieve, especially on the first 
try.33 As such Baumol and Oates considered the “standards and pricing” approach, which looks at 
increasing the tax rate incrementally until the desired rate has been reached.34 In the case of the CRC, 
this would mean slowly increasing the allowance price until it was high enough to achieve carbon 
emissions reduction. As it stands, the price of carbon under the CRC increased in line with the Retail 
Pricing Index only.35 
For many, the CRC is simply not “a vast amount of money” when considering that other business 
spending is in the millions or billions (CRC M13). In part, this could be a result of how the emissions 
are calculated under the scheme. Whilst allowance prices continue to rise, this can be offset by lower 
emissions factors,36 meaning that, in real terms, more energy can be consumed for the same price. 
This has an impact on organisations’ motives to reduce their energy consumption (CRC M6). For the 
rest, it is the allowance price that has the biggest impact on the size of the financial incentive – that is 
to say, the higher the allowance price, the higher the tax, and the bigger the financial stick.  
At the moment, this financial stick is not perceived by interviewees as being big enough: 
“I think that the costs that we see at the moment are very low and the costs 
associated with the CRC are tiny.” (CRC P1) 
There is the perception that the carbon price is currently too low to change behaviour (CRC P1, CRC 
P4, CRC P7, CRC M1, CRC S2): “in the scheme of things it's £90 000 and the budget [of the entire 
company] is £60 or £70 million you know” (CRC P1). The price attached to carbon is arguably more 
                                                          
31 Arthur Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th Edition) (Palgrave Macmillan 2013). 
32 Michael Skou Andersen, Governance by Green Taxes: Making Pollution Prevention Pay (Manchester 
University Press, 1994), p36. 
33 Kaalle Määttä, Environmental Taxes: An Introductory Analysis (Edward Elgar 2006), p46. 
34 W Baumol and W Oates, ‘The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment’ (1971) 73(1) 
The Swedish Journal of Economics 42. 
35 Chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘Autumn Statement to Parliament 2012’ (December 2012), p71. 
36 See Chapter Three. The kWh of energy consumed needs to be converted to tCO2, and this is done by 
multiplying the raw energy consumption figures by an emissions factor. This has fluctuated throughout the life 
of the CRC, and has dropped. This means that whilst an allowance may be pricier, fewer need to be bought.  
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symbolic than a substantial financial stick.37 CRC M11 talks about how the costs of the CRC are factored 
into business models: 
“The cost element in terms of the additional price that you are paying because 
of the CRC -  I’ve never seen that factored into any project. I have never seen a 
project that is either taken on or not taken on because of the upside or the 
downside regarding the CRC. It tends to be: ‘oh we have got this project, we are 
building some new pubs for instance – we want to build new pubs – that is going 
to increase our total energy as a group, oh yes, we have to pay more CRC too’. 
It doesn’t influence our decisions about whether or not those projects are still 
going to go forward.” (CRC M11) 
As it stands, the CRC cannot be the driving force in new projects, when the CRC costs are low enough 
that more money can be saved through by simply selling a building rather than reducing energy (CRC 
M13). “At the moment, it’s too cheap” (CRC M1).  
An issue that compounds the cost of carbon is the cost of energy and, in particular, the recent lower 
costs of energy. For instance, between 2014 and 2015, the cost of energy dropped 3.7%;38 and 
between 2015 and 2016, energy prices dropped a further 4.4%.39 The lower costs of energy have 
“lessened” the impact of the CRC (CRC M2), as the aggregate cost of energy remains similar to previous 
years even with the costs of the CRC factored in. The costs of the CRC generally only form a small part 
of the overall energy costs; as such, if energy prices are low, then this is the bigger opportunity (CRC 
M16) and the costs of the CRC get swallowed up into the “costs of doing business” (CRC M6). 
As such my interviewees suggested that the only method to increase the effect of the negative 
incentive alone, is to increase the cost of carbon (CRC P2, CRC M1, CRC M7, CRC M15, CRC M16). CRC 
M9 calls for the costs under the CRC to be based on an “accurate assessment of what the cost of 
carbon is”. As the price of carbon increases, the price of energy also increases (CRC P1), and 
investment into energy efficiency becomes more viable (CRC P3): 
“I think it is, because as energy generally costs more you reach a tipping point 
where people start to do things about it. I think the downside of it is it does 
attract a lot of criticism because generally energy costs are going up anyway, so 
                                                          
37 For more on symbolism, see Chapter Nine. 
38 Department of Energy and Climate Change, ‘Quarterly Energy Prices’ (September 2015), p4. 
39 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Quarterly Energy Prices’ (September 2016), p6. 
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you would expect companies to do something about it before being taxed.” (CRC 
M3) 
CRC M15 argues that raising the tax on carbon is a “good approach”; if the unit price of carbon is 
increased, then this will focus everyone’s mind onto the issue of carbon (CRC M1). However, a CRC 
that is constantly raised may be perceived as a “losing battle” (CRC M8), whereby participants struggle 
to keep up with energy reduction in line with the increasing costs. In turn, this would lead to a sense 
of exasperation on the part of these participants and lead to a level of disengagement with the 
scheme, as participants give up the struggle to reduce more than the increasing costs. Overall, the 
consensus amongst interviewees is that the price needs to be higher, to draw more attention to the 
CRC. “If there’s a monetary incentive, and it’s a large one, then that’s the only time you can get their 
engagement” (CRC M4). This would require a change in policy from the government, who are currently 
pro-business.40 Interviewees are sceptical about policy shifting to a higher tax, arguing that the 
government is not willing to go far enough in this area.  
Reliance on a negative financial driver, such as a tax that is trying to alter behaviour (as in the case of 
the CRC), is dependent upon taxpayers engaging with that cost and trying to reduce it. Whilst an 
additional cost draws attention to a behaviour and starts to create engagement, this has not been 
completely successful. With lower energy costs, and the perceived low cost of the CRC, the CRC cannot 
currently provide a driver for change with a tax alone. Any negative financial driver therefore needs 
to be a significant cost. It is not within the scope of this thesis to try and calculate what that cost may 
be; however, an alternative approach may be to couple the negative incentive with a positive 
incentive. Here, and notwithstanding the potential for a large, financial stick to change behaviour; 
interviewees expressed concern over the sole use of negative financial incentives to change 
behaviour. Interviewees respond much “better to carrots that [they] do to sticks” (CRC P4). This 





                                                          
40 As demonstrated by their most recent green tax consultation entitled “Reforming the business energy 
efficiency tax landscape”, which looked at streamlining policy in the area to a single tax.  
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7.3 Positive incentives 
 
7.3.1 The Salient Carrot  
The majority of interviewees that raised the carrot and stick analogy did so in reference to carrots 
rather than sticks. Even those that did not specifically raise the idea of “carrots” spoke of rewards and 
incentives – which are the same thing. Those that raised the idea of carrots etc. spoke of combining 
the CRC tax with a positive incentive: 
“I think you need to again provide both a stick and a carrot. You need to have 
regulation that will penalise those who are not prepared to do even the bare 
minimum but you also need to provide incentives for those who are prepared 
to go further.” (CRC P4) 
CRC P4 refers to going beyond compliance here, and states that in order for organisations to take that 
step beyond compliance, positive incentives are required. This does not displace the need for a stick 
“to shove people in the right direction” (CRC P1), but rather suggests that the emphasis should be on 
“incentivising change not penalising” (CRC P3). This chapter will therefore consider the potential use 
of carrots alongside the CRC in order to “make things happen” (CRC M1).41 
Some of the interviewees suggested that a positive incentive provides much more freedom to business 
to achieve change in their own way (CRC S3).42 Whilst the stick focusses participants, the carrot gives 
the freedom for participants to get creative. For example, CRC M15 discusses the incentives provided 
for renewables and how this has had an impact on the organisation: 
“Our renewable energy generation has exploded since 2002 and that has been 
the positive incentives that renewables have been subject to, so that's the 
reward side rather than the ‘stick’ side. So because renewables are growth, it's 
                                                          
41 Or “incentives for behaviour”. Such incentives have been considered in taxation before: Ann Mumford, 
‘Marketing Working Mothers: Contextualizing Earned Income Tax Credits within Feminist Cultural Theory’ 
(2001) 23(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 411, 414. 
42 Note that inflexibility is one of the key arguments against the use of command-and-control regulation, and 
one of the key advantages of economic instruments: Neil Gunningham, ‘Environment Law, Regulation and 
Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (2009) 21(2) JEL 179, 183. See also; Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and 
Marton Lodge, ‘Introduction: Regulation – The Field and the Developing Agenda’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin 
Cave and Martin Lodge, The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (OUP 2010). For an argument of the benefits of 
economic instruments over command-and-control regulation, see: Richard Stewart, ‘Economic Incentives for 
Environmental Protection: Opportunities and Obstacles’ in Richard Revesz, Phillipe Sands and Richard Stewart 
(eds), Environmental Law, the Economy and Sustainable Development: The United States, the European Union 
and the International Community (CUP 2008). 
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doing something, it's growing the company, you're getting a reward and a 
positive revenue stream from that work, that I think has proven more effective 
than the stick side.” (CRC M15) 
This would equally apply to energy efficiency. A financial incentive here would provide that positive 
revenue stream; in addition, the push to reduce energy consumption provides an additional reward 
by reducing energy bills (above and beyond any energy cost fluctuations). Energy efficiency projects 
could regenerate old buildings or bring in new technology which is also a reward for the business. 
There is therefore a reward-reward, or win-win, culture. Without this, unless energy efficiency is 
already built into a building, you simply cannot change behaviour – you “can’t get them to turn the 
lights off”, or manage buildings correctly, and “you don’t get the maximum benefit” (CRC M13). 
An initial point to be made, and which forms the backdrop of the discussion below, is that any 
incentives which are introduced need to be clear and apparent to the taxpayer. This means that they 
are obvious, clearly labelled, and understandable to the taxpayer. For instance, M14 discussed how 
they had considered making use of government incentives to reduce their energy consumption, but 
that they were unable to do so because the incentives were not well publicised. Another got “into a 
right fuddle” due to the complexity (M16) of incentives. Incentives therefore need to be clearly 
available and understandable to taxpayers.  
 
7.3.1.a Revenue recycling element of the scheme 
 
When the CRC was first introduced, it was designed to be a revenue neutral scheme which recycled 
the revenues generated from allowance sales back to participants.43 How much money a participant 
got back out of the scheme depended on their performance on the Performance League Table – so 
the top performers would get back the money they paid under the CRC, as well as an additional 10%.44 
P4 describes the original CRC as follows: 
“When it first came in it was quite a novel instrument in the sense that it 
provided a stick and a carrot. So it encouraged you to not only monitor and 
                                                          
43 HM Government, ‘A White Paper on Energy: Meeting the Energy Challenge’ (May 2007), p53. The Spending 
Review in 2010 also states: “Revenues from allowance sales totalling £1 billion a year by 2014-15 will be used 
to support the public finances, including spending on the environment, rather than recycled to participants” 
(emphasis added). HM Treasury, ‘Spending Review 2010’ (March 2010), paragraph 2.108. 
44 CRC R1. The original White Paper does not provide an exact figure for how much will be recycled back as a 
bonus or penalty. 
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report on your energy use but there were some incentives there that if you 
made some savings then you might actually get some money back out of the 
scheme to invest in energy efficiency.” (CRC P4) 
Most interviewees saw the revenue recycling as an incentive, and as a positive of the scheme. The 
“ethos” of the scheme was perceived as being right (CRC M12, CRC P8). It provided the opportunity 
for some people do better out of the scheme, and some people to do worse (CRC P1). The effect of 
this is twofold: 1) participants have a direct positive incentive to do well (i.e. to perform well enough 
to get additional money out of the scheme), and 2) an incentive which is tied to a ranking system 
provided the opportunity for participants to compare their own performance with others.  
In terms of the positive incentive, this provided the opportunity for participants to engage with the 
scheme in order to improve their performance under the scheme to receive the positive financial 
reward. It allowed for consultants to provide support, in terms of energy efficiency ideas, to business 
in order to get the most out of the scheme (CRC M4). The potential for money to be coming back to 
participants was deemed “a very good incentive” (CRC P8). The transition from revenue neutral to 
revenue raising was perceived as the CRC’s transition to a tax. As such, it is now perceived as “just a 
tax” (CRC P4, CRC M2, CRC M3) rather than an energy efficiency scheme with environmental aims as 
its primary focus. Following its removal in 2010, any positive incentive under the scheme was deemed 
to have been removed by some interviewees (CRC P4, CRC P8, CRC M3), which meant that regulatees 
disengaged with the scheme.  
The CRC therefore started its life with a positive incentive. This was well received by participants, but 
was removed by the government after just one year of the CRC – as such, no recycled payments were 
ever made to participants. This coincided with, and was published less than a month after, the 2010 
change in government from Labour to the Conservative – Liberal Democrat Coalition. This builds upon 
the link that participants made between the changes to the CRC and policy.45 Now that participants 
view the CRC as just a tax which raises revenue for government, and one without incentives, 
participants suggested that they are less likely to change their behaviour.  
My data suggests that positive incentives have an important role to play in the CRC, in order to get 
participants to go beyond compliance and change their behaviour. This is potentially taking the data 
at face value, as it is only logical that regulatees want to see more positive incentives under a scheme. 
However, the consistent narrative throughout this thesis that the CRC is perceived by interviewees as 
‘just a tax’ would indicate that just a tax is not good enough for regulatee engagement. The use of 
                                                          
45 See Chapter Four for more on stability and the CRC. 
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positive incentives is therefore one way in which policymakers could improve regulatory engagement. 
This chapter will now consider a number of incentives that were raised by interviewees, and how they 
may help to contribute to the overall engagement with the scheme, and behavioural change.  
 
7.3.2 Food for thought: proposals for the CRC  
 
According to the interviewees, there is no point in the CRC scheme only being a tax. "You can't just tax 
people to death if you don't give them another option" (CRC P1). Positive incentives, as it has been 
discussed above, have a role to play in engaging taxpayers to change their behaviour. In this case, 
incentives would be trying to reduce energy consumption. Interviewees discussed the potential 
incentives that they would like to have seen introduced with the CRC. 
 
7.3.2.a Ringfencing revenues – earmarked taxes 
 
Interviewees often highlighted the fact that the revenues from the sale of allowances goes to the 
Treasury and are not dedicated to environmental issues. This is referring to what is otherwise known 
as hypothecated, or earmarked taxes. The modern concept of an earmarked tax was first raised by 
James Buchanan in 1963: “’Earmarking’ is defined as the practice of designating or dedicating specific 
revenues to the financing of specific public services.46 It provides a “means for compartmentalizing 
fiscal decisions” and allows for the individual to participate in how tax revenues are spent.47 Buchanan 
argues that earmarking allows the individual to have a say in how specific services are funded, in 
contrast to general funding (where all tax revenues go to the Treasury), where the individual only has 
a say in the aggregate spending.48 
Whilst the academic literature in this area is relatively sparse, the theory of hypothecation has been 
built upon and developed since 1963.49 Margaret Wilkinson differentiates between strong and weak 
                                                          
46 James Buchanan, ‘The Economics of Earmarked Taxes’ (1963) 71 Journal Political Economics 457, 457 
47 Ibid, 458. 
48 Ibid; see also Charles Goetz, ‘Earmarked Taxes and Majority Rule Budgetary Processes’ (1968) 58 American 
Economic Review 128, 129. 
49 See for example: Dieter Bos, ‘Earmarked Taxation:  Welfare Versus Political Support’ (2000) 75(3) Journal of 
Public Economics 439. 
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hypothecation.50 Strong hypothecation is where the revenue from the tax fully determines the 
spending.51 By way of example, if a road tax raises £1 billion, and its revenues are hypothecated for 
roads in the strong sense, then exactly £1 billion will be spent on roads. In the weak sense, the 
hypothecation is more of a formality; an exercise to make the tax system more transparent and to 
inform taxpayers of the costs of certain services.52 It is the latter type of hypothecation that this 
chapter is concerned with, and at no point will this chapter argue that the CRC revenues should form 
the sole basis for environmental spending.  As will be explored below, strong hypothecation creates 
more constraints than benefits to the environment.53 
A historic example of a hypothecated tax can be seen in the “Ship Money” tax, raised by Charles I 
between 1634-38, where money raised was earmarked for the Royal Navy.54 The tax was seen in a 
negative light, and was even argued to have contributed to the English civil war, and Charles I’s 
beheading.55 In general, the UK policy on earmarked taxes has remained constant over the years, with 
a general unwillingness to engage in tax hypothecation.56 Despite this, hypothecation has been 
advocated in two, separate, policy-related documents. In 1993, the think tank Demos published a 
pamphlet advocating the use of tax hypothecation.57 Their goal was to “bring tax raising closer in line 
with service provision by hypothecating funds wherever possible”.58 In 2011, the Environmental Audit 
Committee made the following statement: 
“There is a pressing need for Government to take a more coherent approach to 
environmental taxation. A clear strategy should be adopted, setting out their 
objectives and rationale, the basis on which rates are set, and how their impact 
will be evaluated. Even partially hypothecating revenues from environmental 
taxes for environmental ends can also help to build greater acceptance, whilst 
                                                          
50 Margaret Wilkinson, ‘Paying for Public Spending: Is there a Role for Earmarked Taxes?’ (1994) 15(4) Fiscal 
Studies 119. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid, 122; House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2008-2009 
(June 2009) available at 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmenvaud/563/563.pdf accessed 
10/05/2017 accessed 03/07/2017, p8. 
54 Samuel Brittan, ‘Time to Know What You Pay Fo’r, Financial Times, 15 December 1994. 
55 Ibid.  
56 Michael Spackman, ‘Hypothecation: A view from the Treasury’ in Timothy O’Riordon, Ecotaxation (1997 
Earthscan), p45. 
57 Geoff Mulgan and Robin Murray, Reconnecting Taxation (Demos 1993). 
58 Ibid, p41. 
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also providing much needed funding for the low-carbon transition.”59 (Own 
emphasis). 
This report drew criticisms from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (which is routinely against tax 
hypothecation),60 and the UK government has not yet adopted any widespread tax hypothecation 
policy. 
This standpoint is echoed in the government’s dealings with the CRC. In the 2010 spending review, the 
government announced that revenues from the CRC would go to the Treasury and be spent on public 
spending. Whilst this may include public spending on the environment, the revenues are not labelled 
as such. This has been picked up, unprompted by me, by some of the interviewees. In their minds, the 
revenues from the CRC should be ringfenced for the environment: 
"But I think you need to be very clear about what you’re trying to achieve and 
where the money goes that you collect for it. So, if the money goes into general 
taxation, to the Treasury, and just into the general pile of money that you’ve 
got, then I think there’s a risk that companies will think, “Well, hang on a minute, 
we’re paying a lot of money for our energy and we’re not even seeing 
improvements to the National Grid or improvements to our generating 
capacity,” those type of things. So, I think as long as you can show the that the 
money that is being collected by a tax is going towards better power 
infrastructure that is going to help us meet our UK obligations as far as climate 
change is concerned, then I think you can make it stand up."  (CRC M16) 
It is the idea that taxpayers see some link between the money that they are paying in taxes and a 
benefit. This link between the tax and the revenues was emphasised by Demos, because there is a 
clear link between “action and effect”.61 According to interviewees, the effect could be capital 
improvements to energy infrastructure; or, better received, would be the investment of revenues into 
energy efficiency projects: 
"So, some of the money being generated by CRC income to then go back into 
energy efficiency projects, either in terms of grant or match funding or even 
                                                          
59 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Budget 2011 and Environmental Taxes: Sixth Report of 
Session 2010-2012 (June 2011), p3. 
60 Arun Advani, Andrew Leicester and Peter Levell, ‘IFS Observations: Hyping Hypothecation: Should Green Tax 
Revenues be Earmarked?’ (July 2011) available at https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/5622 accessed 
14/05/2017. 
61 Demos (n 57), p23. 
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carbon trust loans that used to exist, loans for energy efficiency equipment, I 
think should return." (CRC M3) 
This would label the revenues of the CRC as green money. As it will be seen in Chapter Eight, how 
regulation is packaged is important. It is often argued that hypothecated taxes garner more public 
support than unhypothecated taxes. For instance, in 2007, the Green Fiscal Commission 
commissioned a poll which looked at public attitudes to green taxes.62 The results of the poll suggest 
a general 51 per cent support of green taxes, which rises to 73 percent when the revenues are 
hypothecated to be spent on emissions reduction projects.63 However, this use of hypothecated taxes 
to gain public support could result in HM Treasury “being deluged with petitions” for taxes that the 
public no longer want to pay.64 On balance, this does not appear to be likely with the CRC, as the tax 
is not paid by the public at large (and it is also being abolished). What hypothecation of the CRC 
revenues could achieve is to make the CRC taxpayers more willing to pay the tax,65 and so more likely 
to engage with the scheme. 
In addition to hypothecation being able to improve public support for taxation, it can also play “an 
expedient role in getting a specific project” off the ground.66 It is particularly important in getting the 
right message across to taxpayers in the early stages of a tax’s development.67 The fact that the CRC 
does not ringfence its revenues sends a signal to taxpayers: one that is focussed on raising revenues, 
rather than trying to improve the environment. As P3 states, "I think if the CRC was to try to encourage 
companies to reduce, it would reinvest that money into energy efficiency". As such, my interviewees 
view the CRC as a revenue raising tool as well, and the CRC is labelled as a tax, rather than a tool to 
protect the environment: 
“[T]here doesn’t seem to be any sort of a feedback on revenues that are ring 
fenced for anything particularly on energy or environment or anything like that, 
you know, so it’s just a billion-pound carbon tax.” (CRC P7) 
The sentiment, that “it’s just a tax” (CRC M12) resonated through all the interviews. It is the very 
opposite of positive incentives, and led to a level of disengagement; with a “it’s one of those where 
                                                          
62 Green Fiscal Commission, ‘Public Opinion on a Green Tax Shift: Briefing Paper Three’ (June 2009) available at 
http://www.greenfiscalcommission.org.uk/images/uploads/GFC_Briefing_3_Final.pdf accessed 10/05/2017. 
63 Ibid, p2; relied upon in Environmental Audit Committee (n 59), p14. 
64 House of Commons, ‘Hypothecated Taxation Standard Note’ (SN01480) (September 2011) available at 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN01480/SN01480.pdf accessed 10/05/2017. 
65 IFS, ‘The IFS Green Budget: Commentary 80’ (January 2000) available at 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm80.pdf accessed 10/05/2017, p109. 
66 Wilkinson (n 50), 133. 
67 Demos (n 57), p19. 
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you’ve got to pay it so you’ve got to pay it” attitude. This attitude is not particularly conducive to going 
beyond compliance and reducing energy consumption. It was argued that revenues from 
environmental taxation “should go towards providing incentives, so encourage change” (CRC S5). 
Indeed, taxpayers were of the opinion that it was “reasonable” for the government to earmark any 
environmental tax revenue for investment into energy efficiency measures (CRC S1). 
My work suggests that by not ringfencing the revenues of the CRC, the government has seriously 
undermined the intentions and aims of the CRC. This has led to a disengagement with the scheme, 
and has even led to one interviewee questioning the legitimacy of the scheme: 
“Yes, I do. I think in order for it to have legitimacy the tax has to have a purpose 
rather than just being a revenue raiser and the income that that tax generates 
should therefore be used for that purpose. So for instance, I go back to my 
example about generation, I think if there were a tax on electricity supplies 
through the grid that were then used to subsidise people in producing local 
generation, that would incentivise valuable behavioural change.” (CRC S6) 
Whilst a tax does not need “a purpose” in order for it to be a legitimate tax,68 this does provide an 
invaluable insight into how taxation is perceived. Earmarking revenues from environmental taxes can 
be used as a legitimacy strategy for policy makers.69 The ideas additionally link to Adam Smith’s canon 
that a tax should not be arbitrary;70 the interviewees have clearly implied that an environmental tax 
without an environmental purpose is arbitrary. However, the use of earmarking to create legitimacy 
is still subject to the traditional criticisms of tax hypothecation.71  
In addition, the lack of ringfencing also has an impact on the tax morale of the taxpayers as they cannot 
make a link between the tax they are paying and any benefit. When taxpayers can make the link 
between the action and the effect, in this case the tax and the revenues, this has a profound effect on 
taxpayer attitude:72 
"As long as the money from it is invested and then people know where it’s going, 
because at the end of the day people are quite happy to pay generally tax and 
things like that, as long as they can see where it’s going and it’s actually achieving 
something." (CRC M1) 
                                                          
68 See Chapter One for the legal definition of a tax. 
69 Määttä (n 33), p32. 
70 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776, Electric Book Company 2001), pp1103-1105. 
71 Määttä (n 33), p32. 
72 Demos (n 57), p23. 
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“My firm view is if any political party was upfront and said: “we’re going to 
charge you more tax but this is what we’re going to spend it on”, and kept to 
their promise, people would be prepared to pay more tax. But the trouble is that 
isn’t how it works in practice.” (CRC S4) 
The ringfencing of revenues is therefore important not only because it sends important 
signals to taxpayers about the CRC, but also because it can fundamentally affect tax 
morale. Critics of hypothecations argue that making this link between action and effect 
does not necessarily equate to understanding on how the revenues are spent in practice.73 
Ringfencing also introduces rigidities in terms of how revenues are spent – i.e. if the CRC 
revenues are ringfenced for energy efficiency programmes, they can only be spent on 
this.74 It is for this reason that strong hypothecation (where revenues = spending) would 
not be appropriate. The aim of the CRC is to reduce carbon emissions, and should, 
theoretically be a tax that diminishes over time in line with reducing emissions. As such, 
these lower revenues would lead to lower spending,75 which is not logical for a problem 
as enduring as climate change. However, weak hypothecation or even partial, weak 
hypothecation (where only some revenues would be ringfenced) would be enough to 
convey a link between revenues and spending, and which could improve tax morale.  
Happy taxpayers are engaged taxpayers. Existing literature on tax morale clearly states 
that happy and engaged taxpayers are less likely to try to avoid the tax.76 I would argue 
that my study builds on this, in the sense that happy taxpayers are more likely to engage 
with the tax – and this means going beyond compliance and reducing energy 
consumption.   
This chapter will now consider the energy efficiency measures that CRC taxpayers would 
like the CRC revenues to be spent on. 
 
 
                                                          
73 Standard Note (n 64), p3. 
74 Wilkinson (n 50), 122; House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 
2008-2009 (June 2009) available at 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmenvaud/563/563.pdf accessed 
10/05/2017, p8. 
75 IFS Green Budget (n 65), p110. 
76 Feld and Frey (n 8), 105. 
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7.3.2.b Positive incentives under the CRC 
 
Regardless of whether revenues from the CRC are hypothecated for the environment, the 
following positive incentives raised by interviewee shed a light on how engagement with 
an environmental tax could be improved.  
Interviewees were clear that there needed to be a positive incentive that went beyond the inherent 
incentive of the tax, in order to get them “switching off” energy (CRC M14). This positive incentive 
ranged, they suggested, from tax rebates to investment of the revenues into big, energy efficiency 
schemes. It is perhaps not surprising that the majority of the suggestions raised by interviewees were 
focussed on positive, financial incentives. The financial incentives raised by interviewees can be 
generally grouped into two camps: (i) wider investment into energy efficiency measures (more indirect 
incentives); and (ii) direct investment into grants and rebates for CRC taxpayers.  
More specifically, interviewees were looking for energy efficiency grants and/ or loans which are 
available for those under the CRC to improve their energy efficiency.77 Making use of these grants or 
loans would afford taxpayers the flexibility and freedom to spend the money to best fit the 
organisation.78 This is one of the advantages of incentives: “positive incentives allow freedom of 
choice; penalties do not”.79 A grant or loan to be spent on energy efficiency would provide a positive 
incentive, as it would allow the investment into new technologies and management processes which 
reduce energy consumption – this has the twofold benefit of reducing energy costs and reducing CRC 
liability. Especially when considering the use of a grant, this would not have to be repaid, and so is an 
instant, clear incentive to taxpayers. The use of loans would provide the opportunity for organisations 
that do not have the initial capital to invest in energy efficiency, to invest and improve their 
organisation.  
Closely linked to the administration of the CRC itself were the incentives of tax rebates (CRC M4) and 
tax holidays.80 These fall under the camp of tax incentives, which have been defined as “all measures 
                                                          
77 Subsidies in particular are described as the “mirror image of various kinds of taxes”, Robert Hahn and Robert 
Stavins, ‘Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?’ (1991) 18(1) Ecology Law 
Quarterly 1, 11. See more generally: Adam Jaffe and Robert Stavins, ‘Dynamic Incentives of Environmental 
Regulations: The Effects of Alternative Policy Instruments on Technology Diffusion’ (1995) 29(3) Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 43; Andrew Green, ‘You Can’t Pay them Enough: Subsidies, 
Environmental Law and Social Norms’ (2006) 30 Harvard Environmental Law Review 407. 
78 Grabosky (n 20), 262. 
79 Ibid.  
80 Tax incentives such as tax holidays and rebates have been analysed in tax literature but largely under the 
umbrella of tax competition, for example: OECD, ‘Corporate Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment’ 
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that provide explicitly for a more favorable tax treatment of certain activities or sectors compared to 
what is granted to general industry”.81 Here, the idea that good performance under the scheme (linked 
to the reputational element, which also has the ability to change behaviour)82 would be rewarded with 
tax rebates (having tax returned to the taxpayer) or tax holidays (breaks from paying the tax). Links 
were also made with Climate Change Agreements, which are voluntary agreements between the 
regulator and the regulatee, and which allow for a reduction in the Climate Change Levy if certain 
targets are met.83 Interviewees argued that a similar mechanism could be put in place under the CRC: 
“I think the whole concept of the climate change agreements. This is not 
obviously good for the government revenue generation, but if you’re really 
trying to incentivise people to save energy, there has to be some reward for 
saving energy. So the climate change agreement is whereby if you can 
demonstrate that you’re going to reduce your consumption over a given period, 
then it allows you to keep your exemption certificate, to me I think has worked 
really well…” (CRC M7) 
This would combine a voluntary agreement with a financial incentive. It also requires taxpayers to 
engage with the scheme in a positive way, by making them demonstrate an energy reduction. This is 
something that would require far more engagement, than say, simply paying a tax. It is useful to note 
here that when the CRC comes to an end in 2019, it will be replaced by the CCL (or something very 
similar). This positive opinion of CCAs is therefore a useful take away point forward for post-CRC in 
2019. 
Whilst most interviewees wanted more positive incentives, financial incentives have been criticised 
by some interviewees and academics. For instance, CRC P6 argues that while taxpayers would take 
advantage of financial incentives at the start, they would quickly lose their appeal. Another criticism 
highlighted was the fact that taxpayers would begin to try to cheat the tax, in order to maximise the 
incentive received: 
                                                          
(OECD 2001); Alexander Klemm, Causes, Benefits and Risks of Business Tax Incentives (International Monetary 
Fund 2009); (and, for an updated version) Alexander Klemm, ‘Causes, Benefits and Risks of Business Tax 
Incentives’ (2010) 17(3) International Tax and Public Finance 315; Alexander Klemm and Stefan van Parys, 
Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Tax Incentives (International Monetary Fund 2009);  Sebastian James, ‘Tax 
and Non-Tax Incentives and Investments: Evidence and Policy Implications’ (2009) SSRN paper available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1540074.  
81 Klemm 2010, ibid, 315. 
82 See Chapter Six on nudging. 
83 Finance Act 2000, Schedule 6, Part IV. 
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“So yeah, I think tax incentives on that basis are fine, but again, the only thing 
that worries me about tax, I’m a little bit cynical and I do think that when tax 
gets involved people start to distort the way they approach things because 
they’re just trying to maximise the incentive rather than do the right thing.” (CRC 
M16) 
This is a criticism that has been echoed in academic literature. Financial incentives tied to performance 
could lead to a “narrow accounting mentality, and may ultimately defeat the spirit of the incentive 
programme”.84 Braithwaite also argues that when an incentive is introduced for something such as 
energy reduction here, then the businesses that are already in a strong position to claim these 
incentives will compete to retain these incentives.85 The problem arises with those that are in a poorer 
position to claim the incentives. These businesses do whatever they can to stop the stronger 
businesses from gaining an advantage by using the incentives.86 This can include lobbying to delay 
incentives, manipulating compliance data, and bribing regulators.87 A more common term to describe 
this consequence of the use of incentives is referred to as “creative compliance”.88 
Braithwaite highlights creative compliance in their study of nursing homes in the US.89 In this study, 
where care homes were given incentives to involve residents in extra activities, they noted that 
sleeping residents were “being wheeled in to the room […] so they could be recorded on the head 
count as participating”.90 Overall, they found that the bigger the incentive provided to them, the more 
creative the creative compliance becomes.91 Whilst M16 admitted to having a cynical view when it 
comes to incentives, this was not echoed throughout the rest of the interviews. It raises the question 
of the efficacy of the audit process (covered briefly in Chapter Five), as the mechanism that would be 
responsible for catching any creative compliance. There is not the scope in this thesis to answer this 
question; however, my study data would indicate that creative compliance was not a primary concern 
for interviewees. 
                                                          
84 Grabosky (n 20), 269-270. 
85 Braithwaite (n 20), 14. 
86 Nathaniel Keohane, R Revesz and Robert Stavins, ‘The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental 
Policy (1998) 22 Harvard Environmental Law Review’ 313, 351-353. 
87 Braithwaite (n 20), 14. 
88 Doreen McBarnet and Chris Whelan, Creative Accounting and the Cross-Eyed Javelin Thrower (John Wiley 
and Sons 1999). 
89 John Braithwaite, The Nursing Home Industry in Michael Tonry and Albert Reiss (Eds) Beyond the Law: Crime 
in Complex Organisations (University of Chicago Press 1993) 
90 Braithwaite (n 20), 15. 
91 Ibid.  
190 
 
Another potential pitfall of incentives is money: with financial incentives comes financial cost. It is 
argued that the cost of incentivising everyone far outweighs the cost of punishing those who 
transgress the rules.92 The extension of incentives to all citizens would be too costly and 
administratively difficult to be effective.93 In the case of the CRC, the scheme deals with a limited pool 
of taxpayers to be rewarded (i.e. only those that fall under the scheme), which would limit the costs 
of administering these incentives. However, considering the future policy objectives of the 
government, and their move away from individual energy efficiency schemes to one single energy 
efficiency tax,94 an automatic rebate or financial payment for all taxpayers depending on their 
performance is unlikely to be feasible. The taxpayer pool will be considerably larger.95 
Looking beyond financial and reputational (covered in Chapter Six) incentives, only one additional 
suggestion was made by one interviewee. This suggestion was improved, free support for taxpayers: 
“And again, an incentive could, for example, be free support. That would be nice, 
but within lots of organisations they’re too busy or stretched or whatever to 
utilise that. And an example in point is that we’ve been offered free support 
from (an organisation) to come and do some interesting energy audit work. That 
would be great if we had the time to get them in and then respond to the 
actions; it’s not always the case that you can do that. So I think other incentives, 
again, and I think there was talk about it, or originally there was, within the CRC, 
kind of that league table or that name and shame.” (CRC P6) 
CRC P6 would like to see further support for energy efficiency, but questions whether organisations 
would have the time and resources to take up this support. This interviewee criticises incentives in the 
fact, that quite often, one type of incentive is not enough to engage behaviour. This mirrors the 
general regulatory concept that a mixture of measures should be combined in a regulatory scheme.96 
                                                          
92 Grabosky (n 20).  
93 Ibid, 268. 
94 This policy is clearly demonstrated in their 2015 consultation entitled: Reforming the business energy 
efficiency tax landscape. 
95 This is because the CCL (which already has a revenue stream which is similar to the CRC), will also 
encompass CRC participants from 2019. 
96 See for example, Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, ‘Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for 
Environmental Protection’ (1999) 21(1) Law and Policy 49. See also literature on ‘meta-regulation’, a summary 
of ‘meta-regulation’ and similar approaches can be found in: Sharon Gilad, ‘It Runs in the Family: Meta-
Regulation and its Siblings’ (2010) 4 Regulation and Governance 485, 486. See also literature on ‘new 
governance’ which explains “a range of processes and practices that have a normative dimension but do not 
operate primarily or at all through the formal mechanism of traditional command-and-control-type legal 
institutions”: Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart 
2006), p2; Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a 
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7.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
“Carrots and sticks need not be inextricably linked. Nor are they invariably 
independent. Their respective use, alone or in combination, will vary according 
to the risk which they are intended to control, the target of the incentive in 
question, and the wider regulatory context in which they exist.”97 
This chapter has considered the interplay between positive and negative incentives. In terms of 
negative incentives, these can be useful in getting the attention of the taxpayer. With the CRC, this 
negative incentive is the tax to be paid on each tonne of carbon dioxide. Interviewees were almost 
unanimous in arguing that the cost of this negative incentive was not high enough. In addition, 
interviewees argued that a negative incentive alone was not enough to change behaviour, but that a 
positive incentive was also required.  
Positive incentives have been criticised in academic literature. A significant number of interviewees 
called for the revenues of the CRC to be ringfenced and invested into positive incentives. This thesis 
does not argue for strong ringfencing of CRC revenues, but a weaker ringfencing of revenues could 
provide a positive image for participants – rather like a labelling exercise – where participants can see 
that the CRC is aiming to improve the environment by spending on the environment. By making the 
link between the revenues of the CRC and some environmental spending, the government would add 
legitimacy to the scheme in the eyes of the taxpayers. This partial ringfencing would, in turn, be able 
to fund some financial positive incentives for energy efficiency. Whilst a tax wide financial incentive 
under the CCL is likely to be unworkable once the CRC comes to an end (as the CCL covers a far greater 
number of taxpayers than the CRC), the traditional advantages found in the literature, of providing 
low interest green loans, or grants (say to those who demonstrate an engagement with energy 
efficiency through an application process) could apply. In addition, the labelling process achieved by 
partially ringfencing revenues would be strengthened by spending on a scheme which further helps 
achieve energy reduction.  
A tax is traditionally used to discourage certain behaviour, through the use of a negative incentive. 
Under the CRC, the government is trying to discourage high emissions and making organisations pay 
for those emissions. Considering the aim of the CRC, it would perhaps be more effective to frame the 
                                                          
New Architecture (OUP 2010); and Grainne de Burca, Claire Kilpatrick and Joanne Scott, Critical Legal 
Perspectives on Global Governance (Hart 2014). 
97 Grabosky (n 20), 270. 
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CRC in a more positive light: that is, encouraging energy efficiency rather than discouraging high 
energy consumption. As P4 states: 
 “[B]ut since that incentive has been taken away, since it’s become just a pure 
tax it’s become very frustrating because the reporting is still very onerous for 
what it is and completely unnecessary. And it’s – it’s not having an impact; all 
it’s doing is actually taking money out of my budget and not allowing me – it’s 
not providing me any incentive to do further energy efficiency.” (CRC P4) 
Because no incentives are provided through the CRC, participants find the scheme a burden for what 
it is. That is to say that they believe the scheme should be streamlined if it is only a revenue raising 
tool (i.e. a tax). As such, the CRC could be perceived to be inefficient in its current form. Chapter Eight 
will now go on to consider regulatory efficiency more generally, in order to analyse the CRC in its 
current form.  
The chapter that follows is the final, substantive chapter in this thesis. Chapter Eight will now consider 







Chapter Eight: Efficiency and Symbolism 
 
In the previous chapters, different themes emerging from the data were explored. To recap, this thesis 
has considered the role of stability in green tax policy; the regulator/ regulatee relationship and the 
role of trust; the power of nudging in green taxes; and the role of incentives in taxation. 
This chapter will consider one final theme that arose from the data: the complexity of the CRC. During 
interviews, interviewees were specifically asked: “how complex do you find the CRC?”. My data 
suggests that the CRC is considered to be a complex tax.1 The complexity of the CRC had previously 
been highlighted by government during the 2012 reforms to the CRC, and so the subject of complexity 
seemed to be worth exploring. The complexity of a regulatory scheme will be tied into the overall 
efficiency of the CRC, in order to discover how regulatees engage with a complex scheme. As such, 
this chapter offers, on the basis of my data, some learning experiences for regulators when it comes 
to regulatory design and operationalisation. 
This chapter will first consider the literature on regulatory efficiency before moving onto the 
complexity of the CRC. There, I will outline a number of the perceived complexities of scheme including 
mechanical complexities, the problem of regulatory overlap, and administrative complexities. Drawing 
on interview data, this section will consider the practical impacts of complexity, including 
understanding and engagement with the CRC scheme and how these can impact on the overall 
efficiency of the scheme. I begin by looking at concepts of ‘good’ regulation. 
 
8.1 Regulatory efficiency: complexity  
 
The pool of regulatory literature is vast. However, the literature on taxation and regulation is less so. 
Taxation regulates market activity,2 and the author Arthur Pigou made the link between taxation and 
externalities (environmental harm, for example, is an externality).3 In his seminal work, the Economics 
of Welfare, Pigou argues that an optimal tax taxes the externality-creating activity at a rate that is 
                                                          
1 Of course, there are many other complex taxes. See, for example Ann Mumford’s discussion of the 
complexity of the US Tax Code in Ann Mumford, Taxing Culture: Towards a Theory of Tax Collection Law 
(Routledge 2017), Chapter 6. 
2 Valerie Braithwaite, ‘Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction’ (2007) 29(1) Law and Policy 3, 3. 
3 Arthur Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th Edition) (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) Part II, Chapter 11, p223. 
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equal to the damage caused by the externality.4 Despite this foundational work, Braithwaite argues 
that traditionally the link has not been made between taxation and the wider regulatory arena.5 
Braithwaite argues: 
“If regulation entails directives to act in certain ways but not others, backed by 
enforcement practices, formalized as law and justified in terms of protecting the 
public interest, taxation should be at the center of the regulatory stage.”6 
There is very little by way of discussion on the interplay between regulatory efficiency and taxation in 
the academic field.7 This chapter will primarily focus therefore on wider regulatory theory literature, 
drawing on taxation and economics literature where available.  
“Well designed” and “properly implemented” regulation can help policymakers achieve 
environmental aims, but what constitutes ‘good’ regulation is difficult to pinpoint.8 Within the 
regulatory field, a number of theoretical approaches have been taken to describe “good regulation”. 
Baldwin et al reject the idea that ‘good’ regulation is regulation that maximises wealth;9 although it is 
a factor that can be taken into account when looking at regulation.10 The reasoning behind this 
objection lies in the fact that regulation impacts upon individual rights, and wealth distribution cannot 
explain or justify an interference with individual rights.11 Instead, Baldwin et al propose five key tests 
which should be considered when deciding whether regulation is ‘good’ regulation:12 
1) “Is the action or regime supported by legislative authority? 
                                                          
4 Ibid.  
5 Braithwaite (n 2), 3.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Although Posner does argue that many of the legal doctrines and institutions are “best understood and 
explained as efforts to promote the efficient allocation of resources”. Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Law (2nd Edition) (Little, Brown and Company 1977), p17. 
8 Fiona Haines, The Paradox of Regulation: What Regulation Can Achieve and What it Cannot (Edward Elgar 
2011), p7. 
9 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (2nd 
Edition) (OUP 2012), p25. 
10 Ibid, 26. 
11 Ibid.  
12 The five factors put forward by Baldwin et al. feature in relatively few papers in their entirety. Papers that 
cite this work include: Sanford Berg, Sustainable Regulatory Systems: Laws, Resources and Values (2000) 9 
United Policy 159; Ivandro Campos, Health-Care System Regulation in Brazil and in Great Britain (2013) Legal 
and Forensic Medicine 223; the MSc work of Valeriy Tasplin, An Evaluation of the Efficiency of Energy 
Regulation in Ukraine (2001) available at www.kse.org.ua/uploads/file/library/2001/Tsaplin.pdf accessed 
20/04/2018; and the doctoral work of Anastasia Verra, Achieving Regulatory Efficiency: A Study of the Greek 
Telecommunications Authority (2008) available at https://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/jspui/handle/123456789/384 
accessed 20/04/2018. These works cite the five factors but do not really explore exactly what efficiency is.  
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2) Is there an appropriate scheme of accountability? 
3) Are procedures fair, accessible, and open? 
4) Is the regulator acting with sufficient expertise? 
5) Is the action or regime efficient?”13 
These five questions are based in real-life debates on regulatory reform, and collectively, they set a 
benchmark for assessing regulation.14 As for the first three questions in relation to the CRC, the first 
can easily be answered in the affirmative (i.e. the CRC is supported by legislative activity). The second 
and third questions are outside the ambit of this thesis. In relation to the fourth question, this thesis 
has already considered the role of expertise when looking at the regulator/ regulatee relationship in 
Chapter Five. In that chapter, we saw that where regulatees perceived the regulator to be lacking in 
competence, then this lack of faith had wider ramifications on the scheme as a whole. In the case of 
the CRC, this has led to a general disengagement with the scheme by regulatees, and specific problems 
of enforcement through the audit process. However, it is only really point number five, which 
considers the efficiency of regulation, which speaks to the rationality of a piece of regulation. It is this 
fifth point which will form the point of focus for this chapter. 
The concept of regulatory efficiency is not covered in much depth by key authors on regulation15 – 
that is, whilst regulation should be “efficient”, there is little that follows by way of definition of what 
“efficient” is. Efficiency more broadly has been considered by Vilfred Pareto, who describes efficiency 
as the efficient distribution of resources; which is achieved when it is no longer possible to improve 
one person’s situation without making another person worse off.16 This applies equally to preference 
criteria as to individuals. This definition of efficiency can be seen in government policy, which states 
that efficiency is where “nobody can be made better off without someone else being made worse 
off”.17 
                                                          
13 Baldwin et al. (n 9), p27. 
14 Ibid, p32. 
15 For instance, Baldwin et al. (n 9).   
16 D Gale, ‘Efficiency’ in M Hazewinkel and A Rinnooy Kan (eds), Current Developments in the Interface: 
Economics, Econometrics, Mathematics (Springer 1982). For a discussion on the relationship between Pareto 
and Pigou see: Ian Dobbs, ‘Externality, Efficiency and the Pareto Principle’ (1981) International Review of Law 
and Economics 167. 




An alternative approach splits efficiency under two headings: First, productive efficiency, where the 
regulation is being “implemented at the least possible level of inputs or costs”;18 second, outcome 
efficiency, where an efficient piece of regulation is one which produces efficient results.19 These 
approaches to efficiency both describe what regulation should be, but does not really inform the 
reader as to what efficient regulation looks like. Below, I will apply these concepts to what the 
interviewees said about the regime and its complexity. 
 
8.1.1 The complexity of the CRC 
 
During interviews, one of the most recurring criticisms of the CRC related to its complexity. Those who 
have read Chapter Three of this thesis may agree. Whilst the link between the issues of complexity 
and efficiency may not be immediately obvious, this section will discuss how the practical impacts of 
the CRC’s complexity have impacted on its efficiency. The complexities to be covered include 
mechanical complexities of the CRC (in terms of setting up and integrating the CRC into an 
organisation; regulatory overlap (the fact that the CRC overlaps with a number of other environmental 
regimes); and finally, the administrative burdens of the CRC. We will now turn to the first of these 
complexities. 
 
8.1.1.a Mechanical complexities of the CRC 
 
“In our business, we still refer to it but we call it Complicated Really Complicated.  
It's an acronym obviously for CRC, but historically it's been extremely 
complicated.” (CRC M10) 
All but two interviewees made a reference to the complexity of the CRC and/or the evolution of this 
complexity through the CRC reforms (for more on the reforms to the CRC, see chapter Four). 
Interviewees refer to what this chapter will label the “mechanical complexity” of the CRC – that is to 
say, the overarching principles of the CRC are not complex, but that their application in the real world 
is complex. This perceived unnecessary complexity leads to confusion amongst participants, as well as 
the opinion that the CRC is “tiresome” (CRC M1). If the regulatees are unsure as to what their 
                                                          
18 Baldwin et al. (n 9), p31. 
19 Ibid.  
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obligations are under the scheme, then this requires further resources and time from regulatees to 
come to grips with the scheme.  
In terms of productive efficiency,20 this would render the CRC inefficient. Furthermore, not only does 
this make the CRC less efficient in practice, but these inefficiencies are also felt by the regulatee – 
here, the complexities of the CRC have been labelled by interviewees as “unnecessary”. The 
disadvantages of complexity are therefore twofold: a productive inefficiency; and a perceived 
inefficiency. That is to say, regulatees are aware that the CRC is inefficient. The later part of this 
chapter will consider the role of symbolic legislation to explore how the CRC has been packaged to 
regulatees. Obvious inefficiencies that are perceivable by those regulated form part of this package – 
i.e. they form part of the visible attributes of the CRC – and impact on how the scheme is approached 
as a whole.  
The CRC was often described as “complex” by interviewees.21 A distinction needs to be made in terms 
of the overarching ideas underpinning the CRC, and the mechanical processes that constitute the CRC 
and how it functions. It is only the latter that has been perceived to be complex by interviewees: 
“I think it is very complex. I think a lot of the rules are very complex. I think the 
broad-brush structure of the scheme isn’t that complex, but nothing is simple. So, I 
think it’s very difficult. There are always going to be lines that have to be drawn 
that make it complicated. There are always going to be complicated corporate 
structures and ownership of entities and so on that require a rule book for them to 
be dealt with within the scheme. But it is a very complicated scheme.” (CRC S3) 
 “Well in its principle it is not complicated at all, it is quite straightforward. But in 
its application, it is actually very complex.” (CRC S6) 
What is interesting, is that these two quotes come from two interviews with solicitors with extensive 
experience in working in environmental and property law – and as such, have experience dealing with 
technical pieces of legislation across the wider field of environmental law. A different solicitor 
described the CRC as “one of the most complex things we advise on” (CRC S2). Even in the eyes of the 
professionals, therefore, the CRC is viewed to be complex on a micro level. Exploring these 
complexities in more depth, a number of specific complexities were highlighted during interviews. 
Whilst it is not the purpose of this chapter to tackle these complexities head on, and suggest 
                                                          
20 Ibid.  
21 CRC M2, M4, M6, M14, M15, S2, S3, S6. 
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alternatives, these complexities will be raised to illustrate how the CRC is perceived by regulatees and 
those who advise regulatees.  
First, interviewees discussed the initial difficulties of setting up the CRC as a scheme in their 
organisation and preparing for compliance. One interviewee, CRC P5, discusses the set up in their 
organisation: 
“I don’t find it particularly onerous now we’ve got a good idea of what all our 
meters are doing and we’ve got procedures in place. It’s not particularly onerous 
now, but if I was on my own, I would find it very difficult, because to get all those 
processes in place has taken us a couple of years really.” (CRC P5) 
The CRC is now well established, being in its second phase, and as such, the CRC is an embedded 
scheme in many organisations which have learnt how to “deal with the grey areas” (CRC M12). 
However, the complexity of the CRC can still be experienced by those who are newcomers to the 
scheme (for example through participant staffing changes). For these people, “it’s incredibly complex 
for them to get their head around a lot of the mechanisms” (CRC M4). This is due to both the base 
complexity of the scheme (i.e. the scheme as it stands), and the numerous reforms that the CRC has 
been through (see chapter Four for more on stability) (CRC M13, M15). 
Interviewee M6 compared their experience with setting up the CRC to their experience of the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme. Here, they discuss the fact that whilst the CRC is difficult to set up, it is not 
as complex as the EU ETS:  
“In terms of complexity, I think it’s complex to set up. It’s more complex than 
just mandatory carbon reporting, which is very straight forward, it’s basically 
just like use a recognised methodology and help and compliance. But obviously 
it’s not as complicated as things like the EU ETS. So sometimes it’s really just 
carbon reporting, but definitely not EU ETS.” (CRC M6) 
Overall, there were mixed views on the CRC set up, with some interviewees talking about the “faff” of 
the process of setting the scheme up (CRC M1), to the sentiment that the scheme was very much well 
established now. This included negative feedback from interviewees on the abolition of the scheme 
(CRC M3); there was, for some interviewees, some consistency and stability to be found in the fact 
that the CRC had now been around for a number of years and become a familiar face in organisations 




8.1.1.b Regulatory Overlap 
 
Second, a complexity highlighted in interviews was where the CRC fits into the regulatory landscape. 
There are currently a number of different green taxes that all have different rates,22 and regulatees 
need to navigate this landscape. In regulatory literature, where there are a number of different 
instruments targeting the same area, this is referred to as regulatory pluralism. The regulatory 
literature tends to take quite a positive approach to regulatory pluralism, arguing that there is too 
much focus on “single instrument” approaches.23 Instead, a multiple-instruments based approach, as 
well as a broader range of regulatory actors, is said to produce better regulation.24 It has also been 
argued that it is useful to use multiple instruments for the same approach, including a mix of command 
and control with other forms of regulatory instrument.25 Regulation is therefore “a toolbox from which 
the optimal tools are (or should be) selected”.26  
When considering the more tax specific literature, however, the viewpoint on regulatory pluralism is 
much more negative. Here, authors argue that while pollution control instruments can be combined 
with other instruments (such as information policies to overcome information asymmetry),27 
international tax overlap with national taxes results in inefficiencies. In the case of the CRC, this 
plurality can be seen with the overlap seen between the CRC, CCL and EU ETS.  
Interviewees discussed the complexities that are created if they also have to deal with EU ETS supplies 
or have a Climate Change Agreement in place (CRC M5). This regulatory overlap is a point on which 
solicitors are asked to provide advice (CRC S3), and is a source of complexity with the CRC (CRC S3): 
“The complexity of the legal regulatory fiscal landscape for energy is very 
complex. Because there’s a number of schemes we have to interact with, which 
overlap. I think the CRC were overlapping with them.” (CRC P8) 
                                                          
22 Note in particular potential overlap with the CCL; and also, the EU ETS, which, whilst not a tax, is an 
economic instrument with some overlap. 
23 Timothy Swanson, ‘Review of Economic Incentives and Environmental Policies: Principles and Practice’ 
(1995) 4(1) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 85; Neil Gunningham and 
Darren Sinclair, ‘Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection’ (1999) 21(1) Law 
and Policy 49, 50. 
24 See Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, ‘Integrative Regulation: A Principle-based Approach to 
Environmental Policy’ (1999) 24 Law and Social Inquiry 853. 
25 Baldwin et al. (n 9), p63. 
26 Kieron Flanagan et al., ‘Reconceptualising the ‘Policy Mix’ for Innovation’ (2011) 40 Research Policy 702, 706. 
27 Paul Lehmann, ‘Using a Policy Mix for Pollution Control - A Review of Economic Literature’ (2008) Helmholtz 
Centre for Environmental Research - UFZ Leipzig, available at https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/21354/1/MPRA_paper_21354.pdf accessed 01/08/2017. 
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More specifically, the overlap creates administrative burdens in terms of data collection, and 
reporting. With multiple schemes overlapping, regulatees often have multiple reporting obligations 
which are all different, and such are not resource efficient. CRC P5 argues that: “The trouble is, there 
are lots of very similar reporting mechanisms, but just slightly different, and they’re just a burden 
really”. This “massive duplication” is therefore something that should be avoided in a green tax 
scheme (CRC P1).  
With its roots in Smart Regulation (the idea that a mix of policy instruments should be used with a 
three-dimensional enforcement pyramid),28 Gunningham et al. argue that the full range of policy 
instruments available to a task should be considered, before employing a mix of these instruments to 
achieve the task.29  
 Gunningham and Sinclair argue that whilst there is too much focus on single instrument approaches, 
it cannot always be assumed that multiple instruments “will be better”.30 They then categorise 
multiple instrument approaches into the following groups:  
“1) mixes that are inherently complementary; 2) mixes that are inherently 
incompatible; 3) mixes that are complementary if sequenced; and 4) mixes 
whose complementarity or otherwise is essentially context specific”.31  
They then consider the compatibility of different mixes of command and control, economic 
instruments, self-regulation, and voluntary agreements.32 The current situation with the CRC 
resonates with the fourth group more than the others, in the sense that we are dealing with a mix of 
instruments in the set context of emissions control. However, what is not considered is the 
compatibility of multiple economic instruments which are broadly covering the same (but slightly 
different) emissions. In the case of the CRC, for example, the CRC targets organisations that could also 
be covered by the CCL and the EU ETS for some of their energy consumption. In this scenario, 
regulatees are required to identify the different energy supplies by each regime, in order to exclude 
                                                          
28 Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy (OUP 1998), 
Chapter 6. 
29 Ibid; also see: Michael Howlett and Jeremy Rayner, ‘Design Principles for Policy Mixes: Cohesion and 
Coherence in ‘New Governance Agreements’’ (2007) 26(4) Policy and Society 1, 4. For use outside pollution 
control, see Irene King and Christoph Schroeter-Schlaack (editors), Instrument Mixes for Biodiversity Policies 
(POLICYMIX, 2011), p10. 
30 Gunningham and Sinclair (n 23), 50. 
31 Ibid, 53. 
32 Ibid, 55 onwards. 
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them from the CRC. This pluralism is viewed negatively by regulatees as an administrative burden and 
additional complexity.  
This is echoed in various of the EU ETS literature,33 which considers the impact of domestic tax regimes 
on the efficiency of the EU ETS. Here, it is argued that the EU ETS is affected by national tax regimes, 
rendering a multiple regime approach “at best redundant and at worst counterproductive”.34 This 
literature focusses on the situation where the EU ETS emissions are subject to a second tax, the 
proponents for which argue that there would be an additional incentive for emissions reductions.35 In 
a study by Boehringer et al. they dismiss the use of additional taxation in conjunction with the EU ETS 
as “environmentally ineffective”, raising the costs of compliance with the EU ETS.36 This is particularly 
pertinent when the multiple instruments have one single policy objective, with the potential for 
“costly overlaps”, and therefore inefficiencies.37 In a more recent study, Goal and Holtsmark also argue 
that the efficiencies of permit trading are also lost when additional taxes come into play.38 
However, again, this is not the case with the CRC. Energy supplies which are already covered by the 
EU ETS and the CCL fall out of the scope of the CRC.39 There is therefore a lacuna in the regulatory 
literature which considers the situation where the regulatory instruments overlap in the sense that 
there is the possibility of pluralism (i.e. in theory the EU ETS and the CRC can cover the same 
emissions); but that in practice, there is no pluralism. Whilst an organisation can fall under both the 
CRC and the EU ETS, one supply of energy would not be covered by both regimes at the same time. 
Therefore, organisations can have emission X which is covered by the EU ETS, and emission Y which is 
covered by the CRC. Both regulatory regimes (while targeting different emissions) are therefore both 
part of an overall package of climate change regulatory responses that target, to a degree,40 the same 
organisations. As such, the regulatees are instead required to wade through the complex regulatory 
                                                          
33 Nick Johnstone, ‘The use of Tradeable Permits in Combination with other Environmental Policy Instruments’ 
(OECD 2003) available at http://www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/32427205.pdf accessed 01/08/2017; 
Christoph Boehringer, Henrike Koschel and Ulf Moslener, ‘Efficiency Losses from Overlapping Regulation of EU 
Carbon Emissions’ (2008) 33 Journal Regulatory Economics 299; Odd Godal and Bjart Holtsmark, ‘Permit 
Trading: Merely an Efficiency-Neutral Redistribution away from Climate Change Victims?’ (2011) 113(4) 
Scandinavian Journal Economics 784. 
34 Johnstone, ibid.  
35 Boehringer et al. (n 33), 300. 
36 Ibid, 311. 
37 Christoph Boeringer et al., Good Things do not always come in Threes: On the Excess Cost of Overlapping 
Regulation in EU Climate Change Policy (2016) 94 Energy Policy 502, 503 
38 Godal and Holtsmark (n 33). 
39 The CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order 2013, SI 2013/1119, Schedule 1, Paras 28 and 29. 
40 There is not a total overlap, because not all CRC captured emissions are also captured by the EU ETS/ CCL 
and vice versa. 
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landscape to navigate this potential pluralism. I consider this situation to be a question of efficiency, 
and an additional administrative burden on regulatees.   
This raises questions about the broader regulatory landscape in which the CRC sits. This difficulty was 
also highlighted in the 2015 consultation on the business energy tax landscape: 
“The government believes there is potential to streamline taxes in a way that 
reduces variations in tax rates faced by different users, simplifies the tax system 
and strengthens the price signal. This consultation proposes doing this by 
replacing the CRC and CCL with a new energy consumption tax based on the 
CCL.”41 
This proposal was subsequently adopted by the government in their response to the consultation:  
“The government is responding by abolishing the CRC energy efficiency scheme 
(CRC) – a burdensome and bureaucratic tax. Instead, we will move to a single 
tax, the existing Climate Change Levy (CCL), and consult on a new streamlined 
reporting framework.”42 
Therefore, whilst the regulatory overlap was identified by interviewees as a source of complexity of 
the CRC, steps have already been taken by the government to mitigate this overlap. The exact logistics 
of how the CCL single tax will replace the CRC is yet to be published, but will hopefully tackle the 
problems of regulatory overlap which the CRC has experienced. 
 
8.1.1.c Administrative complexities 
 
Finally, more specific bureaucratic complexities have been raised by interviewees. These include the 
numerous deadlines under the scheme:  
“And there wasn’t this deadline after deadline after deadline [in reference to 
another scheme], that with CRC is almost intended to trip you up and make you 
realise, ‘Oh, I’ve forgotten to do something and now I’m going to be subjected 
to an enforcement notice’.” (CRC M3) 
                                                          
41 HM Treasury, ‘Consultation: Reforming the Business Energy Efficiency Landscape’ (September 2015), p14. 
42 HM Treasury, ‘Reforming the Business Energy Efficiency Landscape: Response to the Consultation’ (March 
2016), Foreword.  
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This is linked to the preparation of the evidence packs which include all the consumption data in 
preparation for an audit (see Chapter Three),43 which has been described as “over complicated” (CRC 
M14). The preparation for compliance is therefore seen as a burden by some interviewees. Other 
technical complexities can be found in the use of corporate structures for the scheme. The CRC 
requires organisations to separate their organisation into group structures,44 and use this as a basis to 
calculate their energy consumption. The rules surrounding this process are incredibly complex, and 
solicitors often face queries about structuring and the CRC (CRC S3). 
CRC M10 explains the difficulty as follows: 
“The biggest complications would be around interpretation of organisational 
structure, highest parent primary member’s participant equivalence.  
Specifically trust funds, investment vehicles and larger multinational 
organisations, there are quite a lot of queries and support that we can give 
organisations around that.”  (CRC M10) 
Overall, there are a number of complexities that surround that CRC. However, these complexities are 
generally focussed on the mechanical implementation and operation of the CRC. The overarching 
principles underpinning the CRC are not contested – that is, the idea of using a tax to lower energy 
consumption – and are not considered complex. This shows, therefore, that it is the process of putting 
a tax into practice that causes the complexities in the eyes of the regulatee.  
 
8.1.2 Efficiency and complexity  
 
In terms of efficiency, interviewees themselves identified that a complex scheme is not an efficient 
one. For example, CRC P3 stated: 
“I would say an effective piece of environmental legislation is that it is easy to 
understand, and is easy to understand why it was created as well.” (CRC P3) 
This is echoed by CRC S2: 
“Environmental regulation has to be effective, I’m not sure the CRC is, it needs 
to be as simple to understand as possible.” (CRC S2) 
                                                          
43 CRC Order 2013 (n 39), Article 40. 
44 Ibid, Chapter 4. 
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The CRC should therefore be understandable to be effective. A piece of regulation should be effective 
in achieving its aims to be efficient. Therefore, taxpayers should be able to follow and understand a 
green tax regime; so that they can comply and change their behaviour in line with the CRC’s aims.  
One of the more light-hearted consequences of this inefficiency is the difficulty that interviewees had 
in defining the CRC: 
“You need to be able to say what the scheme is or what the goal is, what the 
regulation is, what the legislation is in 30 seconds.  I can't say what CRC is in 30 
seconds beyond saying it's a tax for carbon.  If I go any more than that, I take 
five minutes to explain what it is.  Or if I don’t take five minutes and I take one 
minute, I haven't said everything that I need to say.  The regulation has to be 
something you can say in 30 seconds, and then from that, there is a simple set 
of rules around it.” (CRC M8) 
All interviewees were asked to explain, in their own words, what the CRC was. No answer was the 
same, and varied from a one line “it’s a tax” (CRC M1), to a page long explanation of how the scheme 
works. Even in the longer answers, not all aspects of the scheme were covered. It was argued by one 
solicitor, that this is the tell-tale sign of a bad piece of regulation: 
“I think, a sign of a poorly drafted piece of legislation when law firms have to be 
brought in to advise clients on how it works and what it means.  If it’s a good 
piece of legislation it shouldn’t be that difficult.  I think it’s very complex, I think 
it applies, sometimes, in a way that doesn’t really make sense.” (CRC S1) 
The CRC is therefore a complex scheme which is difficult to explain – a characteristic which favours 
consultants (CRC M3) and solicitors (CRC S2) who make money by selling specialist advice to 
regulatees.45 In general, the CRC requires far too much “lawyer time” to be efficient (CRC S7). 
Building on from the above is a more serious consequence of complexity: a lack of understanding of 
the regulation. Drawing on tax literature, this is referred to as tax salience. Within the pool of tax 
literature, there are both empirical studies and theoretical papers on tax salience.46 Definitions of tax 
salience in literature include “the extent to which taxpayers account for the costs imposed by taxation 
                                                          
45 And as such, potentially acting as “transaction cost engineers” where the role of environmental lawyers is 
corporatised. See, Robert Lee and Steven Vaughan, ‘The Contaminated Land Regime in England and Wales and 
the Corporatisation of Environmental Lawyers’ (2010) 17(1) International Journal of the Legal Profession 35. 
46 For relatively recent empirical studies see: Raj Chetty, Adam Looney and Kory Kroft, ‘Salience and Taxation: 
Theory and Evidence’ (2009) 99(4) American Economic Review 1145; Amy Finkelstein, ‘E-ZTAX: Tax Salience 
and Tax Rates’ (2009) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 969.  
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when the taxpayers make decisions or judgments”.47 However more recent literature frames the 
concept of tax salience in terms of understanding. Mumford argues that tax salience refers 
“essentially, to the capacity of taxpayers to understand legislation”.48  
In tax literature, tax salience overlaps with and has been confused with the concepts of ‘complexity’ 
and ’transparency’.49 However, salience is very similar to the idea of complexity, with the literature 
arguing that “low tax salience by taxpayers generally may be related to greater levels of tax 
complexity”.50 Whilst tax complexity has been considered above, the focus here is on salience – i.e. 
the ability of the CRC participant to understand the CRC. This tax salience is broken down into what is 
termed high and low tax salience: 
“High tax salience indicates that taxpayers have an accurate understanding of 
the law, whereas the description ‘low tax salience’ refers to a significant gap 
between a taxpayer’s impression of legal obligations and those that actually 
exist, whether or not the taxpayer is aware of this gap.”51 
The importance of a high tax salience is contested in academic scholarship. The obvious problem 
linked to low tax salience is that it has potential negative impacts on taxpayers’ ability to comply with 
the tax.52 There is also evidence arguing that high tax complexity can result in “taxpayer confusion and 
error”,53 or an environment of uncertainty.54  
This confusion is reflected in the interview data. Interviewees discussed a general confusion that 
surrounds the CRC – with statements such as “it’s so confusing” (CRC M1) and “it was a bit perplexing 
when it all started” (CRC M12). CRC P1 did not understand the process of the CRC, and CRC P8 felt 
sorry for lots of organisations “because they didn’t know what they were doing”.  
Consultants and solicitors talk about the confusion of their clients: 
                                                          
47 David Gamage and Darien Shanske, ‘Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience’ 
(2011) 65 Tax Law Review 19, 23. 
48 Ann Mumford, ‘Tax Complexity, Tax Salience and Tax Politics’ (2015) 24(2) Social and Legal Studies 185, 185. 
49 John Snape, ‘Tax Law: Complexity, Politics and Policymaking’ (2015) 24(2) Social and Legal Studies 155, 156. 
50 Tamar Budak, Simon James and Adrian Sawyer, ‘International Experiences of Tax Simplification and 
Distinguishing between Necessary and Unnecessary Complexity’ (2016) 14(2) eJournal of Tax Research 337, 
347. 
51 Mumford (n 48), 186. 
52 Andrew Cuccia and Gregory Carnes, ‘A Closer Look at the Relation Between Tax Complexity and Tax Equity 
Perceptions’ (2001) 22(1) Journal of Economic Psychology 113, 113 and 131. 
53 Gamage and Shanske (n 47), 33. 
54 Sol Picciotto, ‘Constructing Compliance: Game Playing, Tax Law, and the Regulatory State’ (2007) 29(1) Law 
and Policy 11, 15. 
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“I think a lot of clients are confused by it.  I think the climate change levy, the 
stuff that gets added onto electricity bills, I think, makes more sense to clients, 
and is much less administratively onerous for them.” (CRC S1) 
 “Now, they didn’t understand what it was; they mostly saw it as just a tax to 
them. So, they literally said, “Look can you deal with all our CRC?” and that’s it. 
And they didn’t really want to know anything otherwise; they just wanted for 
me to let them know when it was all done and over. So, they never really 
engaged from the onset.” (CRC M4) 
As M4 highlights, clients were willing to pass the responsibility of the CRC onto a consultant because 
they did not understand what it was. The data suggests that not only is there a lack of understanding 
because of the complexity of the CRC, but that this complexity results in a disengagement with the 
scheme. The purpose of the scheme becomes lost on the regulatee: 
“Sometimes people get into a right fuddle with things and the way that they 
name things becomes really complicated, and the essence of the new regulation 
or the incentive or the tax gets lost a little bit, and I think a little bit more clarity 
around why something is being done and how it fits in with lots of other taxes.” 
(CRC M16) 
This links to how the regulatee perceives the environmental tax that they are paying. It has been 
argued in tax literature that a clear green policy equates to a clear tax scheme.55 The interview data 
appears to take this further. As in Chapter Four, the role of stable tax policy was discussed as being 
key to how regulatee’s perceive the motives behind a green tax; here, if a tax is so complex that the 
regulatee does not understand it, then the motives are lost once again. The complexity of the CRC 
therefore detracts from its supposedly clear aim: to reduce energy consumption.  
Tax salience needs to be balanced with other priorities when designing tax regimes. Gamage and 
Shanske argue that whilst salience is important, it is but one of a list of priorities when drafting 
legislation, and not necessarily at the top of that list.56 In addition, Mumford argues that another 
source of complexity can be found in the unrealistic expectations of the taxpayer.57 That is to say that 
perhaps regulatees “place unreasonable demands upon the capacity of written legislation to 
                                                          
55 Adrian Sawyer, Moving on from the Tax Legislation Rewrite Projects: A Comparison of the New Zealand Tax 
Working Group/ Generic Tax Policy Process and the United Kingdom Office of Tax Simplification (2013) 3 
British Tax Review 321, 321 
56 Gamage and Shanske (n 47); Mumford (n 48), 187. 
57 Mumford (n 48), 191. 
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communicate, effectively, what at first glance might appear to be simple concepts”.58 Building on from 
Chapter Four on a stable green tax policy, it has been argued that clear legislation stems from clear 
policy.59 In terms of the CRC, I argue that the instability of the CRC over the years has led to the 
perception that the underlying policy behind the CRC is also unstable. Not only does this have the 
effect of creating disengagement (Chapter Four), but associated literature would also indicate that it 
has consequences for the salience of the tax.  
This is echoed further in tax literature. Picciotto argues that if taxpayers disengage with a tax system 
due to its complexity, and as such its uncertainty (as seen with the CRC), then avoidance could 
increase.60 In the case of the CRC, my data suggests that its complexity could have led to further 
disengagement with the scheme. Mumford argues that should uncertainty create a change in the 
psychology of taxpayers – for instance, mistrust in the state – then tax complexity should potentially 
be placed higher on the list of priorities when designing tax schemes.61 Considering, therefore, the 
confusion that complexity has created; and linking this to the negative emotive reaction that can be 
seen through the disengagement with the CRC, my data suggests that the CRC is too complex to 
achieve its aims.  
This is particularly pertinent where regulatees view the complexities of the regime as unnecessary; 
and this is the case with the CRC. CRC S2 labelled the CRC as “unduly complex”, whilst CRC M2 stated 
that it is “more complex than it needs to be”. Interviewees were of the opinion that if the CRC is just 
a tax, then it is too complex. Complexity appeared to be acceptable for the CRC whilst it retained its 
perceived dual purpose: raising revenue and as a tool to reduce energy consumption.62 
CRC P4 argued: 
“I think it’s a missed opportunity because I think when it was first brought in it 
was quite complicated but it was complicated for a reason and it did provide 
incentives. So I think it was quite – I was okay about it, I was quite willing to put 
in the effort, but, since that incentive has been taken away...” (CRC P4) 
Therefore, with the incentives, regulatees are more willing to accept complexity – this perhaps strikes 
back to the regulatees being able to see the motive behind the regulation. In the eyes of the 
                                                          
58 Ibid.  
59 Sawyer (n 55), 321. 
60 Picciotto (n 54), 23.  
61 Mumford (n 48), 196. 
62Note the use of perceived here. The CRC still does have a dual purpose, but this is potentially no longer 
recognised by interviewees. 
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interviewees, incentives reflect a positive policy message in terms of the environment. As the CRC is 
perceived as ‘just a tax’, any undue complexity is not tolerated:63 
“In terms of the complexity of the actual process, I don’t think there’s any real 
upside to that. Once they decided it was going to be a tax, I think they should 
have perhaps done the work to make it a tax and take away all these different, 
what I was outlining about submit the annual report and buy your allowances, 
pay your allowances, surrender your allowances, all those different milestones, 
I just don’t really see that that’s absolutely necessary. A bit of thought and you 
could have got rid of all that stuff.” (CRC M16) 
 “If it’s going to continue down the taxation route, it would be easier if it came 
out of a point of billing; and it was then on all consumption.” (CRC P3) 
As such, the complexity of the CRC is seen as too high for what it is trying to achieve as a tax (CRC M1). 
A number of interviewees advocated that if the CRC was just a tax, then the tax should simply be levied 
at the point of billing (i.e. the energy supplier will collect the tax on behalf of the consumer and this 
would be added onto the energy bill, as seen with the CCL).64 However, whilst this is a possible 
alternative, the data does also indicate that there is some acceptance for a more complex scheme 
which outwardly appears to be tackling energy consumption. The distaste for complexity appears to 
stem from the fact that the CRC is viewed as a mere tax, rather than because the CRC is complex per 
se.  
 
8.2 Concluding Remarks 
 
The CRC is known for being a complex scheme. In 2012, the initial complexities of the scheme were 
highlighted by the government as a reason for significant reform.65 Despite significant reforms in 2013, 
some complexities from before the reform, as well as continued complexities of the CRC, have been 
highlighted as an issue by interviewees. These include problems of integrating the CRC into 
organisations, issues with regulatory overlap, and administrative burdens under the scheme. 
                                                          
63 This point in particular builds upon the work which was commissioned by the government in 2015 where 
they also acknowledged that the CRC was seen as ‘just a tax’ and, as such, too complex. DECC, ‘CRC Energy 
Efficiency Scheme Evaluation: Final Synthesis Report’ (July 2015), p13, p76. 
64 CRC M14, M16, P3, P5. 
65 DECC, ‘Consultation on simplifying the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme’ (March 2012), Executive Summary. 
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Regulatory complexity impacts on the regulatees’ ability to understand the regulation, and therefore 
engage with it. In the case of the CRC in particular, the complexities are viewed by regulatees as 
unnecessary, and, in their eyes, this undue complexity detracts from one of the CRC’s aims: to help 
reduce carbon emissions. This, in addition to the policy discussions seen in Chapter Four on stability, 
makes interviewees question the policy underlying the CRC. 
The complexities of the CRC are visible and are perceived by regulatees. Complexity therefore forms 
part of the visible package of the CRC and can affect how regulatees engage with the scheme. The 
next part of this chapter will consider how regulatory symbolism can potentially be used to embed the 
values of environmental protection and greener policy into the package of the CRC. My data suggests 
that if regulatees perceive the CRC to be green, they are potentially more willing to engage with, and 
go beyond compliance with the scheme. 
This chapter has considered the role of complexity and efficiency in terms of how the former can 
impact on the ability or desire for regulatee to engage with the CRC. The resources required to gain 
an understanding of the CRC have a negative impact on its productive efficiency (i.e. it is not regulation 
that operates at minimum cost; see also Pareto efficiency and the efficient distribution of resources). 
This, in turn, impacts on how participants engage with the CRC – creating a negative effect on the 
CRC’s outcome efficiency – as participants engage less with the CRC, and so potentially engage less 
with energy reduction. As discussed above, these complexities are perceived by regulatees. 
Regulatees can identify complexities and this affects how they perceive the CRC as a whole. Because 
of this, it is useful to consider regulatory symbolism and how the CRC has been packaged as a whole. 
Chapter Nine will bring together the themes of this thesis and explore the regulatory package of the 
CRC in more detail.  
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has shed light on one of the major environmental taxes in the United Kingdom. The CRC is 
an environmental tax that targets larger businesses and public-sector bodies and aims to reduce 
energy consumption (and, by proxy, carbon dioxide emissions) by placing a fixed charge on energy 
consumption. This fixed charge is generated by the requirement for participants to purchase and 
surrender one allowance per tonne of carbon dioxide emitted. What is interesting is the lack of 
literature to date on the CRC, and the little that does exist is lacking depth of analysis. This thesis plays 
a significant role, therefore, in plugging a gap in legal scholarship. Throughout this thesis, various 
aspects of the CRC have been explored including its complexity, reforms (very much in the plural), 
reputational elements, the regulator, and its incentives. The aim of this concluding chapter is to 
summarise and tie together the themes that have flowed throughout, in order to argue  that while 
each of the above aspects can affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the CRC in their own right, 
together (and with all other perceivable aspects not covered in this thesis), they form part of the 
regulatory package which shapes the perception of regulatees. How an environmental tax is packaged 
is therefore very important for regulatee engagement.  
The previous eight chapters have told the story of how the CRC has been communicated to its 
regulatees through various regulatory aspects. As such, there are a number of practical take away 
points for policy-makers. First, without some level of stability, regulatees get bored and disengage 
with regulation. Furthermore, in the case of the CRC, instability also conveys negative policy 
messages to regulatees about the government’s wider commitment to the environment. Chapter 5 
explored how the Environment Agency has been perceived by CRC regulatees. Interviewees in my 
study have questioned the competence of the EA, but attribute this to a lack of regulator resources. 
Policy-makers could consider the policy messages that a poorly-resourced regulator sends out to 
regulatees. Policy-makers could and should also consider the role that the reputation of regulatees 
can play alongside more traditional methods of regulation. Interviewees indicated that there could 
be a role for the use of social norm nudges to encourage further behavioural change. Positive 
incentives for behavioural change could also have benefitted the CRC. Most of these incentives (for 
instance tax hypothecation and green investment) could be construed as a demonstration, on the 
part of the government, of their commitment to the environment. As such, multi-modal approaches 
to regulation may have some benefit in using different types of carrots and sticks to achieve end 
goals (here, reduced energy consumption and reduced GHG emissions). The overriding narrative 
from the previous chapters is that the CRC is perceived as ‘just a tax’. A result of this is that the CRC 
211 
 
is perceived to be far too complex for purpose. My data suggests that a higher level of complexity 
could be tolerated had the CRC been perceived as something ‘more’. The data thus suggests a 
balancing between resources, aims, regulatory approaches and, ultimately, on whether and how 
regulatees have faith in the government doing things for the reasons they say they are doing them.  
My study on the CRC is based, in part, upon raw emissions data published by the Environment Agency 
in the CRC’s Annual Report Publications. Using quantitative methods, Chapter Three undertook a 
statistical analysis of the CRC data. Initially, descriptive statistics (averages) were presented to provide 
an initial view of how the raw emissions data had changed over the six years of reporting. These 
statistics all demonstrated a drop in emissions on a yearly basis with the exception of one year 
(2012/2013). By using t-tests and a repeated measures test, this thesis was able to look at the 
relationship between the emissions data for each year of the CRC. In so doing, it was possible to 
determine whether there had been a reduction in emissions under the scheme. Whilst this approach 
does not take into account other variables (such as changing business size through the acquisition or 
sale of assets), it was useful to start to paint a broader picture of the CRC and its effectiveness. These 
tests showed that the emissions under the CRC decreased, statistically significantly, on an annual basis 
for all but one of the years (2012/2013) since the CRC has come into force. As such, it is arguable that 
the CRC has had some effect in reducing emissions.1 
The content of this thesis also draws upon an original study of the CRC comprised of 31 semi-
structured interviews with: the regulator; participants of the CRC; solicitors; and, consultants. By 
combining the findings from both the qualitative and quantitative methods, this thesis is able to paint 
a broader picture of the CRC than one method alone. The themes that arose from the interview data 
influenced the themes raised in each chapter. As such, this thesis therefore represents the talking 
points for participants under the CRC.  
In short, regulatees are perceptive. They engage (and disengage) with the whole package of the 
scheme, and its regulatory backdrop. As such, how a piece of regulation is packaged to regulatees is 
important. This may seem somewhat self-evident, but it is only through the data offered up in this 
thesis that such self-evidence is grounded. Given the importance of regulate perception, it is useful 
to consider regulatory symbolism alongside the content of the regulatory package. Legislation can 
have symbolic qualities which convey values above and beyond the legislation itself. This chapter will 
consider how conveying environmental values through the CRC package could be beneficial for 
regulatee engagement. My data suggests that if regulatees perceive a positive underlying 
                                                          
1 In line with the government claim that the CRC has at least had some impact on emissions in: DECC, CRC 
Energy Efficiency Scheme Evaluation: Final Synthesis Report (July 2015), p9. 
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environmental goal behind aspects of regulation (for instance, stability, incentives and so forth), 
they appear to be more willing to engage with the regulation and go beyond compliance.  
In what follows, I unpack in further depth the regulatory package and its perception before turning 
to the literature on regulatory symbolism to consider how environmental values can be embedded 
and communicated to regulatees. My argument here is simple:  that by tailoring the regulatory 
package of the CRC, and other such schemes, policymakers can achieve a greater level of 
engagement from regulatees. The CRC will come to end in 2019 and will be replaced by the Climate 
Change Levy (CCL). Whilst this thesis focuses on the CRC journey, interviewees did talk about this 
future change and shift to the CCL. These opinions will be presented in this chapter with calls for 
future research. 
 
9.1 The Regulatory Package, Symbolism and the CRC 
 
9.1.1 The Regulatory Package of the CRC  
 
At the beginning of this project, I did not set out with a particular image of the CRC in mind. The 
journey through this thesis has painted a picture of the scheme in terms of its stability; its regulator; 
its incentives and drivers; and its complexity. By exploring these features of the CRC, this thesis has 
set out that various regulatory aspects of a scheme are perceivable by regulatees, and that this 
perception has the ability to alter how those regulatees engage with a scheme. Whilst this thesis has 
focussed on the strongest themes that have emerged from the interview data, I do not think that 
regulatee perceptions are limited to these particular features, but rather that all aspects of a 
regulatory scheme feed into its regulatory package. Or, how regulation is packaged to regulatees.  
From this regulatory package regulatees are able to draw meaning on the underlying environmental 
values (or lack thereof) that underpin environmental schemes. Reflecting on the different themes 
throughout this thesis, it becomes clearer that these features of the scheme feed into how regulatees 
have responded to the CRC. Since its introduction in 2009, the CRC was substantially reformed in 2013 
and has been “tinkered with” in smaller ways by an almost annual legislative change during its first 
phase (2010-2014). Chapter Four considered these changes in light of economic and regulatory 
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literature to argue that constant change is perceived negatively by regulatees, and that a stable front, 
or stable regulatory domain,2 needs to be presented to regulatees. 
The regulatory domain is the overall continuity of a regulatory regime and is coupled with regulatory 
dexterity, which represents change. Whilst dexterity is useful in remedying specific problems with a 
piece of regulation, this thesis argues that regulatory domain is extremely important for also 
portraying a stable policy which underlies the regulatory field. If regulatory dexterity, and therefore 
change, is the predominant image in participants’ minds, then this will have an adverse impact on the 
scheme’s credibility. This, in turn, leads to a negative change in participant behaviour and 
engagement. Overall, whilst there is a role for dexterity in regulation to alter and amend inefficient 
regulation, the number of changes under the CRC portrays a lack of consistent, green policy to 
participants of the CRC. Therefore, the government could present a more consistent and committed 
green policy in the form of more stable regulation in the energy reduction field. This stability will allow 
participants to engage and invest into the CRC (or indeed what comes to replace it) with confidence. 
In addition, the competence of the regulator can also feed into how the CRC has been perceived. 
Chapter Five questioned the ability of the Environment Agency to respond to regulatees and to have 
a meaningful dialogue with them about the scheme. This chapter relied on the scholarship of 
Kasperson et al,3 adopting a definition of trust that incorporates both elements of cognitive trust and 
social trust. Kasperson et al discussed four elements of trust which include: competence; caring (the 
demonstration of a caring attitude); predictability; and commitment. In particular, the issue of 
commitment was attributed by my respondents to wider policy considerations, rather than as a 
negative of the EA. Interviewees questioned the commitment of the government here to the CRC and 
to the EA. They spoke specifically of the limited resources of the EA in carrying out their role as 
regulator. It was suggested that by ring-fencing the revenues of the CRC and reinvesting them to 
bolster the resources of the EA, then this would strengthen the position of the EA as a regulator and 
potentially allow for an improved level of trust. 
The next two chapters (Chapter Five and Six) considered the various incentives provided or not 
provided by the CRC. How the CRC operated and tried to change behaviour was explicitly identified by 
regulatees, and how regulatees engaged with those incentives varied. Chapter Five demonstrated that 
there is an appetite amongst business for reputational drivers to further environmental goals. The 
interview data raised concerns surrounding the Performance League Table (PLT) and the publication 
                                                          
2 Elen Stokes, ‘Regulatory Domain and Regulatory Dexterity: Critiquing the UK Governance of ‘Fracking’’ (2016) 
79(6) MLR 961. 
3 Roger Kasperson, Dominic Golding and Seth Tuler, ‘Social Distrust as a Factor in Siting Hazardous Facilities 
and Communicating Risks’ (1992) 48(4) Journal of Social Issues 161. 
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of offences. For the former, interviewees were largely disappointed over the abolition of the PLT in 
the sense that a reputational element under the scheme had been lost. They also perceived the 
publication of offences to be too slow and not obvious enough to both participants and the public. 
This concept of reputation and the potential damage to reputation aligns with the concept of a social 
nudge.4 Nudges which rely on social norms are based on the idea that people care about what people 
think of them, and that they are seen to be doing the right thing. This sentiment, I argue, can be 
transferred to businesses as environmental decisions are generally taken by individuals. Moreover, 
businesses do care about their reputation – this is demonstrated by a large number displaying 
environmental achievements on websites and in buildings – and in being seen to be green. A social 
nudge harnesses the power of reputation to change behaviour. 
Chapter Six looked at how regulatees have engaged with the existing financial drivers under the CRC. 
Whilst discussing the costs of the CRC, interviewees also expressed a desire to see more positive 
incentives under the regime. This provides an opportunity for policymakers to tailor the incentives 
package that accompanies environmental schemes such as the CRC to improve regulatee engagement 
and commitment. In particular, interviewees raised the power of ring-fencing revenues for 
environmental projects to help them make the link between what they are paying and the 
environment. Ring-fencing the revenues (tax hypothecation for taxes) is problematic and is not a 
practice much adopted by government. It has the potential to confine and limit government spending 
on environmental projects and removes flexibility for the money to be used elsewhere. However, I 
would argue that some partial ring-fencing, or at least informing regulatees what the money is being 
spent on, could be beneficial for tax morale and so engagement with the scheme. The existing 
literature argues that taxpayers like to make a link between what they are paying and some benefit, 
and partially ring-fencing the revenues would provide this link to taxpayers. If tax hypothecation is 
politically unacceptable, then listing environmental projects that the CRC has helped to fund (i.e. a 
labelling exercise) could otherwise increase morale and engagement.  
Finally, the interviewees perceived the CRC to be unnecessarily complex for what it is trying to achieve. 
This unnecessary complexity also forms part of the regulatory package of the CRC. Chapter Eight 
highlighted three areas of complexity that were raised most frequently by interviewees: mechanical 
complexities (in integrating the CRC into the organisation); regulatory overlap (in the sense that there 
are a number of schemes in the UK which target large consumers of energy); and administrative 
burdens. When describing the complexity of the CRC, interviewees were particularly negative and 
                                                          




disdainful – with a number specifically labelling the complexity of the CRC as “unnecessary”. In 
particular, the complexity was seen as too high for an instrument that is now perceived by regulatees 
as just a tax. This would indicate that regulatees are willing to tolerate a level of complexity if this is 
backed up by an environmental aim. 
Throughout this thesis, it has become clear that at least some of the CRC’s regulatees would like to 
see a different regulatory package presented to them. Whether that is: more stability; a better-
resourced regulator; a different package of incentives (comprising of negative incentives, positive 
incentives and nudges); and/or, lower levels of complexity. Interviewees have drawn negative 
conclusions on the environmental aims of the CRC as a result of these features and there has been a 
lower level engagement with the CRC as a result. This thesis therefore calls for policymakers to think 
about how the regulation they introduce or amend sends deeper policy messages to regulatees. The 
concept of embedding values in legislation is not novel. Here, work on regulatory symbolism 
specifically argues that these values can be incorporated into regulation. This thesis will now draw 
upon this final pool of literature to argue that wider environmental messages can and should be built 
into regulatory schemes such as the CRC.  
 
9.1.2 The Regulatory Package and Regulatory Symbolism  
 
The themes raised by my interviewees point towards the fact that they would like to see something 
more than just a tax. Using the broad definition of regulation, which includes all forms of social 
influence,5 how the CRC is packaged is therefore important in terms of regulatory pluralism – i.e. the 
argument that the use of multiple regulatory instruments will always be better than the use of a single 
instrument.6 Gunningham argues:  
“This will allow the implementation of complementary combinations of 
instruments and participants tailored to meet the imperatives of specific 
environmental issues, and will result in a more flexible, efficient and effective 
                                                          
5 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice 
(2nd Edition) (OUP 2012), p2; Neil Gunningham, Environment Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting 
Architectures (2009) 21(2) JEL 179, 181. 




approach to environmental regulation than has so far been adopted in most 
circumstances.”7 (Emphasis added) 
Chapter Eight considered how the complexity of the CRC affects its efficiency. However, the bigger 
picture on how different elements of the scheme work together, or could work together, also has an 
impact on the scheme’s efficiency. Whilst regulatory pluralism often looks at the use of multiple 
instruments (i.e. multiple bits of regulation), I argue that combining multiple types of approach in one 
instrument (in this case the CRC) can also be better than one approach alone. By combining the tax, 
incentives, nudges, stable policy, and trust; the government is presenting regulatees with a multi-
modal package that comprises a number of social influences. Whilst alone, it is unlikely that these 
‘extras’ would work without being underpinned by the tax, the plurality of instruments allows “the 
state to steer not row”.8 What is meant by this, is that the broader package proposed in this thesis 
drives behaviour change with less intervention by the government – nudging, for example, could start 
a game of competition and/or collaboration between regulatees in which the government would not 
directly intervene. 
It should be acknowledged here that the blend of features highlighted in this thesis is obviously not 
the only possible combination, nor does this thesis cover all important aspects of a regulatory regime. 
What this thesis does highlight are key aspects of the CRC package that regulatees were not satisfied 
with and raised during interview. This thesis therefore forms a starting block for how regulation could 
be better packaged in regulatees’ eyes. A combination of tools and instruments is generally more 
efficient than a single instrument alone. This combination of features also forms part of a regulatory 
package that is perceptible. As well as efficiency, the makeup of this package can also send symbolic 
signals to regulatees. 
The remainder of this chapter will draw together the themes of this thesis alongside regulatory 
symbolism literature, in order to argue that how the CRC has been packaged to regulatees has had an 
important impact on how the CRC has been perceived by regulatees; and, perhaps more importantly, 
how the CRC has been approached. This chapter will conclude by arguing that the CRC needs to be 
packaged as simply as possible; with a competent administrator; incentives to drive engagement 
beyond compliance; and a stable policy backdrop which demonstrates the motives of government 
which underlie the CRC. On a deeper level, the CRC needs to embody a commitment to the 
environment; a higher symbol which can be drawn from the scheme itself.  
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid, 208. 
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In literature, a law is considered symbolic if its primary purpose is to function as a symbol.9 That is to 
say that the law has another meaning beyond its literal meaning; which is generally more general and 
indeterminate than its literal meaning.10 A symbol refers to a “body of social values, knowledge and 
practices which offer guidance for interpreting, processing and coping with specific issues or 
situations”.11 Also referred to as ‘symbolic politics’, it is a term which criticises both the insufficiency 
of policies and those who create them.12 In summary, a symbolic piece of legislation is an ineffective 
one: 
“The enactment of symbolic legislation reflects a breakdown of the legislative 
policymaking machinery, a system that all too frequently addresses real social 
problems in an unrealistic fashion. It also creates a dilemma for regulators and 
judges. While they generally are reluctant to usurp the legislature's 
policymaking prerogatives by substituting their own version of appropriate 
public policy, they also are loath to implement and enforce a statute whose costs 
are grossly disproportionate to its benefits.”13 
Symbolic legislation often has ambitious intentions and goals, but is said by some to be designed to 
be ineffective in practice – and, as such, is unable to attain these ambitious aims.14  The antonyms for 
symbolic legislation have been described as ‘serious’ and ‘functional’ legislation;15 and, ‘substantive’ 
and ‘strong’ legislation.16  
The traditional symbolic politics approach regards almost all laws to be “primarily symbolic”.17 Indeed, 
Newig argues that “all legislation is symbolic (to a certain extent), and that almost all symbolic laws 
are also effective”.18 It is important to contrast partly symbolic laws with those that are ‘merely 
                                                          
9 Bart van Klink, ‘Symbolic Legislation: An Essentially Political Concept’ in Bart van Klink, Britta van Beers and 
Lonneke Port (Eds), Symbolic Legislation Theory and Developments in Biolaw (Springer 2016). 
10 Ibid, 21. 
11 Ingolfur Blühdorn, ‘Sustaining the Unsustainable: Symbolic Politics and the Politics of Simulation’ (2007) 
16(2) Environmental Politics 251, 255. 
12 Ibid, 252. 
13 John Dwyer, ‘The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation’ (1990) 17 Ecology LQ 233, 234; see also: Ian Bache et al., 
‘Symbolic Meta-Policy: (Not) Tackling Climate Change in the Transport Sector (2015) 63 Political Studies 830, 
847. 
14 Jens Newig, ‘Symbolic Environmental Legislation and Societal Self-Deception’ (2007) 16(22) Environmental 
Politics 276, 277. 
15 Dwyer (n 13). 
16 W Witteveen, ‘Significant, symbolic and symphonic laws’, in Hanneke van Schooten (ed.), Semiotics and 
Legislation. Jurisprudential, Institutional and Sociological Perspectives (Charles 1999); Newig (n 14), 277. 
17 Newig (n 14), 277. 
18 Ibid, 278. 
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symbolic’. These ‘merely symbolic’ laws are ineffective, nearly impossible to enforce,19 and place the 
regulatory burden on the agencies that enforce them, creating a regulatory distortion.20 ‘Merely 
symbolic’ laws are known to be ineffective from the outset by the legislature.21 This is what 
distinguishes merely symbolic legislation from legislation that proves later to be ineffective.22 Symbolic 
laws are often introduced to tackle environmental problems, which have high stakes, and often 
require rapid responses by the legislature.23 Indeed, symbolic legislation is a “real and present danger” 
for climate change regulation as public concern on the subject is mounting.24 However, Bowen argues 
that some level of “symbolic greening” is to be expected from policy-makers – and indeed, this 
symbolic greening forms part of their role as they focus on deliberate “political strategies”.25 
The CRC is not a piece of symbolic legislation in the pure sense. It is, on some level, effective. CRC R1 
discussed the drop-in emissions that have been seen following the introduction of the CRC. This would 
appear to correspond with the statistical findings of this thesis in Chapter Three. As set out above (and 
found in Chapter 8 in more detail), paired t-tests for each year of the CRC showed (with significance) 
that there had been a drop in emissions under the scheme in all but one year of the scheme. This 
result was echoed in the repeated measures test. Whilst this statistical analysis is only indicative, and 
does not take into account the wide range of variables that could also account for this drop, it would 
appear to indicate that the CRC has been at least partly effective. What the interview data has 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, however, is a desire by regulatees to see ‘more’ from the CRC. 
When considering stability, interviewees perceived instability as a physical manifestation of the policy 
underlying the regulation. In the case of the CRC, this was felt to be a demonstration of a lack of 
commitment on the part of the government to the environment. In terms of trust, the interviewees 
perceived the regulator to lack competence. The Environment Agency, here, is not perceived to an 
authority, but, this is tied by interviewees to the resources the Environment Agency has been allocated 
by government. In terms of nudges, interviewees expressed a desire to see some form of reputational 
element in the scheme; with incentives, this was echoed with a desire for positive incentives. The 
                                                          
19 Van Klink (n 9).  
20 Dwyer (n 13), 283-284. 
21 Ibid, 248-249. 
22 Newig (n 14), 278-279. 
23 Robert Lee and Elen Stokes, ‘Material Uncertainty: Nanomaterials, Regulation and Symbolic Legislation’ in 
Bart van Klink, Britta van Beers and Lonneke Port (Eds), Symbolic Legislation Theory and Developments in 
Biolaw (Springer 2016), 241; Sander Happaerts, ‘Sustainable Development and Subnational Governments: 
Going Beyond Symbolic Politics?’ (2012) 4 Environmental Development 2, 4; Loren Cass, ‘The Symbolism of 
Environmental Policy: Foreign Policy Commitments as Signaling Tools in Paul Harris (ed) Environmental Change 
and Foreign Policy (Routledge 2009), Chapter 3. 
24 Clive Splash, ‘The Brave New World of Carbon Trading’ (2010) 15(2) New Political Economy 169, 187. 
25 Frances Bowen, After Greenwashing: Symbolic Corporate Environmentalism and Society (CUP 2014), p246. 
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absence of both nudges and incentives was blamed on the government; and led interviewees to 
consider the CRC as just a tax. Considered above, the complexity of the CRC was considered to be too 
high for what the CRC was trying to achieve. 
As such, the intentions behind the CRC, and the motives of the government are important for the 
effectiveness of the scheme.  However, regulatees read and lift these intentions and motives from the 
scheme itself. A stable scheme demonstrates stable policy. Incentives demonstrate a commitment to 
behavioural change. In this sense, the CRC needs to take on a symbolic meaning which goes beyond 
the scheme in its literal sense, and embodies its greener aim: a commitment to the environment and 
the reduction of carbon emissions. This approach can be loosely found within the symbolic legislation 
literature, as non-symbolic legislation can have symbolic qualities: 
“Conversely, non-symbolic legislation commonly has ‘symbolic’ qualities. This 
apparent paradox can be resolved by separately considering an issue-related 
substantive and a political-strategic dimension of legislation.6 The former refers 
to a manifest, explicit end which the legislative act serves as a means. This end 
is in the first place legal effectiveness, but ultimately to change certain real-
world (e.g. ecological) conditions.”26 
In addition, symbols have been argued to be necessary for politics,27 and as such, symbolic legislation 
can have positive effects.28 A symbol, could for example, express “collectivism and a shared 
intention”.29 Blühdorn highlights other positives of symbolic legislation including: 1) a tool of ‘political 
integration and mobilisation’; and, 2) a strategy for complexity reduction.30 Van Klink discusses the 
difference between negative and positive symbolism – here, symbolism can form a communicative 
approach with regulatees: 
“According to this communicative or interactive approach, a law can be called 
‘symbolic’ in a positive sense, if a law has acquired an extraordinary meaning 
within the legal and political community. The law is not merely a set of rules, but 
also a symbol for something higher, more valuable. It gives expression to values 
which are fundamental for the community, for example human dignity, equality 
or environmental protection.”31 
                                                          
26 Newig (n 14), 279. 
27 Blühdorn (n 11), 254. 
28 Newig (n 14), 278. 
29 Lee and Stokes (n 23), 238. 
30 Blühdorn (n 11), 255. 
31 Van Klink (n 9), 24. 
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It is possible for climate change, therefore, to form the basis for something ‘more valuable’ than is 
embodied by the CRC. This commitment needs to be seen from the offset, at the design stage of a 
piece of regulation, in order for the scheme to embody the important features highlighted throughout 
this thesis. For the CRC, it needs to be packaged as simply as possible; with a competent administrator; 
incentives to drive engagement beyond compliance; and a stable policy backdrop which demonstrates 
the motives of government which underlie the CRC. 
To conclude, the CRC is not a symbolic piece of legislation in the ‘merely symbolic sense’, despite its 
perceived lack of effectiveness and inefficiencies by those regulated by the CRC. However, the CRC 
needs to symbolise energy efficiency and environmental goals, as well as being a tax per se.  
 
9.1.7 How regulation is perceived by regulatees forms part of the regulatory package  
 
The themes running through this thesis are all visible traits and features of the CRC that are capable 
of being perceived by regulatees. These traits and features form part of the regulatory package for the 
CRC. As such, regulatees are capable of drawing deeper meanings from the different aspects of the 
scheme, and more specifically, identify an environmental commitment (or lack thereof). 
Legislation that is introduced to be ‘merely symbolic’ is largely ineffective regulation. It would appear, 
from the statistical analysis in Chapter Three and the regulator’s comments, that the CRC has been 
effective on some level at reducing energy consumption and carbon emissions. However, the fact that 
the CRC is not a symbolic piece of legislation in the ‘merely symbolic’ sense, does not stop it from 
retaining (or introducing) some symbolic properties. In this sense, a piece of legislation could 
symbolise public concerns and values whilst still being an effective piece of legislation. The 
interviewees have made it clear throughout this thesis that they are concerned with the government’s 
commitment to environmental values.  
Despite David Cameron’s and Theresa May’s assertions that they are a green government, 
interviewees have not perceived the CRC to be an instrument with underlying environmental values. 
Interviewees have labelled the CRC as just a tax. How policy maker’s package regulation could be 
important in terms of embedding these values and communicating these values to regulatees. 
Interviewees have expressed a level of disengagement with an environmental tax that does not 
embody these values, and so policy makers can potentially increase this engagement by how they 
package environmental regulation in the future.  
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9.2 Concluding remarks 
 
Whilst the CRC has now been abolished, this thesis contains wider regulatory lessons to be considered 
by policy makers. The CRC has had a relatively turbulent life as part of the UK’s regulatory response to 
climate change, and has been criticised by participants and the government alike. Despite this 
criticism, it is encouraging to see some positive views towards the CRC. The constructive comments 
and criticism seen during interviews demonstrate that businesses are willing to engage in an 
environmental tax or scheme aimed at reducing carbon emissions. This thesis tells the story of how 
the CRC has evolved over time, and how the changes to the scheme have been perceived by 
regulatees. It tells a tale of a scheme introduced with the best of intentions but which was complex to 
implement. As such, the CRC has been simplified, but this may have been at the expense of the 
message it is trying to convey: to reduce carbon emissions. What we are left with towards the end of 
its life is a scheme that is perceived as just a tax. In its current form it is unlikely that too many people 
will be sad to see it go.  
 
9.2.1 The future of the CRC 
 
The CRC will end in 2019, but this is not the end of the story. Following the abolition of the CRC, a new 
tax will take its place: the CCL. By way of reminder, the CCL is a levy on energy supply which targets 
businesses. It is levied by the energy supplier and therefore is added to the energy bill. All but three 
interviewees raised the CCL at some point during their interview. Views on the shift to the CCL were 
mixed amongst interviewees, with some being grateful for the reduction in administrative burdens: 
“If that’s all it is, is just a tax and it’s just moving from one scheme to the other, 
but financially it adds up to the same thing; I think it’s going to make very little 
change other than it’s going to free up some of my time so I can actually do some 
proper energy efficiency work.” (CRC P4) 
“Yeah, certainly I think if it was bundled up into the Climate Change Levy then it 
would be a lot easier for everybody involved.” (CRC P6) 
“I think that’s a sensible change. I think – the devil is always in the detail of 
course and quite how they do it remains to be seen. But I think that putting a 
straight line charge on electricity and gas consumption makes practical sense. 
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Administratively it is much easier, which will free up resource for the 
Environment Agency. And it is much easier for the people who actually pay it to 
be in control of what they pay because you reduce your energy consumption 
you directly reduce what you pay.” (CRC S6) 
Interviewees talk about simplifying their tax obligations and removing administrative burdens that 
exist under the CRC and which they perceive will no longer exist under the CCL.32 This corresponds 
with the government’s desire to streamline the business energy tax landscape,33 and also with the fact 
that the CRC was considered to be too complex as ‘just a tax’:  
“it is a shame it [the CRC] hasn’t achieved as much as we would like because 
the minute we started talking about it as a tax people were saying: ‘oh well 
why don’t they just stick it on the bill as a straightforward tax and then we 
don’t have to worry about all this energy management stuff’. So, that was the 
moment in which it started to lose its impact as a good thing to do.” (CRC M9)  
The fact that the CRC has been perceived as an overly complex tax has therefore perhaps paved the 
way for the CCL to take its place – which is a more straightforward tax on an energy bill. How the CCL 
is being perceived by interviewees therefore needs to be framed in light of their negative perceptions 
of the CRC. In addition, CRC M9 argued that the CCL is perceived more favourably than the CRC 
because of the possibility of tax relief under a Climate Change Agreement: 
“The difference is that all of the participants wanted the CCAs because they 
were going to get cash back from them. The CCL relief. So, as a result, they 
wanted them and I think that is the biggest single factor here between the 
reputation of the CRC and the CCAs/ CCL. The CRC was just seen as something 
we don’t want and so we are going to moan about it, whereas CCAs we will 
support as there is a financial benefit to it.” (CRC M9) 
The role of incentives under the CRC was considered in Chapter Seven, where it was outlined that the 
CRC has no visible positive incentives. Further research into how the CCL has been perceived by CCL 
participants is needed before conclusions on the CCL can be drawn. It is possible that the opinions on 
the CCL outlined above are tainted/ biased by interviewees’ experience and perceptions of the CRC. 
                                                          
32 This echoes with the DECC study on the CRC; DECC (n 1), p42. 
33 See 2015 Consultation on Reforming the Business Energy Landscape: HM Treasury, ‘Reforming the Business 
Energy Efficiency Tax Landscape’ (September 2015). 
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Comparatively, the CRC has no visible incentives as seen with the CCAs and is, at least in the eyes of 
interviewees, more complex than the CCL. 
I can draw, however, a couple of initial observations on potential obstacles that the CCL will face. First, 
the shift away from the CRC to the CCL is the final change that the CRC will see. Much in the same way 
that the constant changes to the CRC were perceived as a negative thing by interviewees, there is a 
danger that the abolition of the CRC will also be perceived negatively. Policymakers should ensure that 
the CCL does not become the “political football” that the CRC was (CRC M9). 
Second, a number of interviewees questioned the ability of the CCL to change behaviour. In particular, 
the regulator highlighted the loss in visibility that the CCL would bring:34 
“Largely because the people who matter -the Finance Directors - they don’t see 
CCL. It’s integrated into the fuel bill so they don’t actually see it. They won’t see 
– unless they actually look at the fuel bill itself they don’t see it as a CCL. What 
they get is, this is your energy cost. The CRC they get, this is your energy cost 
and this is your CRC bill, you’ve got to sign separately and that’s the key thing, 
that’s the key difference. CCL doesn’t do that.” (CRC R1) 
This was echoed by participants: 
“I think there’s more of a chance of it [the CRC] actually doing something like 
that, than like the climate change levy and all those which are just sort of tagged 
on to the…you know, and there’s lots of things that just go onto the bill, and just 
people just saying well, that’s another cost…” (CRC P7) 
There is therefore a balance to be struck between the administrative burdens of the CRC (and lack of 
burdens for the CCL) and the visibility of the cost and scheme to organisations (the CRC provides a 
higher amount of visibility than the CCL). If anything, this thesis raises a potential missed opportunity 
for the government in terms of the CRC, but also the potential opportunity to learn from the mistakes 
made with the CRC going forward to the CCL. 
 
 
                                                          
34 See also: DECC (n 1), p42.  
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9.3 Calls for future research 
 
More widely, this thesis has demonstrated that there is still a long way to go before policymakers 
design regulation that is fully engaged with by regulatees. The CRC has been a case study to show 
why it is still important to better understand how regulatees respond to different aspects of 
regulation. It would be useful, therefore, for further research to explore regulatees’ motivations and 
what ‘regulatory package’ should be presented to regulatees to encourage engagement and 
behavioural change. This greater understanding would enable policymakers to combine a more 
optimal mix of measures alongside environmental taxation; in order to engage regulatees to change 
their environmentally harmful behaviour, whilst retaining some level of revenue stream from such 
taxes. Further research into nudging businesses and the use of a wider range of incentives would be 
useful in this regard. It is particularly important that we understand the way in which regulatees 
interact with green taxes. If lessons can be taken away from the CRC and brought to the CCL, then a 
more positive engagement with environmental taxation could be achieved.  
As this thesis has focused on the CRC and has not covered the CCL in any depth, this naturally opens 
the door to future research in this field. As the environmental tax that will replace the CRC, further 
empirical research on how regulatees have reacted to the CCL would be timely and would help to 
paint a fuller picture on how lessons from the CRC could be brought forward after its abolition. This 
additional research, drawing on the themes and findings in this thesis, would help inform policy 
makers on how better to present the CCL to achieve environmental aims and would therefore be 
useful for informing a policy change. This thesis has begun to tell the story of the CRC Energy 
Efficiency Scheme from regulatees’ point of view. It is now time to broaden the scope of this 
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APPENDIX 7 – FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST NR6994 
 
Civil Penalties issued and published  (March 2016)      
Non-Compliance: Phase CRC Reg. No. Name of organisation Amount Published Status 
Footprint Report 1 CRC4704005 Saur Services (Glasgow) Limited £20,500 2012 Paid 
Annual Report 1 CRC4704005 Saur Services (Glasgow) Limited £20,500 2012 Paid 
Footprint Report 1 CRC5959337 Henkel Limited £19,000 2012 Paid 
Annual Report 1 CRC5959337 Henkel Limited £19,000 2012 Paid 
Footprint Report 1 CRC6892135 Criterion Capital Limited £25,000 2012 Paid 
NR6994 CRC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS  
   Number of Notices issued 
Non-Compliance: Phase Compliance year Enforcement Notice Notice of Intent 
Failure to submit an annual report 1 2011-12 0 3 
   2012-13 0 1 
   2013-14 0 7 
TOTAL FOR PHASE 1     0 11 
         
Failure to surrender allowances   2011-12 135   
   2012-13 37   
   2013-14 267 11 
TOTAL FOR PHASE 1     439 11 
PHASE 2         
Failure to register by the registration deadline 2   7 6 
Failure to submit an annual report   2014-15 0 8 
Failure to surrender allowances   2014-15 124 3 
TOTAL FOR PHASE 2 to MARCH 2016     131 17 
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SPTS Technologies UK Limited (formally SPP Process 
Technology Systems Limited) £5,000 2012 Paid 
Footprint Report 1 CRC7010111 BI Group PLC £5,000 2012 Paid 
Annual Report 1 CRC7010111 BI Group PLC £5,000 2012 Paid 
Footprint Report 1 CRC2351236 Rocco Forte and Family Limited £5,000 2012 Paid 
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Footprint Report 1 CRC5476594 Tomkins PLC £5,000 2012 Paid 
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Annual report 1 CRC0939753 Aptuit (Glasgow) Limited £3,500 2013 Paid 
Annual report 1 CRC0428280 Harbour Exchange Management Company Limited £179,952 2013 Paid 
Annual report 1 CRC6878507 Mansfield College £2,500 2013 Paid 
Annual Report 1 CRC8772457 
RB Investments/ PSC Nominee 1 Ltd (Paig 
Investments) £4,740 2015 Paid 
Annual Report 1 CRC20173788 Geraud (UK) Limited £5,000 2015 Paid 
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Pentair SSC UK Limited (formerly Pentair Flow 
Control (UK) Limited) £13,500 2015 Paid 
Failure to Register 2 CRC0718856 Poundworld Retail Limited £45,000 2015 Paid 
Annual Report 1 CRC 9911785 The Planning Inspectorate £2,850 2015 Paid 
Inaccurate Report 1 CRC1502651 Merkur Casino UK Ltd £3,466 2015 Paid 
Inaccurate Report 
 
1  CRC4781854 
Stobart Transport and Distribution Limited (formerly 
Stobart Holdings Limited) £2,957 2015 Paid 
 
 
 
 
 
